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This thesis is a literary critical investigation into the strategies of self-definition at work in the 
autobiographical fiction of J.M. Coetzee. My focus falls on those of his novels that have a more-or-
less explicit autobiographical resonance (Boyhood, Youth, Elizabeth Costello, Diary of a Bad Year, 
Summertime), with supplementary forays into two additional books (Age of Iron and The Childhood 
of Jesus). My argument centres on the observation that Coetzee’s work derives its affective force 
from the conflict he stages, time and again, between the desire for a transcendent sense of being, 
Romantic in origin, and the realization that being derives its co-ordinates from the discursive 
formations – ideological, socio-historical, philosophical, linguistic – that provide the structure of 
meaning for self-expression in writing. 
I introduce my argument by situating Coetzee’s work according to a poststructuralist critical 
framework that emphasizes his strategies of subjective displacement. Our reading of his work, I 
then suggest, might benefit from a more considered evaluation of the persistent influence of a 
Romantic ideal concerning the primacy of subjective experience. In the first chapter I explore the 
conceptual tension that derives from these contrasting points of view by considering Coetzee's 
engagement with the tradition of confessional writing, arguing that he foregrounds the textual 
subject as the locus in which the truth of the self is to be sought. The second chapter examines the 
central role of the Karoo farm in the formation of the autobiographical subject in Coetzee's writing, 
and links it to a Romantic model of identification between the self and nature. In the third chapter I 
argue that Coetzee's awareness of socio-political realities inhibits the Romantic yearning for an 
authentic sense of self, even while he reformulates the idea of authentic voice as the expression of a 
politically and historically compromised subjectivity. Finally, in the last chapter I turn my attention 
to the authorial imprint that derives from the consistency of Coetzee's depiction of conflict between 
transcendent and contextual realities, and conclude by tracing the afterlife of this dynamic in his 
most recent novel, The Childhood of Jesus. 
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VATIC SPEAKING AND THE QUESTION OF AUTHORITY 
 
1. The Return of the Author 
 
In the first part of J.M. Coetzee's Diary of a Bad Year – the part containing the so-called “Strong 
Opinions” – in a section entitled “On authority in fiction”, JC, the author-protagonist, makes a 
pronouncement that strikes the reader as somewhat disingenuous. “Announcements of the death of 
the author and of authorship made by Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault a quarter of a century 
ago,” he says, “came down to the claim that the authority of the author has never amounted to 
anything more than a bagful of rhetorical tricks” (Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 149). By situating 
these claims about the death of the author squarely in a historical context (“a quarter of a century 
ago”), JC appears to be suggesting that their time has passed. That this is indeed his opinion is 
confirmed when he carries on: “Now that the dust has settled, the mystery of Tolstoy's authority, 
and of the authority of the other great writers, remains untouched” (150). Despite the best efforts of 
the poststructuralists (and before them the Russian formalists) to expose the figure of the author as a 
myth, the masters of realism have emerged with their authority intact, and JC continues to read 
them with “shamefaced absorption” (150). 
 
This is an unusual sentiment to emerge from the pages of a writer who is so clearly indebted to the 
intellectual tradition that is being discredited here. Ever since the appearance in the late 1980s of the 
first book-length study of Coetzee's fiction (Teresa Dovey's The Novels of J.M. Coetzee: Lacanian 
Allegories), the prevailing opinion among critics has been that Coetzee is, in the first place, an 
author who is finely attuned to the metafictional aspects of writing. Dovey sets the tone when she 
argues that the novels should be read as deliberate theoretical interventions into the novelistic 




her reading she pays particular attention to Coetzee's “self-deconstructive mode of writing” (49) and 
argues that it prevents him from falling into the trap of “a false and falsifying gesture of mastery,” 
thus protecting the text itself “from a diagnosis that should be directed at the system in which the 
textual subject is constituted”. Dovey’s insistence on the diagnostic value of Coetzee’s writing – her 
recognition that a substantial part of its meaning lies in exposing the ideological fault lines that run 
through traditional forms of novelistic discourse, and her belief that this salutary effect goes hand-
in-hand with the self-effacement of the author-subject in his writing – inaugurates a long-lasting and 





Dovey’s approbation of the poststructuralist elements in Coetzee’s writing – her insistence that its 
metafictional complexity is exactly where its value lies – announced itself against the grain of what 
David Attwell has called the “materialist” reading of Coetzee's work: a critical approach, fairly 
common in the 1980s,
2
 that took issue with Coetzee’s “privileging of metaphysics and individual 
consciousness over historical forces” (Review 518) and agitated for a more committed stance on the 
part of the author against the specific ills that afflicted South Africa during the apartheid years. The 
tenor of these criticisms, writes Dovey, was that Coetzee had not gone far enough “in deploring the 
system, in delineating the historical and economic bases of oppression, or in projecting the ultimate 
triumph of the oppressed peoples of South Africa” (The Novels of J.M. Coetzee 52). One of the 
                                                 
1
 Dovey’s method of reading Coetzee from a broadly poststructuralist (and narrowly Lacanian) perspective is not 
without its drawbacks. As David Attwell points out in an early review of her book: “What this study does – and this 
is acknowledged when the mode is described as ‘criticism-as-pastiche’ – … is to show how Coetzee’s fiction 
replicates the arguments of poststructuralism. This is either a form of propaganda for poststructuralism, or a form of 
reassurance to those who dislike being on the periphery” (Review 518). What Attwell calls for instead is a critical 
framework that shows how “the categories of structuralism and poststructuralism are recharged, perhaps even 
challenged, in and by Coetzee, by being brought into relationship with a new and problematic discursive and 
historical context” (519). It is a task that Attwell took upon himself, and achieved convincingly, in his own book, 
J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing (1993). More recently, in Countervoices (2009), Carrol 
Clarkson has taken up the challenge of analysing Coetzee’s active contribution to poststructuralist questions 
surrounding the position (or the non-position) of the subject in language. 
2
 According to Attwell, the material criticism of Coetzee's work was especially prevalent after the publication of Life 
& Times of Michael K (1983), a novel whose “unnatural, almost inhuman” protagonist (quoted from Z.N., African 
Communist 103), and the determinedly anti-political stance he appeared to represent, incensed a number of socially-




emblematic instances of such an approach is Nadine Gordimer’s 1984 review of Life & Times of 
Michael K, in which she argues that the self-consciously allegorical mode of the novel detracts from 
what is most important about it, namely its depiction, through the ordeals of Michael K, of a 
struggle that is shared by “hundreds of thousands of black South Africans” (“The Idea of 
Gardening”). While Gordimer is satisfied that the “truth and meaning of what white has done to 
black stands out on every page,” she is nevertheless troubled by the impression that the elusive 
authorial stance Coetzee achieves in the novel is a betrayal of the “the integral relation between 
private and social destiny … more than is allowed for by the subjectivity that is in every writer.” 
Gordimer is critical of precisely that which Dovey celebrates: the refusal of the author to respond in 
his own voice, from a clearly demarcated subject position, to the distortions of power he depicts so 
incisively in his work. Thus, even while they may have disagreed vehemently on the relative merits 
of his style,
3
 critics from both camps were eager to identify Coetzee's indebtedness to a theoretical 
tradition that goes out of its way to foreground the structural contingency of the author-subject, and 
that draws attention to the unstable discursive grounds on which that subject bases his or her 
authority. 
 
In recent years, the tendency among critics to recognize and applaud Coetzee’s metafictional 
approach has evolved into a more refined position concerning the ethical importance of his work.
4
 
Mike Marais, for example, argues in his book, Secretary of the Invisible: The Idea of Hospitality in 
the Fiction of J.M. Coetzee (2009), that Coetzee’s methods of self-negation can be read as an 
existential move, one that is motivated by the desire to realize an ethics of “otherness”. So, in 
Disgrace (the argument goes) David Lurie must learn to overcome his entrenched sense of self in 
order to experience the fundamental (and fundamentally other) reality of those around him: a “self-
                                                 
3
 In J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing, David Attwell notes Michael Chapman’s strongly worded 
indictment of Coetzee’s style as “a kind of masturbatory release, in this country, for the Europeanizing dreams of an 
intellectual coterie” (South Africa and the Politics of Writing 127; quoted from Chapman, Review 335). 
4
 It is worth noting that, since the publication of Dovey’s book in the late 1980s, the critical industry around Coetzee's 
work has grown at an astonishing rate. In his recent biography of Coetzee, J.M. Coetzee: A Life in Writing (2012), 
John Kannemeyer notes that “[a]bout 500 M.A. and doctoral dissertations on his work have been completed while 




effacing form of identification” that aims to bring an end to the cyclical violence that characterizes 
historical progress in Coetzee’s writing (Marais, Secretary of the Invisible 161).
5
 What emerges 
strongly from Marais's work is a sense of Coetzee as an author who refrains from asserting his own 
subjective will on the fiction he produces. It is this recognition, namely a recognition of Coetzee as 
a writer who self-consciously abstains from imposing authorial meaning and provokes the reader 
into a confrontation with his or her own methods of signification instead, that marks the common 
ground between those readers who have been sceptical about Coetzee's political non-affiliation and 
those who have argued for the ethical importance of his methods. Coetzee’s refusal to assume a 
position of authority in relation to his work – a refusal that reveals a marked debt to 
poststructuralism
6
 – has arguably become one of the defining characteristics of his reception in the 
critical community over the years. 
 
How, then, do we account for JC’s disavowal, in Diary of a Bad Year, of those metafictional 
techniques that have proven to be such a productive method for both Coetzee and his critics (and of 
which JC himself is a product)? Has Coetzee decided, at this late stage in his career, to pay mind to 
Gordimer's warning that the gap he has been sustaining so fastidiously between his private and his 
public self is a betrayal of “the subjectivity that is in every writer” (Gordimer, “The Idea of 
Gardening”)? Has he left behind his patrician abode in the smoke-and-mirrors country of 
postmodernism to announce, finally, that he is ready to speak in his own voice? Can we understand 
JC's “rejection of the Barthesian credo” as an “abjuration on Coetzee's part,” as David Attwell 
suggests (“Mastering authority” 220) – a signal of a growing fatigue with the “anguish of self-
division, a longing that the separate spheres might be brought together” (218)? 
 
                                                 
5
 I take up this point again in chapter three. See section 4 – “The Sympathetic Imagination”. 
6
 In Secretary of the Invisible, Mike Marais refers extensively to the work of Derrida, Levinas and Blanchot to 
elucidate his argument concerning Coetzee's literary-aesthetic confrontations with alterity. The theme of hospitality 
– of hosting, in writing, that which exceeds the limits of representation, or of giving a form of purchase to the 
irreducible other that arrives from beyond the “visible” realm of history (Secretary of the Invisible xiii) – is of 




It is among these questions that I would like to situate my own contribution to Coetzee scholarship. 
Alongside the well-established critical approach that concerns itself with Coetzee's metafictional 
strategies of displacement, and that argues for the ethical importance of those strategies – a history 
in which JC's (and arguably Coetzee's) enthusiastic celebration of the authority of the great masters 
(“Slava, Fyodor Michailovich! May your name resound forever in the halls of fame!” he writes in 
Diary of a Bad Year, 226) sits rather incongruously – I want to argue that there is (and has been) in 
Coetzee's work a much more considered awareness of the persistence of an authorial self than he is 
usually given credit for. Accordingly, the general aim of my thesis is to extend the reach of our 
critical awareness of Coetzee by paying sustained attention to that which Derek Attridge refers to, in 
his introduction to Inner Workings, as “gleams of transcendence in Coetzee's novels” (Introduction 
xiv): the sense one has of an outré, extra-textual, subjective reality that occasionally breaks through 
the careful architecture of his writing. My argument sets out from the impression that the tenacity of 
the author-subject in Coetzee’s work – that which stakes its claim in opposition to the 
poststructuralist notion that the self-in-writing is purely a matter of textual or ideological 
contingency – has its roots in the Romantic heritage, and particularly in the Romantic belief that the 
reality of one's subjective experience forms the basis for what constitutes value in literary 
expression. Coetzee's notable predecessor in this regard is Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose influence 
is perhaps stronger than one would infer from the critical view of his confessional project Coetzee 
expresses in his well-known essay, “Confession and Double Thoughts”, and in his inaugural 
professorial lecture, “Truth in Autobiography”
7
. A more diffuse presence is the figure of 
Wordsworth, whose devotion to subjective experience as a source of authority in writing has 




My thesis traces the various ways in which Coetzee has woven these Romantic ideas concerning the 
                                                 
7
 Rousseau, and more precisely the question of Coetzee’s engagement with his Confessions, features prominently in 
chapter one (“The Subject of Confession”). 
8
 I discuss Wordsworth’s influence on Coetzee in some detail in chapter two (see especially section 2 – 




importance of subjective experience into the fabric of his fiction. The poststructuralist praxis of 
writing that defines Coetzee’s ongoing oeuvre, and that informs much of the criticism around his 
work, is marked, or altered by the equally strong insistence of longings and desires that cannot 
easily be accounted for in the language of metafictional device, and that calls for a more nuanced 
consideration of the persistence of subjective concerns (or of the continued presence of an author-
subject) in his work. I do not mean to suggest that Coetzee has been a closet Romantic all along; but 
rather that the strategies of deferral we have grown accustomed to noticing in his writing gain their 
profoundly affective power from the extent to which they hinge on a constant yearning for what has 
been left behind, namely a unified, discoverable sense of self. Coetzee’s novels derive their 
meaning chiefly from the conflict he stages, time and again, between the mediated nature of 
experience – the self-in-writing as a linguistic and ideological construct – and the intimation of a 
subjective truth that needs to be told – the sustained belief in the intrinsic value of subjective 
experience that frequently bubbles up through the surface of his prose. My thesis is devoted to 
exploring the centripetal force of the conflict that arises between these two opposing notions of the 
self in Coetzee’s literary project, and to demonstrating its usefulness as a conceptual framework for 
making sense of the powerful effects of his writing. 
 
First, however, it is necessary to substantiate some of the claims I have been making so far 
concerning Coetzee’s indebtedness to poststructuralism. I would like to do so by investigating his 
engagement with the thought and writing of Roland Barthes more carefully.
9
 What is at stake in 
Coetzee’s investment in the intellectual heritage of poststructuralism? And what does it mean to 
speak, in such a milieu, about the re-emergence of the author-subject? Is it feasible to conceive of 
Coetzee as a writer who occupies a kind of fold between poststructuralist and Romantic ideas of 
                                                 
9
 In an early interview with Stephen Watson (1978), Coetzee has the following to say about Barthes: “I have the 
greatest admiration for Barthes as someone who has experienced what I regard as the fundamental movements in 
modern criticism in a very intense and very intelligent way, and really has much to say to practising writers” 
(Coetzee and Watson, “Speaking: J.M. Coetzee” 6). My focus in the following section (“Coetzee and Barthes”) falls 
on three of Barthes’s texts (Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes, “La mort de l’auteur” and S/Z) that were produced 
during what we could term the “poststructuralist” phase of his career (i.e. the period following the publication of 




authorship and authority? And, indeed, is there a sense in which Coetzee’s indebtedness to Barthes 
already prefigures the ambivalent return of the author-self? 
 
2. Coetzee and Barthes 
 
In her book J.M. Coetzee: Countervoices, Carrol Clarkson analyses the linguistic and philosophical 
underpinnings of Coetzee’s preoccupation, throughout his career, with the implications of stylistic 
choice for an ethics of writing (style being understood here specifically as “the complex sequence 
of empirical linguistic choices on the part of the writer that produces certain literary-aesthetic 
effects,” Clarkson, Countervoices 5).
10
 Clarkson’s argument is rooted in the observation that 
Coetzee’s sustained consideration of “the grammar of subject positions” (I’s, you’s and we’s) has 
“profoundly ethical ramifications – especially in relation to questions about the authority, and hence 
the responsibility, on the part of the writer” (2). The first chapter of Clarkson's book (‘Not I’) probes 
the way in which Coetzee’s frequent use of the third person, in Boyhood and Youth, but also in the 





Coetzee, through the use of the third person, throws the balance of the speech utterance 
off-centre; where we would expect to find ‘I’ we now have ‘he’ – the one who is absent 
… but at the same time, the one who seems to hold authority in relation to the narrative 
                                                 
10
 In her introduction, Clarkson elaborates on what she means by “the ethics and aesthetics of literary address”: “[I]n 
what ways do seemingly innocent linguistic choices on the part of the writer have ethical consequences for the 
position of the speaking or writing self in relation to those whom one addresses, or in relation to those on whose 
behalf one speaks, or in relation to a world one attempts to represent or recreate in writing?” (Countervoices 1) 
11
 Clarkson refers to Benveniste to demonstrate the need for an ‘I’ in linguistic utterance (Countervoices 25); she 
argues, furthermore (with reference to Susan Barton’s crippling realization, once she has taken up the pen in Foe, 
that she cannot truly write before she has found a way to tell the story of Friday’s muteness) that “[l]inguistic 
exigency dictates that the position of pre-eminence and control goes to the speaker, and this is in keeping with the 
long history in Western thinking that associates language with the expression of reason – and hence dominion – over 
other forms of consciousness” (37). The point, for Clarkson, is that the linguistic ‘I’, which comes into being as a 
matter of definition – “the one who speaks,” according to Benveniste’s Arab grammarians (25) – is traditionally also 
the site of authority, or the site from which the “one who writes” deploys his authority (i.e. asserts control over the 
meaning of and in his writing) (43). Coetzee’s “careful exploration of the grammar of person” (18) thus extends into 
an ethical consideration of the traditional authority of the author-subject (or the writer-self) over that which (or 




recounted. What does this imply for the authority of the implied ‘I’ of the anonymous 
narrator, the ‘I’ of the writer? Thus the use of ‘he’ seems to proliferate the possible sites 
of occupation for ‘I’ – but the result is that the position of ‘I’, usually the position of 
authority with respect to the utterance is one that has been destabilized.” (Clarkson, 
Countervoices 37) 
 
Clarkson thus describes how the positing of an absent, nebulous ‘he’ as the nominal patron of the 
narrating voice (a voice that, in the case of Life & Times of Michael K, “seems to vibrate between a 
narrating and narrated consciousness,” Countervoices 30) causes a dispersion or fragmentation in 
the linguistically implied ‘I’ of the narrative, and suspends the convention by which the author-self 
(the one who would occupy the terrain of the ‘I’) claims a position of authority in relation to his 
writing: “the written site of that self is internally and dialogically split across self and other, present 
and past, writer and protagonist,” she writes (39). 
 
The disaggregation of the site of the “I” in Coetzee’s writing, and the consequent severance of the 
author-self from his position of authority, calls into question the assumed presence of an a priori 
subject as a point of cohesion (or source of authority) for the narrative. This is a thought that 
emerges, for Clarkson, in Coetzee’s reflections on Roland Barthes. In reference to Coetzee’s short 
essay on Barthes, “A Note on Writing” (which was first written in 1984 and collected in Doubling 
the Point in 1992), Clarkson notes Coetzee’s identification, via Barthes, of the ghost-like presence 
of a “middle voice” in certain verb forms (i.e. “to write”) (Countervoices 44). If we think of the 
verb “to write” as being in the active voice – that is to say, as a transitive verbal construction that 
takes a subject as the agent of the action, e.g. ‘John writes a book’ – then we are implicitly relying 
on “an unspoken conception of the subject” (44): a subject that is “prior to, independent of, and 
untouched by the verb” (Coetzee, Doubling the Point 95). If, however, we think of the verb “to 
write” as situated somewhere between the active and the passive voice – as existing in the “middle 




Countervoices 43): a subject, in other words, that is written as much as it writes. Unlike the active 
voice, in which the subject remains “untouched” by the verb he or she performs, “to write” in the 
middle voice implies a two-way traffic between the self who writes and the activity of writing, thus 
transforming the “act” of writing into an “experience of writing” (43) – with all the implications of 
retroactive self-constitution that accompanies the idea of “experience”. 
 
Clarkson draws a link between this discussion and Coetzee's insistence that one does not always 
know beforehand what one is going to write – that the writing “writes you as you write it” (Coetzee, 
Doubling the Point 17) – and makes the point that, for Coetzee as for Barthes, “the subject does not 
have an a priori existence apart from the instant of the discourse; the writing results in the 
emergence of a subject” (Clarkson, Countervoices 44, my emphasis). What Clarkson’s analysis here 
brings to the fore is the extent to which Coetzee’s reading of Barthes entails a shared scepticism 
between the two writers: a scepticism that is rooted in a mutual appreciation of grammatical, or 
linguistic nuance, and that is directed toward the notion of an independently existing author-subject 
as the source of authority in writing. However, in the very notion of the subject as a function of the 
writing – as something that emerges from the writing, rather than precedes it – Clarkson also 
suggests a qualified sort of return to the idea of an author-self in Coetzee’s work. Or, as she puts it 
elsewhere: 
 
[W]e see in Coetzee an attentiveness and a return to the idea of authorial consciousness 
– and the ethical implications attendant upon that. These preoccupations constitute a 
break with more programmatic structuralist conceptions of authorship, authority and 




Thus, even while Coetzee is indebted to Barthes for pointing the way to a critical-linguistic 
                                                 
12
 Clarkson discusses the return of authorial consciousness in Coetzee’s work more directly in relation to the work of 
Mikhail Bakhtin, and the idea of the cultural contingency of the self. I return to these question in chapter three 




interrogation of the authority that has traditionally been the province of an a priori author-self, he 
never wears (so to speak) the cloak of an acolyte: his professional interest in the underlying 
ideological assumptions and rhetorical niceties involved in the practice of writing, and his keen 
attentiveness to the ethical implications of stylistic choice, do not quite entail a wholesale 
subscription to the structuralist- and poststructuralist tendency, embodied so eloquently by Barthes, 
to champion the removal of the author-self. Clarkson’s work allows us to appreciate Coetzee’s 
investment in poststructuralist writing techniques (with a special emphasis, in this case, on Roland 
Barthes) while keeping alive, at the back of our minds, the lingering presence of an author-subject 
in his writing. Conversely, when we trace the implications of JC’s rejection of Barthes in Diary of a 
Bad Year, we are able to consider the ways in which that rejection, and its consequent suggestion of 
the return of an author-self, still reveals the influence of the poststructuralist tendencies that are 
evinced in Barthes’s announcement of the death of the author. 
 
The structure of the novel in which JC presents his opinion of Barthes (i.e. Diary of a Bad Year) is 
an unconventional one. Visually, its most conspicuous feature is the division of the narrative into 
three separate tracts, or bands. While JC’s opinion pieces occupy the top band, the other bands 
represent the story of his relationship with Anya, a Filipina woman who lives in an apartment 
downstairs and whom he enlists – motivated more by erotic longing than by any pragmatic concerns 
– as a typist. For the first few pages we are given only JC’s perspective on their relationship, but 
Anya’s voice soon emerges in a third band to give her distinct outlook on events. “This hypertextual 
polyphony,” writes Boyd Tonkin, “becomes a source of poignancy, even pleasure, as human factors 
messily revise all the dogmas booming out above” (“Diary of a Bad Year, by J.M. Coetzee”).
13
 On a 
more technical level, Johan Geertsema points out how the obtrusive layering of the text (“like the 
news crawl on a TV screen,” writes James Wood in The New Yorker, “Squall Lines”) challenges the 
reader to question the status of the relationship between the different modes of discourse – the 
                                                 
13
 “Meanwhile, in the basement, a kind of novel begins,” is another way that Tonkin puts it in the same review (“Diary 




didactic and the literary – that are at work in the separate bands (Geertsema, “Coetzee's Diary of a 
Bad Year, Politics, and the Problem of Position” 71). As a result of this discursive uncertainty, when 
JC puts forward his observation that the value of certain great novels is the result of the authority of 
their authors, it is not possible separate his statement from the textual framework in which it occurs 
– a framework that undercuts the authority of his strong opinion by foregrounding the role of the 
reader in determining how much weight it should be given among the other narrative bands that 
make up the text. The novel thus creates a discursive moment in which Barthes’s call for the death 
of the author is refused (in JC’s bold opinion) at the same time as it is affirmed (in the grounds for 
interpretive freedom produced by the porous structure of the narrative). 
 
The open-ended, fragmentary structure of Coetzee's novel – a novel that self-consciously inhabits 
the borderland between fiction and autobiography
14
 – can already be seen as a kind of veiled 
homage to Barthes's own evasion of autobiographical pressure in his book Roland Barthes par 
Roland Barthes, first published in 1975. The body of that book is divided into two parts: a kind of 
symbolic image-vault (“l'imaginaire des images,” Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes 4) which 
consists mostly of photographic reproductions focusing on the young Barthes and his early family 
life; and – more to the point for our discussion of Diary of a Bad Year – a collection of short written 
pieces, or fragments, that range from theoretical reflection to personal anecdote, often blending the 
two in highly innovative ways. The self-effacing gesture of authorship to which Roland Barthes par 
Roland Barthes bears testimony is already evident in the reproduced segment of handwriting that 
serves as the book's motto: Tout ceci doit être considéré comme dit par un personnage de roman 
(“All this must be considered as if it were said by a character in a novel”)
15
. Barthes makes it clear, 
from the start, that he renounces any claims to a superior knowledge of himself; that, on the 
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He is also keen to note the autobiographical resonance of the book as a whole: “The initials J.C., together with many 
other clues, imply that the text is to be taken as autobiographical, though in a sharply qualified sense” (214). 
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contrary, the persona that emerges in the writing (or the self that is produced in the text) also 
identifies the persona (or self) that is the nominal subject of the autobiography. In contrast to what 
the reader would expect from an autobiography, Barthes refuses to participate in the convention that 
would situate the autobiographical text as an explanation or illumination of the antecedent being of 
the author. These thoughts are focalized explicitly in one of the fragments that occurs in the second 
part of the book (La coincidence, “Coincidence”): 
 
I do not seek to put my present expression in the service of my previous truth (in 
classical terms, one would sanctify this task under the name of authenticity), I renounce 
the exhausting pursuit of a former piece of myself, I do not seek to restore myself (as 
one says of a monument). I do not say, “I am going to describe myself,” but: “I write a 
text, and I call it R.B.” (Barthes, Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes 60) 
 
The dream of a purely textual self – a self that is not merely the symbolic representation of an a 
priori subject, but that is born, and that lives, in the “pure materiality” of the text (Roland Barthes 
par Roland Barthes 60): a textual self that identifies with nothing but itself – is figured, for Barthes, 
in the fragmentary structure of the writing in Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes. The absence of a 
conjunctive grammar between the different fragments of the text, as well as the internal “parataxis” 
of the fragments themselves (i.e. the contrived, “heteroclite”, anti-natural form of association that 
governs, for Barthes, the arrangement of the internal elements of the fragment, 97)
16
, make it an 
ideal vehicle for approximating a condition of non-referentiality. A text that is composed entirely of 
fragments, in this sense, is like a piece of music composed entirely of “intermezzos”: “each piece is 
sufficient unto itself, and yet it is never anything but the interstice of its neighbours” (98). By 
composing an autobiography entirely of fragments, then, Barthes supposes that he might “cease to 
discourse about himself in imaginary terms” and thus “attenuate the risk of transcendence” (99). 
The fragmented text is the mark of the autobiographer's desire to remove himself as an antecedent 
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source of authority over the meaning of his writing – a desire that finds an echo in the fragmentary 
structure of Diary of a Bad Year. 
 
Although Barthes briefly toys with the idea, in Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes, that his fixation 
on fragment, and his career-long penchant for exposing the rhetorical and ideological conventions 
that give rise to apparently “natural” forms of expression, might finally be nothing more than a 
mask for his own secret desire to write a journal,
17
 it is important to note (and especially so in 
relation to Coetzee) that there is also a strong ethical dimension to his efforts to discredit the 
authority of an a priori author-self. This aspect of his thought emerges quite prominently in the text 
that serves as an immediate point of reference for JC's renunciation of Barthes in Diary of a Bad 
Year, namely “La mort de l'auteur” (“The Death of the Author”). In it, Barthes declares that the 
reader should replace the author as the figure who brings cohesion to the meaning of a text: “[W]e 
know that, in order to return to writing its future, it is necessary to reverse the myth: the birth of the 
reader must happen at the cost of the death of the author” (“La mort de l'auteur” 69).
 
The myth of 
which he speaks is the myth of the Author with a capital “A”, that grand figure who arose in modern 
times as a result of the prestige accorded to the individual by “English empiricism, French 
rationalism, and the personal faith of the Reformation” (64). This godlike persona exists in an 
antecedent relationship to the text. He is conceived of as the past of his own writing (like a father is 
conceived of as the past of his child, 66), and the task of criticism, more often than not, is to 
discover the author’s true, inner voice through the “more or less transparent allegory of the fiction” 
(64). 
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 “Under the alibi of the destroyed dissertation, one has arrived at the regular practice of the fragment; then from the 
fragment, one slides into the 'journal',” writes Barthes (Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes 99). “Is not the point of 
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The point is not lost that Coetzee's Diary of a Bad Year, with its fragmented structure, is in fact presented as a 
journal (or “diary”) – an eventuality that brings into focus precisely the tension between self-effacement and the 
desire for a less circuitous, more conventionally autobiographical form of self-expression that is implicit in Roland 




The motivation for Barthes's denunciation of the author lies in his refusal to see the text as a 
window onto a fixed social reality (“La mort de l'auteur” 67), of which said author becomes the 
spokesperson, based on the quality of his genius. Following Austin,
18
 Barthes argues that a text 
should rather be thought as a kind of performative act, an “enunciation that has no other content 
than the act of its own saying”, as for example the “I declare” of a king or the “I sing” of the ancient 
poet (69). “We know now that a text is not made up of a line of words, sending out a single 
meaning, in a sense that is almost theological (which would be the 'message' of the Author-God),” 
he says, “but a space of multiple dimensions, where various writings join and contest each other, 
none of which is original: the text is a tissue of citations, issuing from a thousand cultural sources” 
(67). The place where all these jostling traces are held in simultaneous tension – the place where 
they engage with each other “in dialogue, in parody, in contestation” (69) – is in the figure of the 
reader. It is important for Barthes to prevent the reader from becoming a symbol in the service of 
the cult of the individual (which is the legacy of the author) and he takes care to define him as “a 
man without history, without biography, without psychology; he is only that someone who holds 
together in a single field all the traces of which the writing is constituted” (69). 
 
The active role Barthes envisions for the reader in “La mort de l'auteur” – and which informs the 
fragmentary structure of a novel like Diary of a Bad Year – corresponds quite closely to the notion 
of the “texte scriptible” (or “writerly text”) that he develops in S/Z. The writerliness of a text, 
Barthes tells us, is that value which provokes in us the desire to construct and reconstruct its 
meaning with each successive reading. It is, in a word, the method or approach that strives to make 
of the reader “no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text” (Barthes, S/Z 10). The opposite 
value to the writerly text – that against which it reacts or agitates – is the “texte lisible”, or readerly 
text. The problem with readerly texts, says Barthes, is that they enforce the great divide that exists 
in the literary industry (or existed in the late 1960s in France) between those who manufacture texts 
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(“le fabricant”) and those who merely consume them (“l'usager”), thereby turning the reader into a 
sort of passive recipient of meaning for whom “nothing remains but the paltry freedom either to 
accept or reject the text” (10). The ideological conceit (or, to use the proper Barthesian term, the 
“myth”) that sanctions the reductive reading habits encouraged by these so-called textes lisibles is, 
for Barthes, an important one. At its heart, he says, the ideal of fixing the meaning of a text to a 
stable referent is no less than an attempt “to return to the closure of Western discourse (scientific, 
critical or philosophical), to its central organisation, to arrange all the meanings of a text in a circle 
around the hearth of denotation” (13). The author, in this ideological vision, is the master of truth, 
and his writing is to be taken as the encoding of an essential meaning that precedes the utterance of 
the text. The reader, by contrast, is the one who works back from the text in order to decode the 
original truth of which the writer is the authority and master. And the critic happens to be the 
exemplary reader: 
 
The mastery of meaning, a veritable semiurgy, is a divine attribute, insofar as this 
meaning is defined as an overflow, an emission, a spiritual emanation that spills over 
from the signified to the signifier: the author is a god (his place of origin is the 
signified); as for the critic, he is the priest, attentively deciphering the Writing of the 
god. (Barthes, S/Z 166) 
 
Against the background of these reasons for Barthes's denunciation of the author – reasons which 
have to do with the emancipation of literary meaning from its roots in the positivist traditions of 
Western thought – JC's opinion on the persistence of  authorship begins to take on a somewhat 
altered significance. The author is not dead, he says, but nor should the author be restored to his 
pre-Barthesian role as a speaker of universal truths. 
 
In a language that echoes the religious register used by Barthes to describe the hermeneutic 






 century authors by their devotees (he speaks of Tolstoy and Whitman in 
particular). The “disciples who swarmed [to these authors] in quest of enlightenment,” he says, 
were missing the point, because apart from their ability as poets, they were “ordinary men with 
ordinary, fallible opinions” (Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 151). They did not have access to a truth 
beyond their art, of which their writing is merely a diluted form (“wisdom was not what they dealt 
in,” 151). JC, like his author, appears to have taken the lessons of the French iconoclasts to heart, 
and when he makes his case for the staying power of great authors, we should not read it as an 
atavistic return of the Author-God. On the contrary, it leaves us with the problem of having to work 
out what it means to speak of authorship, and of the persistence of an author-self, from within an 
intellectual framework that denies the universal legitimacy of those subjective experiences a writer 
may lay claim to as the basis for his art. 
 
3. A Close Reading of Authority 
 
In a manner that is typical of Coetzee's writing in general, and of the opinion pieces in Diary of a 
Bad Year especially, the answer JC provides to the question of what sets certain authors apart is 
suggestive rather than definitive. The passage that forms the crux of his opinion is brief, but if we 
look at it closely it reveals much that is relevant to our understanding of the relationship between 
the self and writing in Coetzee's work. What JC has to say is the following: 
 
What the great masters are masters of is authority. What is the source of authority, or of 
what the formalists call the authority effect? If authority could be achieved simply by 
tricks of rhetoric, then Plato was surely justified in expelling poets from his ideal 
republic. But what if authority can be attained only by opening the poet-self to some 
higher force, by ceasing to be oneself and beginning to speak vatically? (Coetzee, Diary 
of a Bad Year 151) 
 




that continue to affect us, then – the quality of which their authors are possessed to a very high 
degree – is “authority”. However, the simple declarative sentence in which he makes this statement 
(“What the great masters are masters of is authority”) belies the fact that it is not at all obvious what 
he is talking about. Nor does the rest of the paragraph clarify the matter in any straightforward way. 
Instead, we are given three speculative sentences, each suggesting a range of implications for the 
notion of authority that JC wishes to advance as a standard or marker of quality in authorship. I 
would like to consider each of these sentences in turn, and then to suggest how the conceptual force 
that gathers around the idea of authority points us toward a way in which to understand the peculiar 
manifestation of an authorial presence in Coetzee's work. 
 
1. What is the source of authority, or of what the formalists call the authority effect? 
 
The first sentence of JC's speculative answer takes the form of a question, which immediately 
places the notion of authority under a certain interrogative pressure. This is not an unusual stylistic 
progression in Coetzee’s writing, where a word or concept is often subjected to scrutiny the moment 
it has been used (think, for example, of the sequence friend/freond/freon in Disgrace, 120; or of 
Elizabeth Costello’s defence of her vocation, in Elizabeth Costello, as a matter of testing the 
soundness of words, 199). In this instance the interrogative mode invites the reader to question the 
claim JC makes for authority, thereby introducing a moment of hesitation, or a lacuna in the 
association between JC the author and the substance of his strong opinion. The authorial voice 
produces at once the ideal of authority and a gesture of scepticism towards that ideal. From the 
outset, the reader is alerted to the idea that the authority JC is talking about might be thought of as a 
contested space (or a space of contestation) in which the force of a statement arrives along with the 
conditions for its own undermining. 
 




second part modifies the first (linguistically, it functions as a dependent clause) and they are distinct 
in the sense that they work in separate directions, or refer to separate connotative fields. The first 
part (“What is the source of authority”) refers to the as-yet-unmentioned conceptual framework that 
JC brings to bear on the notion of authority in the sentences that follow, whereas the second part 
(“of what the formalists call the authority effect”) points back to those intellectual traditions (the 
Russian formalists, Barthes, Foucault)
19
 from which he has distanced himself in the earlier stages of 
his strong opinion. The equivocal nature of the relationship between these two parts of the sentence 
is compounded by the conjunction that links them, “or”. The grammatical double function of “or” 
means that it supports both the separation of the two parts (in which case the sentence would imply 
something like, “The authority of which I am speaking is an alternative to what the formalists call 
the authority effect”) and their convergence (in which case “what the formalists call the authority 
effect” becomes an elaboration or explanation of the authority mentioned in the first part). 
Semantically, both of these possibilities occur at once, which signals the latent ambivalence of JC's 
attitude toward the proclamations of the end of authorship that are encapsulated in the second part 
of the sentence. In other words, the structure of the sentence conveys the curious position that JC 
occupies in relation to those theories which informed the early part of his author's career: he does 
not quite accept them, but he never loses sight of them either. 
 
What the sentence asks us to consider is the “source” of authority. But even before JC gives us his 
thoughts on this source – the condition or activity from which authority draws its force and on 
which it depends for its existence – we notice that he has, despite his dismissive attitude, not 
severed himself entirely from those relativist theories that would describe authority as no more than 
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a misleading ideological construct. The declamatory tone of his strong opinion overshadows the 
realization, based on the nuance of his style, that his attitude takes the form of a more tentative kind 
of scepticism, one that does not seem quite ready yet to abandon those rhetorical practices he has 
inherited from the tradition he criticizes. In the light of these observations, the conditional mood of 
the next sentence (“If authority could be achieved simply by tricks of rhetoric, then Plato was surely 
justified in expelling poets from his ideal republic,” Diary of a Bad Year 151, my emphasis) takes 
on a more pointed significance. JC would like to suggest an alternative source for authority, but he 
cannot give himself over to it unconditionally. For that he is too conscious of the ways in which a 
writer can manipulate his material (i.e. language) in order to create the illusion of truth. 
 
2. If authority could be achieved simply by tricks of rhetoric, then Plato was surely 
justified in expelling poets from his ideal republic. 
 
In the introduction to his translation of Republic, Robin Waterfield warns against the tendency of 
modern readers to soften the blow of Plato’s attack on the literary arts. Contemporary audiences 
have long since grown used to the idea of “art for art's sake” (or to the idea that aesthetics might be 
thought of as a value in itself), but we must not forget that poets in Ancient Greece took themselves 
seriously as educators, or that “the overriding purpose of [their] poetry was didactic” (Waterfield, 
Introduction xxx). Thus, when Plato claims that “representational poetry can deform minds (§595b), 
he means it; and when he says that avoiding such poetry is critical if one wants to be a good person 
(§608b), he means that too” (Introduction xxix). Despite his “fascinated admiration” for Homer, 
Plato's Socrates concludes that it would be better to “detach” himself from his youthful crush on 
tragic poetry, like a lover who realizes that “a love affair he’s involved in is no good for him” (Plato, 
Republic §607e). His polemic against the seductive rhetoric of poetry is rooted in one of the central 




from which things in the world derive their particular qualities.
20
 The representational arts, says 
Plato, are concerned with the appearance of things rather than with their reality, and hence lead the 
mind astray from a proper knowledge of the truth. He makes his point by referring to the example 
of a bed: God has made the original, true bed (the ideal type); a joiner who makes a bed 
manufactures a copy of that original; and an artist produces a mere imitation of the joiner's copy: a 
copy of a copy, or an image that is at a second remove from the original bed (§597b-598b). In like 
fashion (according to Plato), a poet’s depiction of good deeds (or of any other activity in the sphere 
of human existence) is a mere imitation, at a second remove, of the true goodness that exists in its 
original form as an ideal type (§598d-602b). Poets deal in appearance only; reality is beyond their 
reach, and the pleasure one derives from their poems has nothing at all to do with truth – on the 
contrary, it compromises the felicitous functioning of “one’s own inner political system” (to take the 
moral analogy of Republic at face value, §608a). When JC speaks about “tricks of rhetoric” in his 
speculative passage on the nature of authority, he appears to have in mind this aspect of Plato's 
argument, with its description of poets as mere imitators of reality who have no real knowledge of 
the things they depict in their work: 
 
[The poet] uses words and phrases to block in some of the colours of each area of 
expertise, although all he understands is how to represent things in a way which makes 
other superficial people, who base their conclusions on the words they can hear, think 
that he’s written a really good poem about shoemaking or military command or 
whatever else it is that he’s set to metre, rhythm, and music. It only takes these features 
to cast this powerful a spell: that’s what they’re for. But when the poets’ work is 
stripped of its musical hues and expressed in plain words, I think you’ve seen what kind 
of impression it gives… (Plato, Republic §601a-b) 
 
Poets are able to cast their “powerful spell” without having to be involved in what they are saying in 
any substantial way. All they need to do is master the trick of arranging language (“metre, rhythm, 
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and music”) in such a way as to give a “superficial” form of pleasure or satisfaction. Authority in 
the literary arts, in such a view, derives from the poet's ability to dupe his audience into believing 
that his patterned imitations of reality are tantamount to the real thing, and that the poet himself has 
“mastered every craft, and is the world's leading expert in absolutely every branch of human 
knowledge” (Plato, Republic §598d) – a claim that Homer's disciples were wont to make for him 
(§598e). One of Plato's chief objections to this duplicitous form of authority (or “sorcery”, as he 
calls it elsewhere, §602d) is that it appeals to “the petulant and varied side of our characters” 
(§605a). It feeds (or fattens up) the low, irrational part of the mind (§605b) and inhibits the 
cultivation of the rational part – that part which encourages us to remain stable under emotional 
duress and that enables the steadfast pursuit of truth and knowledge. “If you admit the entertaining 
Muse of lyric and epic poetry, then instead of law and the shared acceptance of reason as the best 
guide, the kings of your community will be pleasure and pain,” he writes (§607a). 
 
But why does JC invoke Plato to qualify his idea of authority? If it were indeed true, as Plato 
argues, that authority could be achieved merely through “tricks of rhetoric” (Coetzee, Diary of a 
Bad Year 151) – or, more precisely, if authority in poetry were simply a side-effect of rhetorical 
affect, having no source other than the pleasing arrangement of patterns (or “musical hues,” Plato, 
Republic §601b), then JC would agree with Plato that literature has no rightful claim to our 
attention, and that the truth would be better served if poets (after being anointed with myrrh and 
given a “chaplet of wool” in honour of their admirable, but finally quite suspect skill at representing 
things, Plato, Republic §398a-b) were banned from the city gates. But if rhetoric in writing (and 
hence the authority-effect) required something more than mere skilfulness in arranging words, then 
perhaps it would not be so expedient to get rid of the poets. JC appears to be using Plato's 
indictment of poetry, in other words, to set off his suggestion that the relationship between a writer 
and the rhetorical effect of his writing is somehow more involved (and less chameleon-like) than 




arresting force of literature is not merely the result of rhetorical trickery or verbal sleight-of-hand, 
which would indeed justify its condemnation on ethical grounds, but that it involves the being of 
those who are involved in it in a more comprehensive way. 
 
The extent to which JC's position constitutes a challenge to Plato is more plainly visible in his final 
diary entry in the second part of Diary of a Bad Year (“On Dostoevsky”). In it he tries to account for 
the strong feelings that overwhelm him upon re-reading a certain passage from Dostoevsky's The 
Brothers Karamazov, namely the climactic moment in the long confessional speech Ivan 
Karamazov makes to his brother Alyosha, wherein he states that he would like to give back his 
entry ticket to the world created by God. The “uneasy, even shamefaced absorption” of JC's earlier 
response to Tolstoy (Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 150) has now evolved (or devolved, depending 
on your point of view) to the point that he finds himself “sobbing uncontrollably” at Ivan's bitter 
anguish (223). In scrutinizing his own emotional reaction – a reaction that occurs despite his formal 
disagreement with Ivan's “rather vengeful views” (224) – JC comes to the conclusion that it has 
“nothing to do with ethics or politics,” and “everything to do with rhetoric” (225): “It is the voice of 
Ivan, as realized by Dostoevsky, not his reasoning, that sweeps me along,” he says (225). JC's 
subsequent expression of admiration for the powerful affect of the work casts some light on his 
thoughts concerning the role of rhetorical persuasion in literature: 
 
What one recognizes, even as one hears Ivan's words, even as one asks whether he 
genuinely believes what he says, even as one asks whether one wants to rise up and 
follow him and give back one's ticket too, even as one asks whether it is not mere 
rhetoric (“mere” rhetoric) that one is reading, even as one asks, shocked, how a 
Christian, Dostoevsky, a follower of Christ, could allow Ivan such powerful words – 
even in the midst of all this there is space enough to think too, Glory be! At last I see it 
before me, the battle pitched on the highest ground! If to anyone (Alyosha, for instance) 
it shall be given to vanquish Ivan, by word or by example, then indeed the word of 




Michailovich! May your name resound forever in the halls of fame! (Coetzee, Diary of a 
Bad Year 226) 
 
There are two aspects of the passage that mark, to my mind, the grounds on which JC argues for  
the rightful place of rhetorical persuasion in literature. The first of these is the realization (the 
“shocked” realization) that Dostoevsky gives voice to a passionate diatribe against Christendom 
despite the fact that it runs counter to his personal beliefs. The implication here is a far-reaching 
one. What it suggests is that authority derives, at least in part, from the extent to which an author is 
willing, or able, to submit his or her personal ethos to the destabilizing procedures of fiction. To 
think of writing as an activity that cancels or nullifies the author, or that reduces him or her to an 
empty marker whose sole purpose is to set in motion the textual play of signifiers, is an idea that has 
had its historical moment, as JC is well aware.
21
 But this kind of annulment of the author-concept 
does not seem to be quite what he has in mind here. Rather, he appears to be suggesting that the 
author – Dostoevsky, in this case – becomes personally involved precisely to the extent that he 
subjects his own values and beliefs to the creative process, or to that which we may call (in the 
spirit of one of Coetzee's comments in an interview in Doubling the Point)
22
 the art of the possible – 
an art that involves a certain investment in the power of rhetorical evocation. The author is thus no 
longer the singular source of authority in the work, but he is nevertheless an important condition for 
that authority to come into being, in the sense that he submits himself and his belief system to the 
speculative nature of the work he produces. 
 
The second aspect of the passage I would like to draw attention to presents us with an opportunity 
to elaborate on the previous point. “Glory be!” says JC, “At last I see it before me, the battle pitched 
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on the highest ground!” JC's exclamation here has all the force of a revelation, not least because he 
has prepared for it, rhetorically speaking, by situating it at the end of an unusually long sentence, 
one that winds its way rhapsodically through wave after wave of pre-emptive criticism before 
delivering its final pronouncement. But what battle is he talking about? And where is the “highest 
ground” on which it is pitched? The terms of the conflict, I would suggest, derive from the 
ambivalent nature of his response to Ivan's speech. In principle he does not agree with it. Ethically 
and politically he finds himself at a remove from Ivan's point of view, and the easy sentiment of the 
argument – its reference to “cruel landowners” and “martyred children” (Coetzee, Diary of a Bad 
Year 225) – leaves him unconvinced. Nevertheless he cannot deny that the feelings elicited by the 
speech – the “tones of anguish” that strike through despite the deficiency of the argument (226) – 
are real. They are real in the sense that they are ontologically certain: they are “really” real (226). 
The reality they signify is “the personal anguish of a soul unable to bear the horrors of this world” 
(225). The source of conflict in the speech, or the “battle” to which JC bears witness, thus appears 
to lie in the intimation of a wholly subjective reality (the “personal anguish of a soul”) that struggles 
to define itself, or make itself heard against the pressures of a discursive framework that is not 
accepting of its grief. 
 
The tension between the subjective nature of Ivan's plea and the constraints of rational 
accountability is already visible in the substance of the speech itself. Ivan prepares for his 
confession by telling Alyosha that even though he knows that God exists, and even if he were to 
witness for himself the “moment of eternal harmony” at the end of time in which all mankind's evil 
is redeemed by the grace of God (Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov 308) – that is to say, even 
though he acknowledges that there is an underlying order to things, an order that justifies human 
suffering according to some absolute good, and even though he concedes, in the abstract, the truth 
of this order – he still “cannot agree to live by it” (318). “So let me tell you,” he says, “that in the 




admit its validity in any way” (308). Accordingly, the “battle” JC refers to is made manifest not 
only in the opposition between his own and Ivan's ethico-political points of view, or in the extent to 
which Ivan's passionate tirade departs from the religious beliefs of his author, but is the lifeblood of 
the speech itself, in the sense that its meaning, or its affective force, derives from the contest in 
Ivan's delivery between the appeal of an abstract, rational sense of good and the rhetorical urgency 
of his entirely subjective feelings of outrage. The “highest ground” on which the battle occurs, it 
would seem, is the degree of success with which Dostoevsky has managed to embody the 
unceasing, generative nature of this conflict in his writing. 
 
The value of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, JC tells us, is that they set the standard according to which an 
artist might become “ethically better” (Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 227). The vehement tone of his 
defence of these authors carries through into his observation that “[t]hey annihilate one's impurer 
pretensions; they clear one's eyesight; they fortify one's arm” (227). What I have been arguing here 
is that authority, for JC, involves the level or degree to which an author is able to give voice, in his 
or her writing, to the fraught and often antagonistic relationship between subjective impulse and 
those discursive formations – ideological, socio-historical, philosophical – that provide the structure 
of meaning in literary representation. The ethical aspect of such a notion of the source of authority 
in literature – that which vindicates it against the accusation that it is the result of mere rhetorical 
trickery, as Plato argues – would appear to lie in the fact that an important part of the conflict is 
precisely the measure to which an author is invested in his work. However, as I hope I have made 
clear, the way in which authorial investment plays out in Coetzee's writing is not to be taken as a 
reversion to the antiquated image of the author as a unitary representative of a singular truth. The 
special, qualified sense in which we might talk about the persistence of an authorial presence in the 
work is the focus of my analysis of the third, and last sentence in the paragraph containing JC's 





3. But what if authority can be attained only by opening the poet-self to some higher 
force, by ceasing to be oneself and beginning to speak vatically? 
 
What, precisely, is the meaning of “vatic”? The word derives from the Latin vates, for prophet, and 
it means “of or pertaining to, characteristic of, a prophet or seer; prophetic, inspired” (Oxford 
English Dictionary). Setting aside for a moment the discomfiting thought that JC is asking us to 
credit writers with having occult abilities, I would suggest that this locution, with its reference to the 
“poet-self” becoming infused with a “higher force”, gives us an opportunity to mark the influence 
on Coetzee's work of an idea that traces its way to the Romantic heritage. The enduring image of 
the Romantic poet as a seer-like figure first became prominent in the 1970s, thanks in no small part 
to the efforts of M.H. Abrams. In Natural Supernaturalism, Abrams's influential study of the 
patterns of creative production that characterized much of the poetry produced during the Romantic 
period, he speaks of the “vatic stance” taken up by the emblematic poets of the age (Natural 
Supernaturalism 13): 
 
They represented themselves in the traditional persona of the philosopher-seer or the 
poet-prophet (in England, the chief model was Milton, the great “bard” of what Shelley 
called “the last national struggle for civil and religious liberty”), and they set out, in 
various yet recognizably parallel ways, to reconstitute the grounds of hope and to 
announce the certainty, or at least the possibility, of a rebirth in which a renewed 
mankind will inhabit a renovated earth where he will find himself thoroughly at home. 
(Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism 12) 
 
One of the key figures in Abrams's portrayal of the Romantic poets as vatic speakers is William 
Wordsworth, who claims, in a verse preceding his Prospectus, that he has been chosen as the “poet-
prophet” of his times (quoted in Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism 21). The theory of authorship 
that underlies Wordsworth's writing practice can be found in the preface to the Lyrical Ballads, 




mission. He devotes considerable attention to justifying his stylistic preference for “simple and 
unelaborated” language – the language “really used by men” – as well as his choice of subject 
matter, namely “incidents and situations from common life,” based on the premise that this 
approach grants him closer access to the “elementary feelings” that make up what is lasting and 
valuable in human experience (Wordsworth, Preface 21). What sets his poetry apart most strongly 
from the supposedly misguided capriciousness of his contemporaries, however, is “that each of [his 
poems] has a worthy purpose” (22). The terms in which Wordsworth conceives of the purpose of 
poetry are grandiose, and indeed he warns us that he suffers from no sense of “false modesty” 
concerning the importance of the subject (24). Against the influence of the national events of the 
day, he writes, it is the duty of the poet to return to public consciousness those “inherent and 
indestructible qualities of the human mind, and likewise of certain powers in the great and 
permanent objects that act upon it which are equally indestructible” (25). Wordsworth considers 
himself, in his capacity as poet, to be a conduit for those energies of the human spirit that transcend 
the vagaries of historical circumstance. The vatic posture of his calling is embellished by his 
prophetic-sounding statement that “the time is approaching when the evil will be systematically 
opposed by men of greater powers, and with far more distinguished success” (25). 
 
However, there is also a different sense in which we might understand the vatic nature of 
Wordsworth's calling. This sense is personified in the writings of his contemporary William Hazlitt, 
who is of the opinion that Wordsworth's genius “is a pure emanation of the Spirit of the Age” 
(Hazlitt, “Mr. Wordsworth” 252). Hazlitt connects the uncompromising simplicity of Wordsworth's 
style to the iconoclastic fervour that swept through Europe at the time of the French Revolution: 
 
All the common-place figures of poetry, tropes, allegories, personifications, with the 
whole heathen mythology, were instantly discarded; a classical allusion was considered 
as a piece of antiquated foppery; capital letters were no more allowed in print, than 




from their rank and station in legitimate tragedy or epic poetry, as they were decapitated 
elsewhere; rhyme was looked upon as a relic of the feudal system, and regular metre 
was abolished along with regular government. (Hazlitt, “On the Living Poets” 162) 
 
In Hazlitt's view, the originality of Wordsworth's poetry, which derives from the intensity of his 
absorption in natural scenes and the loftiness of his contemplation of the basic elements of 
humanity he discovers there (“He gathers manna in the wilderness, he strikes the barren rock for the 
gushing moisture,” Hazlitt, “Mr. Wordsworth” 254), is in accordance with the absolute rejection of 
decorum that characterizes the revolutionary spirit. These similarities are not merely coincidental: 
“[his poetry] partakes of, and is carried along with, the revolutionary movement of our age: the 
political changes of the day were the model on which he formed and conducted his poetical 
experiments” (253). In this sense, the vatic nature of Wordsworth's poetry is a result of the extent to 
which he embodies, in his approach, the socio-political climate of his times. At the moment in 
history when he wrote his poems (“Had he lived in any other period of the world, he would never 
have been heard of,” claims Hazlitt, 252), his devotion to the elemental truths of human nature 
coincided with a widespread disillusionment with the bloody aftermath of the French Revolution, 
and a consequent urge to provide a new home for what John Beer calls “the great wave of idealism 
that had been released among young men by those same events” (Romanticism, Revolution and 
Language 50). Wordsworth’s personal belief in the prophetic nature of his calling, then, overlapped 
with a larger historical situation in which the old social order had been irrevocably upset, but a new 
one had not yet been envisioned. Or, to put it differently, it was by placing himself in the vatic 
position of someone who communes with a lasting and humane natural order that Wordsworth 
proved himself to be a most fitting spokesperson for the untethered idealism that animated his 
times. 
 
This sense of fusion that we discern in Wordsworth between the transcendent ideals of Romantic 




that occurs under the banner of “vatic speaking”, and that is the source of the Romantic poet's 
authority – has a complex and often quite unsettling afterlife in Coetzee's writing. One way of 
describing it is to say that the ideal of transcendent value has become separated, in Coetzee, from 
the material and socio-historical terrain of the text, but still inhabits it in a ghostly, or disembodied 
form. Like the camp doctor calling out in desperation to Michael K in the eponymous novel, we 
could refer to something that, “scandalously” and “outrageously”, “take[s] up residence in a system 
without becoming a term in it” (Coetzee, Life & Times of Michael K 166). The presence of 
Wordsworth in Disgrace – arguably Coetzee's most widely read novel – is one of the most readily 
accessible examples of the way in which Coetzee's work interrogates and re-situates the Romantic 
notion of authority that I have been describing here (that is to say, authority as a kind of fusion 
between the transcendent and the socio-historical that occurs through the agency of the “vatic” 
author-subject). Lurie's proposed opera about Byron and Theresa is an important subtext for the 
narrative, but it is Wordsworth who is singled out as spiritual forebear for the embattled professor. 
“Wordsworth has been one of my masters,” Lurie tells Melanie after inviting her into his home for 
the first time (Coetzee, Disgrace 13); later, after he has been found guilty of sexual misconduct, he 
describes himself as a “disgraced disciple” of the nature poet (46). It is no accident, I think, that a 
novel which speaks so directly to the historical present in which it was written (the period following 
the first democratic elections in South Africa) presents the figure of Wordsworth as a strong cultural 
influence on its protagonist. In the first place, the image of Wordsworth as a prophetic figure, or as 
someone who spends his days contemplating nature and giving voice to the sublime truths he finds 
there, signals the severely anachronistic position that his disciple Lurie occupies in the socio-
political climate of post-apartheid South Africa. A useful metaphor for Lurie's disengagement from 
the social fabric of his environment is the look of “[b]lank incomprehension” on the faces of his 
students when he tries to explain Book 6 of The Prelude to them (22). 
 




how deeply Coetzee has been influenced by the notion of an author as someone who gives voice, 
though his writing, to the historical pressures that distinguish his milieu, in the “vatic” sense that 
Hazlitt describes above. We might recall at this stage that one of the three books Lurie published 
during his undistinguished career is specifically about “Wordsworth and history” (it is entitled 
“Wordsworth and the Burden of the Past”, Coetzee, Disgrace 4). The sustained reference to 
Wordsworth in Disgrace – a reference which I am taking here as an instance of symbolic, or 
allegorical allusion – is thus deeply ambivalent: it signals at once the persistence of Lurie’s 
allegiance to an outmoded, transcendental form of value, and his awareness, on the other hand, of 
the degree to which that allegiance is challenged by the reality of his historical situation. The 
uneasy coexistence of both these allusions is given purchase in the lecture mentioned above, when 
Lurie describes the central problem of Wordsworths’s Prelude as an unresolved tension between the 
“pure idea”, which resides in the imagination, and the “sense-image”, which comes from the outside 
to encroach upon that idea: “The question is not, How can we keep the imagination pure, protected 
from the onslaught of reality? The question has to be, can we find a way for the two to coexist?” he 
says (22). 
 
When JC speaks of the vatic origins of authority in Diary of a Bad Year, then, we might understand 
it in this double sense. It alludes to the Romantic notion of the author as someone who gives voice, 
in aesthetic form, to values that lie beyond the reach of historically determining factors; but it also 
refers to the writer as someone who channels – perhaps unconsciously – the historically determined 
social reality in which he or she lives. So even while JC is feeling his way toward what seems to be 
a rather antiquated solution to the problem of authority, we are not able to forget that few writers are 
as conscious as Coetzee of the ways in which aesthetic value depends on historical circumstance,
23
 
or indeed of the implications for textual practice that are raised by the socio-historical situation of 
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 See especially Coetzee's essay, “What is a Classic? A Lecture.” I discuss this essay at some length in my conclusion 






 It is pertinent at this juncture to point out that while JC is making his case for authority 
in the top band of the novel, in the bottom band – the band that is written in Anya's voice – an 
argument is raging, between Anya and her husband, Alan, about his proposed scheme to steal JC's 
money, rather than let it fall into the hands of the Anti-Vivisection League of Australia (Coetzee, 
Doubling the Point 121). Conceptually, the argument revolves around Alan's insistence that 
materialistic interests outweigh the negligible concerns of “a bunch of rats and cats and dogs and 
monkeys” (125), and Anya's strong feeling that there is something intrinsically evil about his 
proposal. Textually, the argument serves as a kind of real-world counterpoint to JC's suggestive 
reference to an intangible “higher force” as the source of authority. The point is that even while JC 
invokes a seemingly ahistorical conception of value in his opinion on authority, Coetzee's writing 
never allows one to stray too far into the immaterial. Instead, the reader is absorbed into the 
relentless conflict the writing stages between an alluded to, and indeed elusive reality that 
transcends the scope of the representable, and the immediate, material nature of the representation 
itself, that derives its meaning not only from the socio-historical paradigm to which it gives voice, 
but also from its own internally signifying structures. 
 
4. Conflicting Sources of the Self 
 
The vatic notion of authority that JC holds up for consideration – suggestively, tenuously, with a 
question mark at the end – and that is from the very moment of its utterance inseparable from a 
narrative structure that impedes its potentially radical implications, resurfaces in a context that has a 
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 See especially Coetzee's “Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech” in the collection Doubling the Point, in which he 
deplores the unavoidable effects of the socio-political situation in South Africa on the practice of the writer: 
 
 The deformed and stunted relations between human beings that were created under colonialism and 
exacerbated under what is loosely called apartheid have their psychic representations in a deformed and 
stunted inner life. All expressions of that inner life, no matter how intense, no matter how pierced with 
exultation of despair, suffer from the same stuntedness and deformity. I make this observation with due 
deliberation, and in the fullest awareness that it applies to myself and my own writing as much as to 





more direct bearing on the question of authorial presence as it relates to Coetzee himself, albeit in a 
no less ambiguous way. The book in question is Summertime, the third instalment in Coetzee's 
series of autobiographical fictions, which appeared two years after the publication of Diary of a Bad 
Year and revisits the 1970s South Africa in which the young writer first struggled to make a name 
for himself.
25 
In the fourth interview in the book, Mr Vincent, the prospective biographer, talks to 
Martin (or “MJ”, as John refers to him in his notebook entries, Coetzee, Summertime 208), a former 
colleague of John in the English Department at the University of Cape Town. The interview 
revolves mainly around John's persona as a teacher – he was, according to Martin, “a little dry and 
reserved” (212) in his pedagogic approach – and the observation is made that “a strain of 
secretiveness that seemed to be ingrained in him, part of his character, extended to his teaching too” 
(212). Thus, when Martin co-teaches a poetry course with John and his subject is Pablo Neruda, we 
learn that even though Neruda “may have mattered a great deal to him” he treated his “connection 
with the poet as a personal secret to be closely guarded” (214) and that he consequently did not 
inspire much enthusiasm for the material in his students. Martin elaborates on the nature of John's 
secretiveness when he considers his “fondness” for “lush poetry” (213): 
 
Without being a Dionysian himself, he approved in principle of Dionysianism. 
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 Although Summertime was recently included, along with Boyhood and Youth, in the collection Scenes From 
Provincial Life (2011) – a move that lends some institutional clout to the practice of reading those three books as a 
trilogy – it has to be noted that the narrative of Summertime departs from those earlier works by venturing more 
overtly into fictional terrain. John Kannemeyer, Coetzee's biographer, who depends rather heavily (and perhaps 
somewhat problematically) on Boyhood and Youth for his account of the early years of his subject's life, is 
noticeably flustered by the unverifiable nature of the events portrayed in Summertime. Although Kannemeyer is at 
pains to point out the “ludic element” of the narrative (J.M. Coetzee: A Life in Writing 215) – or its “engrossing 
blend of fact and fiction” (27) – and even though he states quite baldly that “anybody who reads [Summertime] as 
'truth' will have been gulled” (607), he is nevertheless loath to abandon it as a credible source for his portrayal of 
Coetzee's life. So, for example, when he draws on the notebook entry in Summertime describing John's cement 
laying labours (Coetzee Summertime 7) to give a sense of Coetzee's actual home life in the early 1970s in Tokai, he 
justifies his usage of the text for biographical purposes with the revealing admonition that “[w]hether everything 
happened in just this way is less important than the spirit that this activity conveys to the reader of Summertime” 
(Kannemeyer, A Life in Writing, 233). One may well wonder what a scholar of Kannemeyer's ilk – his monumental 
biographies of Afrikaans writers are renowned for their scrupulous archival research, their unwillingness to stray too 
far from the certainties of documented and verifiable source material – one may well wonder what he has in mind 
when he speaks of the “spirit” that is conveyed by a fictional account as a measure of the truth of a real-life 
situation. For the purposes of my thesis, at any rate, what is telling (and not to say uncanny) about Kannemeyer’s 
method here is that Coetzee's insistence on the autonomy of fiction, with all the ambiguities and uncertainties that it 
entails, seems to have penetrated deeply enough to have infiltrated this first, authoritative biography of his life and 




Approved in principle of letting oneself go, though I don't think he ever let himself go – 
would probably not have known how to. He had a need to believe in the resources of the 
unconscious, in the creative force of unconscious processes. Hence his inclination 
toward the more vatic poets. (Coetzee, Summertime 213, my emphasis) 
 
John's inclination toward the vatic poets – his need to believe in the “creative force of unconscious 
processes” – is closely associated, furthermore, with the source of his own creative inspiration: 
 
You must have noted how rarely he discussed the sources of his own creativity. In part 
that came out of the native secretiveness I mentioned. But in part it also suggests a 
reluctance to probe the sources of his inspiration, as if being too self-aware might 
cripple him. (Coetzee, Summertime 213) 
 
On the one hand, then, we have John's professional persona: the literature specialist who concerns 
himself, at least on the surface, with the technical aspects of the writer's craft – a preoccupation that 
is testified to, inasmuch as one is willing to read John as a reliable autobiographical version of his 
author, by Coetzee's own formidable body of critical writing on writers that have interested him 
throughout his career, exemplified in collections like White Writing (1988), Giving Offense (1996), 
Stranger Shores (2001) and Inner Workings (2007), as well as in various other uncollected pieces 
written for the New York Review of Books between 1985 and the present – and on the other hand we 
are given an intimation of another, undisclosed version of the same person, someone who, Martin 
would have us believe, carries around within him a dark and unexamined source of creative 
inspiration, a source, furthermore, that is strictly cordoned off from the probing of the analytical 
mind that has written so perceptively about the writer's craft.
26
 As in Diary of a Bad Year, the 
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 This tension between the technical aspects of the literary craft and the intimation of a darker, unplumbed source of 
creative inspiration is prefigured in a passage in Boyhood, in which John despairs at the monotony of the essays that 
he is required to write in school: 
  
 What he would write if he could, if it were not for Mr Whelan reading it, would be something darker, 
something that, once it began to flow from his pen, would spread across the page out of control, like spilt 
ink. Like spilt ink, like shadows racing across the face of still water, like lightning crackling across the 




suggestive glimpse we are given here of a secret, “vatic” core that is the wellspring and the 
lifeblood of the author's creative activity – or the source of the author's “authority” – arrives in a 
narrative form that undermines its legitimacy even as it is being spoken. That is to say, the author to 
whom this atavistic sense of communion with a transcendent reality is meant to apply, namely John 
Coetzee (and behind him, the shadow figure of the real author, J.M. Coetzee), is filtered through a 
circuitous network of discursive layers, each one putting us at a further remove from the situation 
the text purports to be describing, namely the life (or, more ambiguously, the “life-story”, 
Summertime 216) of the autobiographical subject. Mr Vincent reports an interview he had with 
Martin, who recollects, many years after the fact, his impressions of his colleague John, whom he is 
at pains to remind us he knew chiefly in a professional capacity (“John and I were colleagues. We 
were friends. We got on well together. But I can't say I knew him intimately,” 216). 
 
Summertime thus presents us with two contesting approaches to the reality of John's self, or to the 
substance of his “life-story”. The first approach sees the self (the self that is the narrative point 
around which the events of a life coalesce and cohere – the autobiographical self as a kind of 
organized agglomeration of perceptions and memories) as a composition of the traces he has left 
behind him in the world (the various portraits of John given in the interviews speak deliberately to 
this notion of the self: “The only story involving John that I can tell … is this one, namely the story 
of my life and his part in it,” says Julia in the first interview, Summertime 43). We can understand 
the reality of such a self – a “discursive” self – as no more than the sum of the various perspectives 
on him provided by the different interviewees.
27
 The other, contrasting approach to John's self – the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
  
 The passage is likewise connected to John's sense of self, when he complains that the limitations of the school 
environment in which he writes his essays is compromising the realization of his true self: 
  
 Whoever he truly is, whoever the true “I” is that ought to be rising out of the ashes of his childhood, is not 
being allowed to be born, is being kept puny an stunted. (Coetzee, Boyhood 140) 
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 This notion of the self appears to match the biographer's sense of what he is doing: “What I am doing is telling the 
story of a stage in his life, or if we can't have a single story then several stories from several perspectives,” says Mr 




approach that is linked explicitly to his authorial self in the Martin-interview – is the idea that there 
is a secret essence that defines him, a quality that falls outside the ambit of the self presented as a 
confluence of traces and that lays claim to an independent, or a transcendent subjective identity. 
This notion of the self resists the instrumentalist tendencies of the discursive model of self-
representation, to the extent that it remains beyond the scope even of John's own “self-awareness” 
(213). The point is that it is not simply a matter of choosing between these two versions of the self – 
of deciding which one constitutes the “real” John – but of realizing that both of them occur 
simultaneously (in the same way that the two sides of a fast-spinning coin might be said to occur 
simultaneously, i.e. appearing to manifest in the same field of perception even while they remain 
cognately separate). 
 
An early essay by Coetzee provides us with a clue toward understanding the incessant, vacillating 
conflict between these two incongruous notions of the self in his writing. The essay in question, 
“Nabokov’s Pale Fire and the Primacy of Art,” was published in UCT Studies in English in October 
1974, and is an attempt to untangle, systematically, but also perhaps mock-systematically, the 
various layers of illusion at work in Nabokov’s inventive story about critical interpretation gone 
awry. There is no space here to go into the details of the ailing émigré Charles Kinbote’s misguided 
attempt to read his own life story into a long poem written by his famous-poet neighbour, John 
Shade (an exegesis that makes up the main portion of the story, and that concerns Kinbote’s 
supposed previous existence as a monarch in the fantastical Northern kingdom of Zembla), or to 
give a comprehensive overview of Coetzee’s reading of the novel (which is made up of thirteen 
numbered paragraphs, echoing the writing technique he would employ in his next novel, In the 
Heart of the Country). What I would like to draw attention to instead is the extent to which Coetzee 
is preoccupied, even at this early stage in his career (Dusklands appeared in the same year as the 
essay; In the Heart of the Country was still three years off from publication), with the question of 




(“planes in the same way that the surface of a mirror is a plane,” writes Coetzee in the opening 
paragraph, “Nabokov's Pale Fire and the Primacy of Art” 1) and the field of reality that lies outside, 
or beyond the text (“the bedrock of a real sense of the real,” 4). Nabokov’s novel, writes Coetzee, 
makes use of a double irony (it pokes fun at its own conspicuous method of writing a novel that 
consists almost entirely of exegesis, 6) in order to protect itself from literary-critical interpretations 
that would seek to explicate it (or “reduce” it, 4) according to some other, external field of meaning 
(the main culprit in this case being psychoanalysis, 4). Coetzee’s verdict is that the true hero of 
Nabokov’s novel, lurking behind the layers of irony, is “the imagination personified and 
triumphant”: 
 
The ideal of Pale Fire is a Symbolist ideal: a state of being in which, having 
incorporated into itself all possible interpretations of itself, the work of art has, like a 
closed system of mirrors, shut itself off forever from interpretation and become a 
monument of unageing intellect.
28
 (Coetzee, “Nabokov’s Pale Fire and the Primacy of 
Art” 6) 
 
However, it turns out that Nabokov's clever method for resisting the reduction of a work of art to an 
auxiliary role within a larger explicatory framework – his anti-reductionism, we might say – is at 
best a temporary measure. Every act of exegesis, including Nabokov's ironically subversive 
application of it in Pale Fire, is itself open to “the endless exegesis of the meta-myth we call 
history,” and “[b]y incorporating the exegesis into the fiction we do not escape history, we merely 
pre-empt its first stage” (Coetzee, “Nabokov's Pale Fire and the Primacy of Art” 6). What is 
relevant here is the extent to which Coetzee's reading of Pale Fire stakes out a confrontational 
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 Coetzee's phrasing here (“monuments of unageing intellect”) echoes Yeats's “Sailing to Byzantium”, in which the 
speaker, who has grown too old to participate in the sensual rituals of youth, yearns to leave behind his ailing body 
and to enter into a realm of pure imagination, the mythical Byzantium, where the fires of art will purge him of his 
corporeal form and put him at a distance from the ravages of history. It is a poem that resurfaces in Coetzee's 
Disgrace, when David Lurie speculates on his own banishment from the realm of youthful lovemaking: “He sighs. 
The young in one another's arms, heedless, engrossed in the sensual music. No country, this, for old men” (Coetzee, 
Disgrace 190). In Coetzee's reading of Nabokov, as well as in the story of David Lurie's fall from grace, the 
invocation of Yeats's emblematic poem occurs in a literary paradigm that is deeply critical of the transcendent rights 
of the imagination; nevertheless it is telling that Coetzee's literary sensibility continues to be informed by questions 




relationship between the autonomy of the creative imagination, on the one hand, and the force of 
history, on the other – a force, in Coetzee's view, that neuters the potency of the imagination by 
roping it in as a supplement to its own material ends. The essay on Nabokov confirms Coetzee's 
well-documented interest in what has since become familiar, from the vantage point of the present, 
as the literary techniques of postmodernism, but it also suggests that there has been from the start of 
his career a certain scepticism concerning the efficacy of those techniques (irony, self-parody, 
pastiche, paradox: in short, the whole web of internally signifying elements that works to sever the 
text from easy associations with the field of the real) in achieving the ideal of artistic autonomy to 
which, in Coetzee’s reading, they bear witness. 
 
It is in the light of these preoccupations that we begin to discern something that resembles a purpose 
– or perhaps we might simply call it a point of departure – behind the conflicted sense of self that 
emerges in a book like Summertime. The insular approach described above (the “closed system of 
mirrors”), and the dream of a transcendent truth to which it testifies – a truth of the imagination that 
does not need to justify itself according to an external measure of value, that carves out a niche for 
itself in opposition to the demands of historical or socio-material demands of accountability – is 
discernible in Coetzee's work, but it does not delimit the boundaries of his creative project, or does 
not describe the limits of the field of play in which his work occurs. Instead, we could say that 
Coetzee's fiction (autobiographical and otherwise) zeroes in on the sense of antagonism that he 
perceives between the push for artistic autonomy (a push that he explicitly associates, in his essay 
on Pale Fire, with Romanticism, and with the Romantic appropriation of the myth that “the 
madman is the greatest truth-teller,” Coetzee, “Nabokov's Pale Fire and the Primacy of Art” 6), and 
the encroachment of history, or the incessant interrogation at the hands of history of any truth-
claims made on behalf of the creative imagination. That is to say, Coetzee's work does not erect 
itself as a monument against the onslaught of a reality that lies somewhere beyond the text, but is 




sufficient powers of creative inspiration (“the divine and exhilarating fire of creativity,” or “the 
sacred fire of art,” as the protagonist of Youth envisions it, Coetzee, Youth  66) and the indifferent, 
yet insistent mechanisms of the world in which that ideal has its existence, and that does not spare it 
from scrutiny (“Now and again, for an instant, it is given to him to see himself from the outside: a 
whispering, worried boy-man, so dull and ordinary that you would not spare him a second glance,” 
remarks the narrator about the same protagonist in Youth, 116). Summertime, with its two versions 
of the author-self (one that is aligned with the “divine” spirit of creative inspiration, and the other 
that takes its form as a confluence of historical traces), presents us with the idea that this sharp note 
of dissonance, reverberating throughout Coetzee’s work, can be taken as a source or origin for his 
creative output, or as the grounds in which the subject in his writing has its foundation. 
 
5. A Word on Method 
 
That, at least, is the main conceit, or the principle of organization around which my thesis is 
arranged. It is in the perpetual staging of conflict – a conflict that makes itself felt at every level of 
the writing, from the larger structural organization of the text to the minutiae of the language, and 
that involves, at its most basic level, an ideal of autonomous creative purpose that is 
incommensurate with a discursive framework that speaks to a historicized sense of reality – that we 
can begin to speak of the persistence of an authorial presence in Coetzee’s work. If we take into 
account the series of qualifying assertions that JC brings to bear on the notion of authority in Diary 
of a Bad Year, and the seam that each of them exposes between the intimation of a transcendent 
subjective reality, on the one hand, and the awareness, on the other, that meaning – including 
subjective meaning – always depends on contextual, or material frameworks of understanding, then 
we begin to realize that authorial voice in Coetzee's work is constructed in a very peculiar way. For 
Coetzee, we might say, the source of authority in writing lies in the measure to which the text 




determine, for better or worse, the way in which that voice is heard (or not heard). 
 
The emphasis here is very much on the conflict rather than on its resolution. In one of the 
interviews in Doubling the Point, Coetzee indicates how deeply his sense of what it means to be a 
writer has been influenced by the notion of giving voice to an unresolved state of conflict, when he 
says about his novel Age of Iron: 
 
So a contest is staged, not only in the dramatic construction of the novel but also within 
Elizabeth's – what shall I say? – soul, a contest about having a say. To me as a writer, as 
the writer in this case, the outcome of this contest – what is to count as a classic in 
South Africa – is irrelevant. What matters is that the contest is staged, that the dead have 
their say, even those who speak from a totally untenable historical position.
29
 (Coetzee, 
Doubling the Point 250) 
 
The rest of my thesis is devoted to exploring the nature of this conflict (or staging of conflict) that is 
such a central feature of Coetzee's writing, and that occupies the space that is more conventionally 
consigned to the presence of an authorial voice. As I mentioned earlier, I will do so by tracing its 
development through a range of thematic concerns, or recurring preoccupations, that come to the 
fore throughout Coetzee's oeuvre. My focus falls quite strongly (although not exclusively) on those 
of his novels that have been inflected, to a greater or lesser degree, by autobiographical concerns: 
Boyhood, Youth and Summertime, but also Diary of a Bad Year and Elizabeth Costello. The reason 
for this is that I hope to show that the centripetal force of conflict in his work has significant 
implications for the notion of the self that emerges in his writing – and more explicitly for the 
relationship between the author-self and the self that inhabits the writing – and this is a project to 
which the autobiographical slant of those novels is most obviously amenable. In two instances I 
depart (strictly speaking) from the “autobiographical” cast of the novels I have chosen for 
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investigation. In the third chapter, I devote considerable space to Age of Iron, on the grounds that 
that novel presents a sustained portrayal of the theme of voice as it arises from the dynamic tension 
between transcendent and socio-historical demands; and in the final chapter I conclude with a 
reading of Coetzee's most recent novel, The Childhood of Jesus, with the aim of presenting a 
retrospective view on the conflicted source of authority that I identify, over the course of my thesis, 
as a defining feature of Coetzee's literary oeuvre. 
 
I have attempted, in the chapter to follow, to draw the terms of the conflict in Coetzee's work from a 
Romantic ideology and practice of writing, for the reasons I have mentioned in this introduction, 
but also because, with Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, I think that “Romanticism 
does not lead us to anything that one might imitate or that one might be ‘inspired by’, and this is 
because … it ‘leads’ us first of all to ourselves” (The Literary Absolute 2). That is to say, I have 
chosen to focalize my discussion of the dynamics of selfhood and self-representation in Coetzee's 
writing by associating it variously with the origins of those ideas in the Romantic period, because I 
think those ideas are still an important and productive resource for making sense of contemporary 
literary questions, and especially so for Coetzee. 
 
Thus, in the first chapter, which is an exploration of Coetzee's engagement with the question of self-
expression as it emerges from the tradition of confessional writing, Jean-Jacques Rousseau figures 
quite prominently as a point of departure for the antagonism that prevails in Coetzee's writing 
between the desire for self-expression and the realization that that desire is usurped by the 
discursive requirements of self-representation in literature. Likewise, in the second chapter, which 
considers the importance of the farm in the formation of the self in Coetzee's autobiographical 
fiction, I trace the protagonist's conflicted sense of displacement in the landscape of his youth to the 
Romantic expression of a unified sense of self that is achieved through communion with the natural 




where the discussion shifts to an investigation of the influence of the socio-historical environment 
on the self that inhabits Coetzee’s writing, I refer to Blake and Keats to provide a context for 
Coetzee's strategic portrayal of the rights of the aesthetic imagination, which forms part, in turn, of 
the larger argument concerning the peculiar realization of voice in his writing. Finally, in the 
conclusion, I tie together the various strands of my argument by tracing the measure to which 
Coetzee's literary practice, and the sense of self that derives from that practice, can be thought of as 
a sustained expression of the ideal of transcendence in the face of the antagonistic pressure that the 
historical context of and in his work exerts on that ideal. 
 
My purpose, as I hope will become clear in the course of the thesis, has not been to give a definitive 
account of the Romantic heritage, or even a comprehensive sense of its continued influence in the 
literary milieu in which Coetzee's writing has its place. Rather, I have used certain influential 
Romantic ideas as mooring points for my argument surrounding the centrality of conflict in 
Coetzee's explorations of self-expression, and of what it means to write about the self. Most often, 
the point is to demonstrate his departure from these mooring points: it is a departure, however, that 
retains the memory of the unified sense of self that those ideas represent. This memory of an earlier, 
authentic sense of self, and Coetzee's interrogation of that memory at the hand of an analysis of 
certain important moments in the heritage of confessional writing, is the point at which the first 





THE SUBJECT OF CONFESSION 
 
1. Coetzee, Rousseau and the Problem of the Self 
 
In 1984, when J.M. Coetzee became the Professor of General Literature at the University of Cape 
Town, he chose as the topic for his inaugural lecture the problem of truth in autobiography. At the 
time he had not yet embarked on his own autobiographical venture – Boyhood would only appear 
some thirteen years later – but the lecture foreshadows, or coincides with his well-known essay 
“Confession and Double Thoughts,” which first appeared in 1985 and is likewise concerned with 
the problem of getting to the truth of the self in writing. In that essay, says Coetzee in an interview 
with David Attwell, he sees himself “getting away from microenvironments and taking on broader 
critical themes” (Coetzee, Doubling the Point 243). The implication is that his investigation into 
what it means to tell the truth about the self constitutes an important moment in his evolution as a 
writer and critical thinker.
30
 My aim in this chapter is to explore Coetzee's investment in the idea of 
truthful self-expression by considering his engagement with certain aspects of the tradition of 
confessional writing. What I hope to demonstrate is that Coetzee's work, and especially his 
autobiographical fiction (Boyhood, Youth, Summertime), collapses the distinction between the 
confessional subject as a primary and the confessional text as a secondary source of interest, and 
points us toward the idea that the truth of the self cannot be thought separately from the being that it 
acquires in writing: that it is in the conflict between transcendent and discursive notions of 
subjective experience that the self has its grounding in Coetzee's work. 
 
In the introduction I argued that the interrogation of an authentic, integral self that precedes the text 
– an interrogation that draws quite heavily on a poststructuralist animosity towards the idea of an a 
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priori author-subject, and from Roland Barthes in particular
31
 – constitutes an important point of 
departure in Coetzee’s writing. In both of the aforementioned critical pieces dealing with the 
problem of the true self in writing, the Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau forms the basis for 
Coetzee’s interrogation of the ideal of an a priori author-self. The particular kind of writing Coetzee 
is concerned with in those pieces is the secular confession, of which Rousseau's compulsive memoir 
is the historical prototype. The conceit, or mechanism underlying the secular confession, Coetzee 
explains, is that it has replaced a faith in divine grace as the source of absolution with a belief that a 
true representation of the self, or a representation of the true self, is in itself enough to absolve the 
confessant from the burden of guilt that compels the writing in the first place (Doubling the Point 
252). However, as Coetzee demonstrates through a conceptual analysis of Rousseau's attitude 
toward money (269-272), the problem with this belief is that it is always possible to read a 
submerged truth behind the truth that is proffered in the confession,
32
 hence casting doubt either on 
the confessant's sincerity, or on his fitness as the author of his own truth (273). In both cases the 
veracity of the confessant is brought into question, and the possibility of absolution is undone by the 
endless deferral of the truth of the self (274). 
 
Despite his thoughts concerning the problems surrounding the integrity of the true self in 
Rousseau's Confessions, Coetzee is reluctant to dismiss the idea of truthfulness in writing per se. In 
an interview with David Attwell that precedes the confession essay (“Confession and Double 
Thoughts”) in Doubling the Point, Coetzee has the following to say about his continued admiration 
for Dostoevsky and Tolstoy: “I read them on what I take to be their own terms, that is, in terms of 
their power to tell the truth as well as to subvert secular scepticism about the truth, getting behind 
sceptical ploys to get behind them” (Doubling the Point 245). Later in the same interview he states 
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 The submerged truth in this case, Coetzee explains, is that what really drives Rousseau is not the desire to confess 
his awkward relationship with money. Instead, Rousseau presents us with a contradictory truth about that 
relationship, which reveals a deeper desire on his part to retain shameful truths about himself in order to keep on 
having something to confess (Coetzee, Doubling the Point 271). The more profound truth about Rousseau – that 




his belief that if “stories must aspire to be more than merely interesting, then one must go beyond 
psychology” (245). I make these observations because I would like to raise the point that for 
Coetzee the structural complexities of self-consciousness in Rousseau's Confessions appear to be of 
more than merely rhetorical concern. What Coetzee is interrogating is not so much, or not only the 
peculiar shortcomings of Rousseau's confessional procedure, but rather the extent to which 
Rousseau relies on the ideal of an essential self to give his narrative the ring of authenticity. If one 
cannot rely on sincere self-knowledge – on that which Coetzee calls in his inaugural lecture “the 
immediate presence of the moral self to the self” (“Truth in Autobiography” 4) – to supply an 
autobiographical narrative with the force of truth, if the essential truth of the self is to remain 
forever sealed off from the author who is writing the story of his or her own life, as Coetzee argues 
in his reading of Rousseau, then it becomes pertinent to conceive of another grounds for 
determining the truth-value of the relationship between the experience of being a self and the 
narrative in which that self accounts for his or her existence. 
 
Before we move on to a more detailed consideration of Coetzee's engagement with the heritage of 
confessional writing, it is worth pointing out that the value Rousseau attaches to the ideal of an 
original, authentic self is not limited to his confessional project, but appears to have had a strong 
influence on his political thought as well. So, in chapter six of the first book of The Social Contract, 
Rousseau defines the “fundamental problem” (Social Contract 55) to which the contract proposes 
an answer as follows:  
 
[To] find a form of association which will defend and protect, with the whole of its joint 
strength, the person and property of each associate, and under which each of them, 
uniting himself to all, will obey himself alone, and remain free as before. (Rousseau, 
Social Contract 54, my emphasis) 
 




himself, is the injunction to safeguard as far as possible the “original state” (Social Contract 54) of 
the individual, which is expressed here in terms of the rights of that individual to live according to 
his own person in total freedom. What is startling about Rousseau's definition of the problem is the 
extent to which he bends the requirements of the social pact to conform to his beliefs in the 
sovereignty of individual being. Even while he concedes the need for establishing a form of social 
organization, we can perceive from his definition of the “general will” that is brought about by such 
an organization that it is important for him to maintain the sacrosanct rights of the individual: 
“[E]ach in giving himself to all gives himself to none, and since there are no associates over whom 
he does not acquire the rights as he cedes, he gains the equivalent of all that he loses, and greater 
strength for the conservation of what he possesses” (55, my emphasis). 
 
The force of this belief finds a more comprehensive expression in Rousseau’s Discours sur l’origine 
et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes, in which he argues, not without controversy and 
perhaps more abrasively than in The Social Contract, that man has been incorrigibly corrupted by 
the advent of society. The image that has entered the popular imagination from the Discours is that 
of the so-called “noble savage”, a primitive man who exists, according to Rousseau, in a state of 
unconscious equanimity with nature, wholly untroubled by the problems that arise from self-
reflexive thought (Discours 31). From this ideal, and indeed heavily idealized original state the 
savage man is lured, in time, by the vanity that accompanies the first crude cultural awakenings – 
Rousseau mentions in particular the desire for self-esteem that goes along with the emergence of 
communal song and dance (73) – until finally he is so consumed by an entirely negative “amour-
propre”, or self-love, that he becomes trapped in capricious vice and estranged from his own true 
being (Dent, A Rousseau Dictionary 33). 
 
What I would like to draw from these brief extrapolations from Rousseau's political writing is his 




has been shaped by society. Seen in the light of this belief, Rousseau's self-proclaimed purpose in 
the Confessions to show us a “portrait” of himself that is “in every way true to nature” (Confessions 
17) takes on a philosophical slant that throws into relief the ways in which Coetzee departs from it 
in his own writing. One of the more significant instances of this departure, to my mind, comes from 
the opening pages of Coetzee’s Diary of Bad Year, in which JC, the author-narrator, voices his 
opinion on the origins of the state. The immediate point of reference in his discussion of what it 
entails to be a subject of the state is Hobbes's Leviathan, but it is hard not to hear echoes of 
Rousseau in his observation that “[f]rom the moment of our birth we are subject” (Coetzee, Diary of 
a Bad Year 4). Whereas it is important for Rousseau to maintain that, despite the fact that he finds 
himself everywhere in chains, man is essentially born free (“L'homme est né libre, et par-tout il est 
dans les fers”, Du contrat social 173), JC has a rather more fatalistic sense of things: man is born 
into chains – the chains of the “certificate of birth” (Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 4) – and there he 
will remain until his death. 
 
What JC's resignation to a condition of inherent subjecthood begins to reveal is a notion of the self 
as always already compromised by the circumstances under which he or she comes into existence. 
Just as there does not exist, for JC, a position outside politics from which to speak about politics 
(Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 9), there does not appear to be a position available to him from which 
to discern in its essential form the contours of his own self. And yet, in the very expression of his 
condition as a condition of compromise, we hear lingering traces of regret: regret that something 
fundamental and inalienable has been lost. It is within this hollow created by the absence of an 
integral self that JC articulates his invective against the totality of the state. In similar fashion, I 
think, it is in the absence of an ideal knowledge of the self that we can discern in Coetzee a 






2. Shameful Incidents 
 
Coetzee's autobiographical fictions are punctuated with episodes that would make rich material for 
a conventional confessional narrative. In Boyhood, for example, we read how John crushed his 
brother's hand in a mealie-grinding machine, and never apologized (Coetzee, Boyhood 119); or of 
the burden of guilt he feels toward Eddie, the coloured boy from Ida’s Valley who worked for his 
family, and who was flogged senseless by the boarder, Trevelyan, for trying to run away (77). Youth 
contains numerous accounts of John's ignominious conduct in matters of sex: his immature response 
to Sally's abortion (Coetzee, Youth 35); his tactical withdrawal from his cousin's friend, Marianne, 
when he takes her virginity and cannot deal with the bloody aftermath (130).
33
 In this section, I 
would like to focus on one such shameful incident in Summertime. My aim is to give a sense of the 
curious double function of the confessional moment in Coetzee's work: the way in which it 
produces a heightened emotional effect even while it reveals a conceptual reworking of the terms of 
self-expression in writing. 
 
The incident in question is from one of the undated notebook fragments that comprise the last part 
of Summertime. When he was sixteen years old, John reports, he was a devout admirer of Bach, and 
he could not tolerate his father's preference for Italian music: 
 
For its sensuality and decadence – that was how, at the age of sixteen, he saw it – he 
resolved he would for ever hate and despise Italian opera. That he might despise it 
simply because his father loved it, that he would have resolved to hate and despise 
anything in the world that his father loved, was a possibility he would not admit. 
One day, while no one was around, he took the Tebaldi record out of its sleeve and 
with a razor blade drew a deep score across its surface. 
On Sunday evening his father put on the record. With each revolution the needle 
jumped. ‘Who has done this?’ he demanded. But no one, it seemed, had done it. It had 
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Thus ended Tibaldi; now Bach could reign unchallenged. (Coetzee, Summertime 249) 
 
The focal aspect of the incident is the sentence that describes the way in which John inflicts damage 
on the record. This sentence (“One day, while no one was around, he took the Tebaldi record out of 
its sleeve and with a razor blade drew a deep score across its surface”) claims its own paragraph; its 
separation enhances the impact of words that are at once explicit and allusive in their effect. The 
locution “razor blade” in particular elicits a wince: we are struck both by its aural effect (the 
deceptive sibilant, the drawn-out violence of the “blade”) and by the sense of surgical detachment 
that it imparts to John's ruining of his father's music. The visceral impact of the sentence provides 
an intimation of the malice that prompted the misdeed and contributes to the sense of shame we 
discern in the protagonist's recollection of it. 
 
Quite beyond the sensory impact of the words, however, the incident betrays an even more 
shameful aspect. It was not necessary for John to damage the record in order to prevent it from 
being played (and so to free the house of the despised Italian influence). It would have been simpler 
to get rid of the record somehow, to hide it under a mattress or to bury it in the backyard, for 
example. The point is that by damaging the record and leaving it for his father to find, John reveals 
that his real intention was to communicate his hatred for the music to his father. The specific means 
by which he gains his triumph adds a dimension of personal hatred to the incident that enhances its 
shamefulness and makes it more valuable as something to confess, at a future date, when he appears 
to be experimenting with things to write about in his notebook. 
 
In this regard, we may note that the incriminating passage is carefully staged to produce a 
heightened emotional effect. The notebook entry in which it appears begins with a long description 
of a visit to a rugby match at Newlands, in which John goes to some lengths to establish an image 




belongs to a club of “sad old men” (247): “solitary men in grey gabardine raincoats in the twilight 
of their lives, keeping to themselves as if their loneliness were a shameful disease” (246). Like the 
rest of the men in his family, he is “without any passion that he [John] can put his finger on” (247). 
Even though the scoring of the record took place many years earlier, it is this image of his father as 
a sad, friendless man with no discernible passions that lingers in the mind when we read about the 
crime his son committed against him. Along with the sympathy-inducing image of the victim, then, 
the gravity of the confession is amplified by the meaning that resides in the object of the crime, 
namely music: the one thing John knew without a doubt his father had a passion for. 
 
The fact that John chooses music as the platform on which to enact his vendetta against his father is 
in itself highly significant, and provides us with an opportunity to move away from the emotional 
impact of the confession to a discussion of its conceptual implications. Firstly, we note the extent to 
which John avoids taking personal responsibility for his actions. When his father discovers the 
ruined record and asks, “Who has done this?” John remains silent (Coetzee, Summertime 249); he 
does not wish to bring the confrontation out into the open. Instead, he gets his point across by 
meddling with the aesthetic medium in which both of them have a vested interest, namely the 
medium of music. Both of them derive pleasure from music – in both of them it evokes a passionate 
response – and rather than engaging directly with his father, John prefers to claim control over this 
common ground between them. 
 
Music, and especially Bach – the composer whom John pits against his father’s beloved Tebaldi – 
occupies a privileged place in Coetzee’s work. In Diary of a Bad Year, for example, we find the 
following emphatic adulation of Bach: “The best proof we have that life is good, and therefore that 
there may perhaps be a God after all, who has our welfare at heart, is that to each of us, on the day 
we are born, comes the music of Johann Sebastian Bach” (Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 221). In the 




father”, and whether this claim might not be related to the fact that he was, in his own life, “such a 
bad son” (222). Curiously, then, we notice that the conceptual triad of “autobiographical 
protagonist”, “father” and “Bach” do not feature in Summertime only: they are connected by various 
strands to Coetzee's previous work (like the passage from Diary of a Bad Year cited above). What 
begins to emerge is that the focal point of the confession, the “razor blade” that elicits such a 
pointed response from the reader, cannot be taken in isolation. It rests on a deeply complex 
engagement, spanning across Coetzee's oeuvre, with the way in which personal feeling – the 
traditional stuff of confession – weaves itself into the aesthetic material that constitutes the common 
ground of the text. 
 
It is on this level that Coetzee's work reveals most profoundly the coterminous presence of the 
emotional need to confess, or to speak truthfully about the self, with a conceptual awareness of the 
dynamics of textual representation that enable (or disable) the possibility of self-expression. The 
point is brought home when we consider the way in which John's admiration for Bach also finds its 
way into a critical essay that Coetzee writes on the question of the classic: 
 
One Sunday afternoon in the summer of 1955, when I was fifteen years old, I was 
mooning around our back garden in the suburbs of Cape Town, wondering what to do, 
boredom being the main problem of existence in those days, when from the house next 
door I heard music. As long as the music lasted, I was frozen, I dared not breathe. I was 
being spoken to by the music as music had never spoken to me before. 
What I was listening to was a recording of Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier, played on the 
harpsichord. (Coetzee, “What is a Classic? A Lecture” 9) 
 
This “moment of revelation” was significant to him, says Coetzee, because “for the first time in 
[his] life [he] was undergoing the impact of the classic” (“What is a Classic? A Lecture” 10). In the 
essay he uses this autobiographical moment to stake out a middle ground between two opposing 




the “socio-cultural” (the classic as historically determined) (9), and finally to suggest that the classic 
in art is that which survives the most stringent critical and historical interrogation (19). Without 
going into the detail of the argument,
34
 we may remark on the peculiarity of an autobiographical 
moment – a refreshingly unambiguous autobiographical moment, written in the first person – 
informing a critical investigation into what constitutes lasting value in art. This realization, along 
with the fact that it is once again Bach who scores the passage, alters our understanding of the 
confessional passage in Summertime somewhat. It begins to seem as if that passage, in which John 
takes a calculated step towards asserting his aesthetic preference by replacing his father's music 
with his own, has as much to do with the relationship between father and son and the emotional 
carriage of that relationship, as it has to do with a performative acknowledgement, and confession 
perhaps, of an aesthetic predisposition that has informed Coetzee's approach to the business of 
writing throughout his career. It becomes more and more difficult, in a word, to disentangle the 
personal content of the confession, as it pertains to John, from the stylistic implications of the 
textual structure in which it appears, as it pertains to Coetzee, the writer of the book. What begins to 
emerge is the notion that the truth of the self, in Coetzee's work, is somehow vested in the textual 
practice that informs his writing. In the next section, I will elaborate on this idea by describing its 
germination in a selection of works from the history of confessional writing. 
 
3. The Subjective Dynamics of Confession 
 
A crucial element in a confessional narrative is for the reader to be convinced of the authenticity of 
the confessant's remorse. That is to say, in order for a confession to signal the possibility of moral 
absolution, we expect a certain level of demonstrative culpability on the part of the person who is 
making the confession. We expect, in other words, for a confession to be made in a spirit of 
sincerity. We might even say that the spirit of sincerity counts for more, in the moral exchange 
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between confessant and confessor, than the quantitative cost of the misdeed the confession 
describes. This dynamic is already evident in one of the foundational texts of confessional literature, 
namely the Confessions of St. Augustine – a text that forms an important mooring point for 
Coetzee's thoughts on confession in his essay “Confession and Double Thoughts” (Doubling the 
Point 251), and that is also the starting point for my investigation into the dynamics of subjective 
truth-telling in the tradition of confessional literature (the other two being Romantic texts: 
Rousseau's Confessions and Thomas De Quincey's Confessions of an English Opium-Eater). 
 
In his sixteenth year,
35
 writes Augustine in Book II of his Confessions, he was living in an 
“abominable” state, “floundering and broiling in the sea of [his] fornication” (Confessions 43). 
Living thus, at a remove from God and caring for nothing “but to love and be loved” (43) by his 
friends, he goes out one night to steal some pears from a tree growing near the family vineyard: 
 
Late one night a band of ruffians, myself included, went off to shake down the fruit and 
carry it away, for we had continued our games out of doors until well after dark, as was 
our pernicious habit. We took away an enormous quantity of pears, not to eat them 
ourselves, but simply to throw them to the pigs. Perhaps we ate some of them, but our 
real pleasure consisted in doing something that was forbidden. (Augustine, Confessions 
47) 
  
Augustine goes on to beg the Lord to look into his heart and to discover the secret reason behind his 
mischief. “I loved my own perdition and my own faults, not the things for which I committed 
wrong, but the wrong itself”, he says, and adds that he was “looking for no profit in disgrace but 
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crime in a story about a transgression committed by a fictional version of his own teenage self, Coetzee implicitly 
draws the Augustinian notion of grace (and the ideal of transcendence that lies behind it) into the discursive field 





only for disgrace itself” (Augustine, Confessions 47). What is interesting about this confession is 
not so much the nature of the crime (in fact, one is hard put to think of a less harmful crime than a 
childish theft of fruit), but rather the moral economy that underlies it. What is shameful about the 
transgression, says Augustine, is not an abject desire for his neighbour's pears, or the fact that he 
caused his neighbour grief by diminishing his fruit harvest, or even the offence that he may have 
caused God by committing the sin of theft. What is shameful, rather, is that he was willing to follow 
the inclinations of his own corrupt heart. 
 
In this regard it is significant that Augustine chooses so modest a crime to confess.
36
 The patent lack 
of potential material consequences resulting from his petty theft emphasizes that what is at stake is 
not the degree of the transgression, but rather the moral constitution of the self who commits that 
transgression. Nor is his remorse directed so much at the disgraceful condition of his heart, but 
rather at the fact that he took the leanings of that heart as a principle for guiding his actions. The 
shame lies in the self that has not yet prostrated itself in order to better serve God, but is on the 
contrary still enthralled by the fluctuations of its own desire. It is not my intention here to enter into 
a discussion of early Christian theology, but we may venture to say that for Augustine, the essence 
of sinfulness, and hence the kernel of his confession, is a self that accepts its own fickle being as a 
source of authority. This observation fits in with Augustine's doctrine of salvation: the belief, as 
Bertrand Russell explains, that all humankind descends from Adam's original sin, and hence that 
“we all deserve eternal damnation”; that no one has it in their power to abstain from sin of their own 
accord; that it is only the elect few that are chosen, through the mercy of God, to be saved (Russell, 
“St Augustine's Philosophy and Theology” 339). The only way to bring an end to the inbred 
sinfulness of the human condition, then, is to give oneself over unconditionally to God, or to step 
away entirely from the “twisted tangle of knots” that makes up one's own efforts to account for 
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 For modern readers, Augustine's ardent self-flagellation before so paltry a crime – the handwringing and 
exclamations of remorse carry on for seven pages – comes across as misplaced, or even “morbid,” as Bertrand 
Russell notes, but “in his own age it seemed right and a mark of holiness” (Russell, “Three Doctors of the Church” 
323). Russell goes on to observe, rather ominously, that “[a] great deal of what is most ferocious in the medieval 




sinfulness (Augustine, Confessions 52). 
 
The sequence of chapters that describes Augustine's final struggle against the shackles of his 
divided will, and the epiphanic moment of conversion that takes place at the end of it (Book VIII, 
chapters 6-12), posits the advent of grace quite firmly as a necessary step in achieving the self-
transcendence that is needed to bring about the confessional procedure. Events are set in motion 
when Augustine (who has primed himself for his Damascus moment by reading the epistles of Paul, 
Confessions 166) hears a story from his friend Ponticianus about the recent conversion of two men 
that had taken place in a house near the city walls of Trêve (modern-day Trier). A strange thing 
happens to Augustine while he is listening to the story: 
 
[W]hile he was speaking, O Lord, you were turning me around to look at myself. For I 
had placed myself behind my own back, refusing to see myself. You were setting me 
before my own eyes so that I could see how sordid I was, how deformed and squalid, 
how tainted with ulcers and sores. (Augustine, Confessions 169) 
 
The process that is set in motion here is one of separation: Augustine, in being able to see himself 
(“how deformed and squalid, how tainted with ulcers and sores”), is slowly becoming divorced 
from himself. The pages that follow are an agonizing – and rhetorically captivating – description of 
the trauma of self-detachment. Augustine is quite literally deformed by the agony of “the fierce 
conflict which [he] had stirred up against [his] soul in [their] common abode, [his] heart” 
(Confessions 170).
37
 He is driven to seek refuge in the garden outside, where no one “could 
interrupt that fierce struggle, in which [he] was [his] own contestant” (171). The self from whom he 
is trying so painfully to divest himself is a self that is beset by a sense of its own inner conflict: 
 
When I was trying to reach a decision about serving the Lord my God, as I had long 
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 “For my voice sounded strange and the expression of my face and eyes, my flushed cheeks, and the pitch of my voice 




intended to do, it was I who willed to take this course and again it was I who willed not 
to take it. It was I and I alone. But I neither willed to do it nor refused to do it with my 
full will. So I was at odds with myself. I was throwing myself into confusion. 




In this way I wrangled with myself, in my own heart, about my own self. (Augustine, 
Confessions 177) 
 
Augustine's struggle against his own self gradually builds up in intensity, until he has gone some 
distance toward leaving his “old attachments” behind (“They no longer barred my way, blatantly 
contradictorily, but their mutterings seemed to reach me from behind, as though they were stealthily 
plucking at my back,” Confessions 176), and until he has reached the very edge of the boundary that 
separates him from God (“I had turned my eyes elsewhere, and while I stood trembling at the 
barrier, on the other side I could see the chaste beauty of Continence in all her serene, unsullied joy, 
as she modestly beckoned to me to cross over and to hesitate no more,” 176). Yet that is as far as his 
own efforts – his own frantic self-reproaches and cross-examinations – are able to take him. Finally 
he is so ravished by internal conflict that he breaks down in a flood of tears, and that is the exact 
moment when grace intervenes: the “sing-song voice of a child,” drifting from afar, compels him to 
pick up a book and to read the first passage he finds (177). The book at hand is Paul's epistle to the 
Romans, and the passage is an exhortation to leave behind the wanton ways of the world and to 
follow Christ without delay.
38
 As soon as he has finished reading it, Augustine's doubts are 
dispelled, “the light of confidence” floods into his heart, and his conversion is complete (178). 
 
In terms of the subjective dynamics of confession, grace is the name that is given here to the 
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 “Not in revelling and drunkenness, not in lust and wantonness, not in quarrels and rivalries. Rather, arm yourself 
with the Lord Jesus Christ; spend no more thought on nature and nature's appetites” (Rom. 13: 13, 14, quoted in 




inexplicable leap by which the self is finally jettisoned from the endless process of self-
interrogation by which it can do no more than circle helplessly around the fact of its own moral 
corruption. The authenticity of Augustine's confession depends on this movement away from the 
self: a movement that is occasioned by the miraculous intervention of grace, and that underscores 
the sense that he is, at the time of writing, in a position of superior knowledge over the self he has 
left behind. Grace, in this sense, becomes the mechanism that enables a distinction between the 
author of the confession and the subject of his confessional text (which is also himself, but not in 
the same way that the author is himself – it is a previous version of himself: grace is what allows the 
yearned-for self to become the present self, and the present self to become the remembered self).
39
 
Coetzee's work on confession likewise reveals a preoccupation with the workings of grace in the 
dynamics of self-expression, but in a way that departs quite fundamentally from the Augustinian 
notion of grace as a mechanism that allows the author to distinguish himself, implicitly, from the 
morally decrepit being of his confessional subject, and hence to tell the truth about that subject. In 
Coetzee's thought, the great divide that exists between the author and the subject of the confessional 
text – the divide that it is given to Augustine to leap across on the wings of grace – has become 
internalized, as a divide that exists between the two polarized notions of the self that inhabit the 
confessional text itself. The point comes across in Coetzee's final interview in Doubling the Point, 
in which he has the following to say about his essay on confession (“Confession and Double 
Thoughts”): 
 
What was going on in that essay? In the present retrospect I see in it a submerged 
dialogue between two persons. One is a person I desired to be and was feeling my way 
toward. The other is more shadowy: let us call him the person I then was, though he 
may be the person I still am. The field of their debate is truth in autobiography. […] 
In the terms brought into prominence in the essay, the debate is between cynicism and 
grace. Cynicism: the denial of any ultimate basis for values. Grace: a condition in which 
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the truth can be told clearly, without blindness. (Coetzee, Doubling the Point 392) 
 
Coetzee's observation here suggests that the subject in his own writing is constituted in equal 
measure by the pull of grace, on the one hand, and by the endless cycle of self-interrogation that is 
the only discernible measure of the self's reality, on the other. In Coetzee's writing, then, grace does 
not act as a guarantor for a true moral knowledge of the self, as it does for Augustine, but forms part 
of an interminable present of self-expression: an immediate, unattainable horizon against which the 
self's abysmal (“truly abysmal,” Coetzee, Doubling the Point 251) interrogation of its own moral 
character attempts to set itself in relief. 
 
Augustine stands at the head of the tradition that locates a moral knowledge of the self as the 
decisive condition for authentic, or genuine remorse. Whereas this knowledge is only available to 
Augustine retrospectively (in which sense the subject of his confession is not, properly speaking, 
himself, but rather an earlier version of that self) we find a remarkable shift in emphasis some 1400 
years later, in the Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (the two parts of which were published in 
1782 and 1789 respectively). Isaiah Berlin describes the emergence during that period of the 
Romantic belief that sincerity in and of itself is sufficient to guarantee the moral value of a 
pronouncement (The Roots of Romanticism 9)
40
 – a belief that becomes manifest in Rousseau's 
departure from the Augustinian credo that it is necessary to leave the self behind in order for the 
confessional procedure to be set into motion. Rousseau's purpose, by contrast, is no more and no 
less than “to show to his kind a man in all the truth of his nature; and that man, it will be me” 
(Rousseau, Les Confessions 5).
41
 Furthermore, he goes on to  assert: 
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 Berlin notes that what the Romantics admired most was “wholeheartedness, sincerity, purity of soul, the ability and 
readiness to dedicate yourself to your idea, no matter what it was” (The Roots of Romanticism 9). The implication is 
that for the Romantics, the willingness to become absorbed in an impulse or an idea counted for more than whatever 
the merits of that idea or impulse might have been. 
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Let the trumpet of the final judgment sound when it will; I will come with this book in 
my hand to present myself before the Sovereign Judge. I will say proudly: look at what 
I have done, at what I have thought, at what I have been. I have told the good and the 
evil with the same frankness. I have not concealed anything bad, nor have I added 
anything good, and if I have added some small embellishments, this has only been to fill 
up the occasional gap in my faulty memory; I may have taken as true that which I know 
to be probable, but never that which I know to be false. I have shown myself such as I 
was, contemptible and base when I have been so, good, generous and sublime when 
such: I have unveiled my inner being as You yourself have seen it. Eternal Being, gather 
around me the innumerable crowd of my fellow men: let them listen to my confessions, 
let them groan at my shameful deeds, let them blush at my woes. Let each of them 
uncover in turn their heart at your feet with the same sincerity; and then let any one of 
them say, if he dares: I was a better man than he. (Rousseau, Les Confessions 5) 
 
Augustine, we have seen, is at pains to disavow his sinful self before God; here, on the contrary, we 
have Rousseau, who plans to enter paradise precisely by virtue of having presented himself in all 
his dubious glory. The shift that occurs, as J.M. Cohen notes, is that “[b]y Rousseau's age men had 
begun to see themselves not as atoms in a society that stretched down from God to the world of 
nature but as unique individuals, important in their own right” (Introduction 7). We may note in 
passing that the social climate was perhaps not as accepting of Rousseau's secular instincts as his 
brave posture would imply – his persecution in later years was to some extent due to his 
insensitivity to religious convention – but it is certainly true that the ability to reveal the truth about 
himself, as he is, attains value as a moral currency in the confessional dynamics of his narrative. 
The fulcrum on which his confession turns is the belief that absolution depends on the degree of 
success with which he is able to access the immediate truth of his being. 
 
As I mentioned earlier, Rousseau's insistence on the intrinsic value of subjective experience had a 
profound impact on his political thought, but in the Confessions the reader soon discovers that it has 




states that it is not his intention to write an apology for his character, but merely to describe the 
events of his life, both good and bad, and that it is up to the reader to “assemble these elements and 
to determine the being that is made up of them” (Rousseau, Les Confessions 175). However, one 
finds with more and more frequency as the narrative proceeds that he believes himself to be 
misunderstood by almost everyone around him, and indeed the final part of the narrative resembles 
a paranoid or existential detective story, in which erstwhile friends with sinister motives set obscure 
plans in motion for the sole purpose of tormenting poor Rousseau. 
 
As a consequence, and despite his protestations to the contrary, the suspicion arises that his 
professed sincerity has an ulterior motive, one that is directed more toward defending his reputation 
as an innocent victim among his peers than toward a philosophical or moral possibility of 
redemption. Rousseau’s sincerity has been discredited in various places (Leo Strauss, for example, 
argues in L’intention de Rousseau that it is best not take Rousseau at his word, and that one should 
rather look at his collective works in order to find a hidden intention there), which seems to signal 
that his insistence on sincerity as a function of confession might have implications that fall outside 
the economy of remorse and absolution that I have been describing here. We begin to suspect, in 
short, that Rousseau’s avowed belief in the singularity of subjective experience, for which sincerity 
is supposed to act as a guarantor, has more to do with elevating his narrative to a position of 
authority over his enemies, real or imagined, and less with the desire to atone for wrongdoing and 
thus gain moral absolution. 
 
The suspicion concerning Rousseau’s strategic use of sincerity is amplified when we consider some 
of the particular crimes that he chooses to confess. The most heinous thing he ever did in his life, he 
tells us, was to steal a ribbon from a rich household where he was working as a valet and to blame 
the theft on Marion, a servant girl. The master of the house is called in; he fails to obtain a 




their duties. “This burden [of guilt] has lain without relief on my conscience until the present day, 
and I can affirm that the desire to relieve myself of it in some way has contributed much to the 
resolution I took to write my confessions,” he says (Rousseau, Les Confessions 86). He goes on to 
tell us that his refusal to withdraw his accusation was based not on the fear of punishment, but on 
the fear of disgrace, the fear of being called a liar, and furthermore that the remembrance of that 
deed has safeguarded him from committing similar deceptions in later life. What is startling about 
the passage, if we consider it carefully, is that Rousseau foregrounds an episode of patent insincerity 
(“du seul que j’aye jamais commis,” 87) in order to convince the reader of the sincerity of his 
character and of the subjective position from which he writes his narrative. Or, to put it differently, 
it seems relevant in a narrative that is preoccupied above all with the sincerity of its subject that the 
central confession is one in which that subject fails dismally at being sincere. 
 
Rousseau intensifies the effect of his confession by framing it in two very specific ways, namely 1) 
by characterizing Marion as the very picture of innocence, and 2) by asserting that he has never told 
it to anyone before. Both of these framing devices contribute to the gravity of the confession, the 
first by enhancing the magnitude of the crime, and the second by creating a condition of privilege 
for the reader: you, dear reader, are the first person to gain access to these dark places in my heart. 
In order for the reader to enjoy this privilege, it is necessary to accept the sincerity of the narrative 
as more than a rhetorical device. It becomes apparent that the appeal to sincerity does not function 
as a detached addendum to the confession; it is built into the narrative structure of the passage itself. 
 
The strategic use of sincerity does not mean that we must cry fraud and dismiss Rousseau as an 
unreliable witness to his own life, nor would that be a very useful conclusion to reach. The point is 
rather to notice the extent to which the notion of sincerity informs the text on a structural level, and 
conversely the extent to which the structure of the text participates in the creation of the sincere 




economy of remorse and absolution from the narrative structure that gives it shape. If Augustine 
signals to us that literary confession is about the way in which the self transacts itself in relation to 
its own shames and desires, Rousseau's text makes it clear that it is not possible to disentangle those 
shames and desires from the process of representation in which they make themselves known. 
Rousseau’s explicit project is to describe his own being from a position of privileged knowledge – 
the emotional knowledge of how he feels at any given moment in his life – but the reader soon 
discovers that the injunction of sincerity requires a strategic organization of material that belies the 
privileged capacity of the author. Sincerity, it seems, is not a secure channel of transmission through 
which Rousseau emits his subjective experience into the text; rather, we can understand the 
emergence of sincerity in the confessional text as a residue or consequence of the process of 
description. Rousseau is the author of his own sincerity; he creates it by describing it. 
 
In another confessional text that comes to us from the Romantic period, namely Thomas De 
Quincey's Confessions of an English Opium-Eater, we find a rather more elusive engagement with 
the dynamics of subjective representation, one that moves closer to the recognition, in Coetzee's 
work, that the medium of self-expression (i.e. language) alters and perhaps even reconfigures the 
motives that prompt the writing in the first place. The point becomes clear if we consider the 
remarkable shift that takes place  in De Quincey's own sense of what he is trying to achieve in 
writing his Confessions. In the opening pages of his narrative he is careful to distance himself from 
the crime of “self-indulgence” that he perceives in most English confessions (De Quincey, 
Confessions of an English Opium-Eater 2), and from the “acts of gratuitous self-humiliation” that 
he finds in the “French” (1); he goes to some trouble to justify his own project on the basis of its 
usefulness and instructiveness for “the whole class of opium-eaters” (2). However, toward the end 
of his narrative (which in its tendency to digress begins to resemble the adventures of Tristram 





You will think, perhaps, that I am too confidential and communicative of my own 
private history. It may be so. But my way of writing is rather to think aloud, and follow 
my own humours, than much to consider who is listening to me; and, if I stop to 
consider what is proper to be said to this or that person, I shall soon come to doubt 
whether any part at all is proper. The fact is, I place myself at a distance of fifteen or 
twenty years ahead of this time, and suppose myself writing to those who will be 
interested about me hereafter; and wishing to have some record of a time, the entire 
history of which no one can know but myself, I do it as fully as I am able with the 
efforts I am now capable of making, because I know not whether I can ever find time to 
do it again. (De Quincey, Confessions of an English Opium-Eater 62) 
 
The passage indicates a divergence from the task that De Quincey had initially set himself, namely 
the edification of his fellow opium-eaters. It appears that he has come to realize through the course 
of his writing that his actual subject is himself, and his audience is no less than the future historians 
of his life. The English decorum of the opening passages has made way for an unabashed 
confession that he has abandoned considerations of propriety and focused instead on following his 
own “humours”, or on tracing the circuitous route of his thoughts wherever they might lead. It 
appears that De Quincey becomes infected with the delight of writing as soon as he puts his pen to 
paper, and in this sense it may be said that his belated confession at the end of the narrative is an 
acknowledgement that he has allowed himself to be written by the story. The subject of his 
Confessions, then, is the unthreading of intention by the narrative, the emergent realization that the 
subject of the story takes on a life of its own, and far from standing aloof, or preceding the 
narrative, the figure of the writer becomes instead a function of the writing. In this sense, De 
Quincey's Confessions forms a bridge between the conceit of immediate moral self-knowledge that 
is sustained so carefully in Rousseau, and the awareness, in Coetzee's literary project, that the 
subject of the confession is always already constituted by the material of the discourse itself. 
 
One of De Quincey's digressions in particular provides us with an apposite example of the intrusion 




constitution of the subject of the confession. In the midst of a protracted description of the happiest 
year in his life, De Quincey interrupts himself:  
 
And, by the way, now that I speak of giving laudanum away, I remember, about this 
time, a little incident, which I mention, because, trifling as it was, the reader will soon 
meet it again in my dreams, which it influenced more fearfully than could be imagined. 
One day a Malay knocked at my door.” (De Quincey, Confessions of an English Opium-
Eater 55) 
 
The ensuing scene is interesting for various reasons, and although it is quite long, I find it necessary 
to quote a large part of it here. De Quincey is fetched by a servant girl, who is convinced that “a sort 
of demon” (56) has arrived on the doorstep, and when he comes down the stairs, he finds the Malay 
and the servant girl arranged in a picturesque vignette in his kitchen: 
 
And a more striking picture there could not be imagined, than the beautiful English face 
of the girl, and its exquisite fairness, together with her erect and independent attitude, 
contrasted with the sallow and bilious skin of the Malay, enamelled or veneered with 
mahogany, by marine air, his small, fierce, restless eyes, thin lips, slavish gestures and 
adorations. Half-hidden by the ferocious looking Malay, was a little child from a 
neighbouring cottage who had crept in after him, and was now in the act of reverting its 
head, and gazing upwards at the turban and the fiery eyes beneath it, whilst with one 
hand he caught at the dress of the young woman for protection. My knowledge of 
Oriental tongues is not remarkably extensive ... I addressed him in some lines from the 
Iliad; considering that, of such languages as I possessed, Greek, in point of longitude, 
came geographically nearest to an Oriental one. He worshipped me in a most devout 
manner, and replied in what I suppose was Malay. In this way I saved my reputation 
with my neighbours: for the Malay had no means of betraying the secret. (De Quincey, 
Confessions of an English Opium-Eater 56) 
 
De Quincey goes on to explain the voracious opium-devouring habits of his foreign guest; the 




above. If we are able to ignore the racism that inheres in the caricatured description of the Malay, 
and we take De Quincey at his word that to the onlookers the unexpected guest had the appearance 
of a phantasm, then his own role in the proceedings takes on a special significance: he becomes a 
mediator between the familiar and the otherworldly, the one tasked with domesticating the irruption 
of the savage into the homely hearth. It is tempting to read the visitation of the Malay as a surfacing 
of the uncanny, in a cultural sense, but that is not quite the point I am trying to make here. What is 
relevant, rather, is the method of mediation, and the roles of the various participants in the scene, as 
described by De Quincey. Most revealing is the fact that the discourse in which the mediation 
occurs is one that is not mutually understood by the participants. De Quincey quotes the Iliad; the 
Malay responds; the onlookers, the servant girl and the child, imagine that their master has 
successfully contained the emergence of the unreal in their world – has tamed the tiger, so to speak. 
De Quincey’s learning creates for him the persona of someone who is able to converse with the 
unfamiliar, the arcane. He inhabits this persona, which is sustained by the gaze of the witness, and 
proceeds to solidify it by appearing to fit the mould. The Malay has “no means of betraying his 
secret”, and hence De Quincey’s identity has been established through the medium of a discursive 
instant in which the actual content of the discourse has little, if anything, to do with the 
manifestation of that identity. 
 
The deeper truth underlying the confession here is that the form of the discourse, by virtue of 
appearing to be authoritative, has supplanted the constitution of the subjective identity which it 
purports to sustain. There is a rupture between the self who speaks and the self that is created by the 
performance of the discourse. The servant girl and the child, for whose benefit the performance has 
been staged and who may be characterized as passive witnesses to the event, can carry on their lives 
in the secure knowledge that an able custodian patrols the perimeters of their world; De Quincey, as 
we know, is troubled by further visitations from the Malay in his dreams, and benefits from no such 




usurps the creation of a sustainable subjective identity, while at the same time revealing that the 
motion of creation emerges from a self that experiences no such sense of coherence. When De 
Quincey admits that it is up to future historians to piece together the subject of his confession 
(namely himself), he is in a sense acknowledging that he has become aware that his own subjective 
presence in the text has more or less the same effect as the meaning of the Greek in his conversation 
with the Malay: it provides a space of mediation, a site to which the witness (or reader) may attach 
his or her understanding, but it does not reveal its true nature. 
 
From these three pivotal figures in the tradition of confessional writing – Augustine, Rousseau, De 
Quincy – we are able to learn two things concerning the subjective dynamics of confessional 
writing: 1) the truth-value of a confession is linked to the constitution of the moral subject; and 2) 
the constitution of this subject is in important ways a retroactive function of the dynamics of the 
discourse. It is along these lines that Coetzee's autobiographical fiction enacts a reworking of the 
tradition of confessional writing. What it amounts to, I propose, is that he has built into his texts a 
formal resistance to the tendency of narrative discourse to posit an identifiable subject. This, in turn, 
has the rather paradoxical effect of redirecting the question of the truth of the self to that which 
resists articulation, or to that which escapes the defining properties of representational discourse. 
Consequently, we perceive in Coetzee's writing a kind of moral honesty, an honesty that derives 
from his keen awareness of the way in which the material of the discourse usurps the prerogative of 
self-definition, and on his strategic manipulation of narrative resources in order to expose, and 
thereby offer resistance to, the motions of that self-definition. Even as the traditional conditions for 
absolution (i.e. the seamless association between the confessional text and its author-subject) recede 
into the distance, we find that it is compensated for by an imaginative reconstruction of the ideal of 
absolution within a writing praxis that concedes the primary role of the text in the constitution of 
the moral subject. Coetzee's autobiographical fiction – especially if we perceive it in the light of his 




dynamics of confessional writing for our post-religious, post-sincere times. I elaborate on these 
thoughts in the next section by considering another significant moment from Summertime, and by 
presenting an account of Coetzee's treatment of the topic of confessional discourse in his inaugural 




The passage from Summertime I have in mind is one that resonates with the scene from Confessions 
of an English Opium-Eater in which De Quincey and the Malay speak to each other in mutually 
incomprehensible tongues. Margot and John are settling down to face the night in a broken down 
Datsun in the Karoo, twenty kilometres outside the town of Merweville. “Are you sleepy yet?” she 
asks. “I'm not. I have a suggestion. To pass the time, why don't we tell each other stories.” 
 
“You tell a story,” he says stiffly. “I don’t know any stories.” 
 “Tell me a story from America,” she says. “You can make it up, it doesn’t have to be 
true. Any story.” 
 “Given the existence of a personal God,” he says, “with a white beard quaquaquaqua 
outside time without extension who from the heights of divine apathia loves us deeply 
quaquaquaqua with some exceptions.” 
 He stops. She has not the faintest idea what he is talking about. 
 “Quaquaqua,” he says. 
 “I give up,” she says. He is silent. “My turn,” she says. “Here follows the story of the 
princess and the pea.” (Coetzee, Summertime 112) 
 
The figure of the female cousin features prominently in all three of Coetzee’s autobiographical 
fictions (as Agnes, Ilse and Margot respectively), and in all three books their characters gesture 
toward a primordial, prelinguistic intimacy in which John is able to “unburden” himself without the 
benefit of a mediating agency (Coetzee, Summertime 97). Elsewhere in Summertime, he tells 




woman has meant being free to say everything on my heart” (97). There is a passage in Boyhood 
that might be read as an evocation of the same memory he is describing here, one in which the 
young John is conscious of “not having to pretend” with his cousin: “As he spoke he forgot what 
language he was speaking: thoughts simply turned to words within him, transparent words” 
(Coetzee, Boyhood 94). In the light of this relationship – a relationship that is founded on the 
memory of an almost prelapsarian intimacy – the story he chooses to tell her in their moment of 
awkward closeness becomes ripe with potential meaning. 
 
The purpose of storytelling, for Margot, is to pass the time and to defuse the tension that has arisen 
from their earlier talk of politics. John’s idealism (to live in a world where racial segregation is not a 
reality, which compels him to do his own manual labour, which means he has performed his own 
truck repairs) has led to the breakdown, and now he is called upon to draw on his powers as a 
fabulist to ease their plight. He spouts a fragment of what sounds like unintelligible theology. A 
suitably informed reader can identify it as a reference to Lucky's rambling speech in Beckett's 
Waiting for Godot (Beckett 36-38), and may read into it any number of possible meanings: that John 
is making an ironic reference to their situation, in which they are merely passing time while they 
wait for someone to save them (“If we are lucky, someone will drive past,” he says, Coetzee, 
Summertime 110); that he is confessing to Margot that he spent his time in America doing nothing 
more exciting than reading Beckett; or simply that his head is so full of high modernist literary 
references that he has lost the ability to tell a straightforward story. To Margot, however it must 
seem like her cousin has degenerated into quacking like a duck (“quaquaqua”); as far as she is 
concerned, he might as well be speaking Greek. The scene is almost painful in its depiction of 
John's ineptitude in the face of their situation. What I would like to draw from it, however, is the 
discrepancy between John's intended meaning (which is entirely open to interpretation) and 
Margot's perception of it (she has “not the faintest idea what he is talking about,” 112). The 




voice that might enable mutual understanding; John becomes unintelligible at the moment of self-
revelation. The discourse of self-revelation, it seems, is not sufficient to carry the full burden of his 
subjective experience. 
 
The history of the relationship between Margot and John suggests that his “quacking” is a genuine 
attempt to unburden himself to her, or to speak without presenting himself in the guise of 
performative utterance. The time John spent in America is a source of suspicion among his family 
members (Summertime 89), and when his cousin presents him with an opportunity to fabulate his 
experience, or to sketch himself in a better light (“it doesn’t have to be true”, she says), he refuses 
the bait: myth-making, the passage would have us believe, is not part of his repertoire. By refusing 
to tell a proper story, John shows up the performance of narrative as inadequate to the gravity of the 
relationship that exists between him and his cousin. The moment in which he reveals his past by 
telling a story is precisely where one would expect the conventional process of subjective 
constitution to occur; instead, here, it signals a resistance to that very process. In the terms of 
confessional discourse, the implication is that the subject begins to emerge in a negative sense, as an 
absence rather than a presence, something that is perceived as an effect rather than a manifest 
component of the text. 
 
These thoughts find an echo in Coetzee's inaugural lecture on autobiography from 1984, “Truth in 
Autobiography”. As I mentioned earlier, an important point of reference in that lecture is Rousseau's 
Confessions. Coetzee argues that Rousseau confesses strategically – that is to say, stops short of 
letting the cat out of the bag entirely – in order to preserve the interest, and indeed the progression, 
of his narrative. The point Coetzee makes is that discourse in general, and autobiographical 
discourse in particular, depends on the preservation of certain secrets, the revelation of which would 
spell the end of the discourse in question. What is notable about Coetzee's lecture is that there 




it will only be able to reveal at the cost of its own existence. The reader of the lecture has a 
mounting suspicion that it is performing something as much as telling something – a suspicion that 
piques the interest, to the extent that the reader wishes to discover the secret behind the 
performance. This becomes all the more relevant because the lecture is about autobiography, a 
genre that trades on the promise that here, finally, the secret behind the author's literary production 
will be revealed. 
 
I would like to consider the conceptual implications of this tension between the performative aspect 
of Coetzee's lecture, and the resistance to disclosure it enacts, by drawing on an observation made 
by J.L. Austin concerning the performative use of language. Among the varieties of utterances, 
Austin explains in How To Do Things With Words, there are a certain number that do not act as 
simple descriptive statements. These utterances may rather be understood as actions, or 
“performatives”. They include locutions like “I promise”, “I bet”, “I swear” and so forth. However, 
as Austin explains, there are certain conditions under which the actions these statements are 
supposed to accomplish are compromised: 
 
[A] performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said 
by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies 
in a similar manner to any and every utterance – a sea-change in special circumstances. 
Language in such circumstances is in special ways – intelligibly – used not seriously, 
but in ways parasitic upon its normal use – ways which fall under the doctrine of the 
etiolations of language. (Austin, How To Do Things With Words 22) 
 
According to Austin's system, there are distinct modes of language, deriving from the context in 
which it is being used, and the mode of “normal” usage enjoys precedence over the mode of 
“performed” usage. A literary instance of a performative utterance (when Estragon curses Vladimir 
in Waiting for Godot, for example, Beckett 65) acquires whatever meaning it may have from our 




literary performance derives from it in some “etiolated”, or watered-down way. Austin is not 
concerned here with making a value judgement concerning the merits of literary language, but the 
hierarchy that he establishes between different forms of discourse, in which the normal becomes the 
source of the performance, and in which the meaning of the performance depends entirely (that is to 
say, “parasitically”) on the normal that hosts it, presents us with a useful vantage point from which 
to observe the way in which Coetzee upsets the separation, in his lecture on autobiography, between 
a pre-existing subject of confession, i.e. the self, and the confessional discourse that purports to 
articulate the being of that subject. 
 
As is the case with John's unintelligible utterance to Margot in the cold Karoo night, we sense that 
there is something in Coetzee's lecture on autobiography that purposefully offers resistance to the 
enquiring gaze of the reader. “There are truths it may cost too much to tell, not because they lie too 
close to the autobiographer’s heart but because they lie to close to his art,” he says in the lecture 
(Coetzee, “Truth in Autobiography” 5). This is a curious statement, because it points us toward the 
idea that the sense of resistance is a formal aspect of the text, rather than a reference to some kind of 
secret truth of the autobiographical subject that underlies or precedes the production of the text. 
Coetzee puts forward the existence of hidden truths – “truths it may cost too much to tell” – but 
then collapses the relationship of anteriority that these truths are supposed to have with the verbal 
expressions that emerge from them. Instead, the relationship becomes one of simultaneity: the 
hidden source (“truth”) and the visible performance (“telling”) both occupy the same discursive 
field (the autobiographer's “art”). Coetzee's thought here aims to subvert the notion (as Austin 
would have it) that the literary dimension of the autobiographical text – its “performed” aspect – is 
subordinate to an underlying, normative source of meaning. 
 
The implication is that Coetzee engages the tradition of confession in his writing while at the same 




about the self who stands behind it. Ever since Rousseau postulated an immediate knowledge of the 
self as a vital condition for confession, there has been a latent awareness that the process of writing 
doubles back on the subject, formulates and posits the subject as much as describes it. Coetzee's 
writing brings this awareness out into the open, and attempts to answer it by writing a resistance to 
the usurpation of the self by the discourse into his texts. His autobiographical fiction is sincere 
about the fact that it is about himself – most obviously so in the fact that he shares a name with his 
protagonist, and has authored the same books – but it is also sincere about the fact that it does not 
wish to be understood as a secondary source for a deeper truth about its origin. That is to say, the 
subject of confession, for Coetzee, is a property of the discourse itself, in the sense that it actively 
resists becoming a supplement to a more authentic subject that precedes the narrative. The extent to 
which this negatively defined subject takes on a life of its own in Coetzee's writing, and the terms 
according to which it might be said to rekindle the ideal of absolution, can be examined by 
considering its genealogy in consecutive manifestations of Coetzee's autobiographical project. In 
the next, and final section of this chapter I will give an indication of the way in which this 
genealogy can be traced by focusing on an important difference between Boyhood and Summertime, 
namely the changing nature of the relationship between John and his father. 
 
5. His Heart Begins to Throb 
 
In Summertime, after John recounts the scratching of his father’s records, he tells us that “[f]or that 
mean and petty deed of his he has for the past twenty years felt the bitterest remorse, remorse that 
has not receded with the passage of time but on the contrary grown keener” (Coetzee, Summertime 
249). He also relates how he presents his father with a new Tebaldi record, and that what he wants 
above all is his father’s forgiveness (250). In the absence of forgiveness – his father appears not to 





[A]s he listens the beginnings of some kind of transformation seem to take place inside 
him. As it must have been with his father in 1944, his heart too begins to throb in time 
with Mimi’s. As the great rising arc of her voice must have called out his father’s soul, 
so it now calls out his soul too, urging it to join hers in passionate, soaring flight. 
 What has been wrong with him all these years? (Coetzee, Summertime 250) 
 
John never gets round to asking his father’s forgiveness outright; nor does his father ever stop being 
an enigma to him. Instead, he discovers an imaginative form of identification with his father by 
opening himself to his father's music, and by letting it change him. Outright confession of his crime 
is not a possibility for John, and nor is it, it seems, for Coetzee. Rather, we find that the narrative 
itself, in its treatment of the characters, speaks back to earlier instances of Coetzee's writing, and 
attempts to atone for certain misdeeds of characterization. In the passage above, for example, we 
learn that his father has a soul which is capable of responding to the passionate call of Mimi 
Coertse's song. This is a far cry from the father we meet in Boyhood, whom the teenage John refers 
to simply as “that man” (Coetzee, Boyhood 158): unemployed, foolish and useless, he lies in a 
darkened room in the middle of the day and stubs out cigarettes in a urine pot (159). To John, this 
father is a figure of disgust, and the text makes no effort to spare him. What the passage from 
Summertime thus appears to suggest is not so much the confession of a real-life sin committed 
against the father, but rather an expression of remorse for the aesthetic predisposition that has been 
able to depict the figure of the father in such cold-blooded terms. In the words of Derek Attridge, in 
Boyhood “we sense the unflinchingness more than the forgiveness” (“Confessing in the Third 
Person” 159). Now, in Summertime we discern the ghostly presence of shame in the text, and we 
notice the extent to which the possibility of absolution has been re-imagined as something that 
applies to the being of the narrative, rather than to a self that precedes, or surpasses the boundaries 
of that narrative. 
 




160) in Coetzee's autobiographical fiction, and makes the point that the power of those books, or 
their “drive for truth”, can be felt “only if the author of the words we read is identified with the ‘he’ 
of the narrative” (161). He acknowledges that we will never be able to eradicate the doubt of this 
connection: it is a “doubt” that “haunts all autobiography… a genre that hovers permanently at the 
borders of the literary and the nonliterary” (161). While it is certainly true that the relationship 
between autobiography and historical truth is an ambivalent one, what I have been trying to 
articulate here is the idea that the impact of Summertime derives not so much from our 
understanding of John as a version of J.M. Coetzee – a watered-down, secondary version of the real 
thing (or an etiolation, in Austin's terms) – but rather from our understanding of him as a 
development of the writing practice that gave us the John of Boyhood. That is to say, Coetzee's 
engagement with the tradition of confessional writing does not necessarily allow him to confess 
better, in the sense that it does not necessarily bring us closer to the historical truth of his being. 
What it does instead is to keep alive the possibility of confession, and the attendant ideal of 
absolution, by re-situating it within a literary practice that is all too conscious of the ways in which 
the aesthetic material of a narrative text supplants and redefines the self that is motivated by the 
urge to confess in the first place. 
 
The relationship between aesthetics and the confessional impulse that I am describing here is a 
complex one. To speak about a “relationship” between them implies that they can be thought of 
separately, as discrete properties of the text, elements that may be cordoned off from each other, so 
to speak, and studied in isolation, with whatever instruments of investigation the critic has at his or 
her disposal. Whereas the thrust of my argument is that this is precisely what is not possible in 
Coetzee's writing: that his autobiographical fiction involves a kind of palpable feeling through of 
the confessional impulse – with all the shadings of remorse and regret and yearning after absolution 
that it entails – in a literary paradigm that is inescapably aesthetic in its bearing (aesthetic in the 




come into existence for a fleeting moment, then pass away, without a telos). The peculiar way in 
which the aesthetic paradigm of Coetzee's writing acquires a confessional dimension becomes 
easier to understand if we look closely at a pivotal moment in Youth, namely the passage in which 
John discovers, in the British Museum, the memoirs of early travellers to Southern Africa, and a 
profound shift occurs in his ideas about his own artistic vocation. 
 
John is gripped in particular by William Burchell's account of his expedition to the interior of the 
country in the early nineteenth century (Travels in the Interior of Southern Africa, first published in 
two volumes in 1822 and 1824). Upon reading these journals, with their descriptions of 
“reconnaissances by ox-wagon into the desert of the Great Karoo, where a traveller could trek for 
days on end without clapping eyes on a living soul,”  he is surprised to discover that he feels a “tug 
at the heartstrings”: “it is his country, the country of his heart, that he is reading about” (Coetzee, 
Youth 137). South Africa, and specifically his own South African background, has up to this point 
been a source of great shame for John. His high-minded artistic ideals at the beginning of the novel 
– his belief that poetry should be “hard and clear like a flame” (21), his unquestioning acceptance of 
the stern aesthetic judgements of Eliot and Pound (25) – are based in no small part on his desire to 
distance himself from what he considers to be the defects of his South African upbringing (“an 
undistinguished, rural family, bad schooling, the Afrikaans language,” 62). When his mother 
persists in writing him letters, he wonders how he can make her accept that “the process of turning 
himself into a different person that began when he was fifteen will be carried through remorselessly 
until all memory of the family and the country he left behind is extinguished” (98). Notably, his first 
prose writing experiment betrays how strongly his literary sensibility – and his sense of his own 
artistic vocation – has been influenced by this desire to “cut all bonds with the past,” (98), in that he 
is troubled to see that the story he has written is still set in South Africa: “[h]e would prefer to leave 
his South African self behind as he has left South Africa itself behind” (62). John’s idealistic 




view that art is a means by which to escape the realities of his historical situation – a situation 
which is, for him, emblematic of a kind of existential guilt (South Africa is “like an albatross around 
his neck,” 101). 
 
John's discovery of Burchell announces a change in his literary sensibility that is important in two 
respects. The first involves the possibility of engaging with his South African past in a way that 
moves him, or that matters to him personally. The “ugly new South Africa” (Coetzee, Youth 137), 
with its sordid apartheid politics and its brutal acts of violence (100), is still anathema to him, but at 
the very moment when his heart begins to quicken with a memory of love for the place he left 
behind, the sheer dead weight of his shame recedes (like the albatross dropping from the mariner's 
neck in Coleridge's poem)
42
 and he is able to reformulate his literary ambitions from a fresh 
perspective. The second change has to do with John's overwhelmed response to the fact that the 
events portrayed in Burchell's travelogue “really happened” (“Real oxen hauled him and his cases 
of botanical specimens from stopping-place to stopping-place in the Great Karoo; real stars 
glimmered above his head, and his men's, while they slept,” 137), and the desire that it awakens in 
him to “write a book that is as convincing as Burchell's” (138). In the convergence of these two new 
defining elements in his aesthetic sensibility (to write about something that involves him personally, 
and to imbue his work with a sense of reality, or an “aura of truth,” 138), John dreams up a new 
task: 
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 In Coleridge's “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, it is at the very moment when the cursed seaman recalls love in 
his heart for God's creation that the dead albatross, the emblem of his guilt, drops from around his neck: 
 
 O happy living things! no tongue 
 Their beauty might declare: 
 A spring of love gusht from my heart, 
 And I blessed them unaware! 
 … 
 The self same moment I could pray; 
 And from my neck so free 
 The Albatross fell off, and sank 
 Like lead into the sea. 







The challenge he faces is a purely literary one: to write a book whose horizon of 
knowledge will be that of Burchell's time, the 1820s, yet whose response to the world 
around it will be alive in a way that Burchell, despite his energy and intelligence and 
curiosity and sang-froid, could not be because he was an Englishman in a foreign 
country, his mind half-occupied with Pembrokeshire and the sisters he had left behind. 
(Coetzee, Youth 138) 
 
In conventionally autobiographical terms, the passage describes the emergence of the idea that 
would culminate, some ten years later, in “The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee.”
43
 If we take a step 
back, however, and we consider the way in which the passage brings this moment of conception to 
life, we notice that it echoes its own content: that Coetzee has taken up, in Youth, the “purely 
literary” challenge of writing a book whose “horizon of knowledge” is that of his own younger self, 
a book that is textured with the historical material that describes the reality in which that self has his 
existence, and that acquires an “aura of truth” to the extent that Coetzee imagines himself 
responding to the world in the way that his protagonist would have responded. The passage that 
announces John's willingness to explore his own heritage – and consequently the roots of his own 
shame – in a literary project (and it is not for nothing that Coetzee's first novel, Dusklands traces the 
contorted dimensions of the colonial mentality) is in itself an aesthetic manifestation of the way in 
which Coetzee's work constitutes a feeling through of the transactions between the self and its own 
historical sense of guilt. John is not absolved from his shame, but the aesthetic dimension in which 
he has his being does not blanch before expressing, in the fullest sense possible, the contours of that 
shame. 
 
In recent years, Coetzee has become more and more preoccupied with the ways in which the 
activity of writing creates a separate frame of existence for the writing self. It is a concern that 
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 That John would go on to write Dusklands becomes retrospectively evident from the Julia-interview in Summertime: 
“One morning… John appeared at the front door. 'I won't stay,' he said, 'but I thought you might like this.' He was 




appears to coincide with a growing awareness of mortality, of the inescapability of death. In a 
review of Philip Roth's Nemesis that appeared in 2010, for example, Coetzee constructs a reading 
that sees the plague condition described in that novel – the polio that swept through Roth's Newark 
in 1944 – as “simply a heightened state of the condition of being mortal” (Coetzee, “On the Moral 
Brink” 2). He goes on to reflect on the peculiarity of Roth's narratorial devices, and marks 
especially the occurrence in his recent fiction of narrators who speak from “beyond the grave”, or 
who deliver meditations on their “post-mortem existence” (6). He ends his review by describing a 
scene that exemplifies the kind of writing that emerges now that the intensity of the “old” Roth – 
the Roth of American Pastoral and The Human Stain, who was still animated by the fires of 
creative passion – has “died down” (9). In the scene, the protagonist of Everyman strikes up a 
conversation with a gravedigger (his own gravedigger) and receives a salutary lesson in the craft of 
making a grave. In Coetzee's concluding remark, it is hard not hear echoes of his own growing 
awareness of mortality, and of how it affects the being of writing: “This modest but beautifully 
composed little ten-page episode does indeed provide a good education, and not just for older 
persons: how to dig a grave, how to write, how to face death, all in one” (10). 
 
If Coetzee's review of Nemesis reveals a preoccupation with the mortality of the writer, there is 
another, more recent review that speaks directly to his professional interest in the ways in which the 
being of the writer takes on a life of its own in writing. This rather peculiar review (“The Quest for 
the Girl from Bendigo Street”) appeared in 2012, and concerns the fiction of Gerald Murnane, an 
Australian writer who developed, in the course of six books published between 1974 and 1990, a 
metaphysics of writing that culminates in the writer taking up residence in the world of his fiction. 
For Murnane, Coetzee writes, “[a]n important stage in the life of writing is attained … when the 
writing self moves from merely observing and reporting on inner images to living an image life 
among image persons in the other world” (“The Quest for the Girl from Bendigo Street” 6). Coetzee 




are readers who will dismiss Murnane's dual-world system as idle theory-spinning,” he warns, 6), 
and he repeats certain staple ideas that will be familiar to most with an interest in Coetzee 
scholarship,
44
 but it is nevertheless telling that he is drawn to the ways in which Murnane's 
excursions into the “other world” of writing might be understood as an imaginative “act of 
atonement” (7). About Inland, a book in which Murnane tries to make amends for an unnamed 
original sin by bringing himself and a girl he loved in his childhood back to life in the image-world 
of his fiction (“Orpheus-like,” 8), Coetzee has the following to say: 
 
The transgression for which Inland is supposed to atone is not visible in the story of the 
youthful pair, but seems part of the constitution of Murnane himself, or the Murnane 
self who figures as the writer of the book. Inland tries to give substance to this obscure 
originary sin by situating it in an overt work of fiction, and thus – in Murnane's 
metaphysical system – making it real. (Coetzee, “The Quest for the Girl from Bendigo 
Street” 7) 
 
Taken in conjunction, these two reviews suggest a growing interest on Coetzee's part in how a 
writer might begin to settle his accounts, so to speak, without betraying a lifelong investment in the 
discourse of fiction. This is not to say that an awareness of mortality is a new departure for Coetzee 
– on the contrary, Age of Iron might be read as a sustained and incisive meditation on the meaning 
of approaching death, and The Master of Petersburg is concerned especially with how a writer 
might come to terms with the reality of death without denying its shattering force. What we notice, 
rather, is a careful and sustained attention to how the image of the self – an image that is inseparable 
from the being it acquires in writing – begins to account for its past in a gesture that resembles the 
moves of atonement we discern in the tradition of confessional writing. It is along these lines that 
we can begin to make sense of Coetzee's symbolic killing off of the author John Coetzee in 
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 “For readers who, despite Murnane's best efforts, cannot tell the difference between image-persons and figments of 
the human imagination, it may be best to treat Murnane's theorizing – which extends into the very texture of his 
fiction – as no more than an elaborate way of warning us not to identify the storytelling I with the man Gerald 
Murnane, and therefore not to read his books as autobiographical records, accountable to the same standards of truth 
as history is. The I who tells the story will be no less a constructed figure than the actors in it” (Coetzee, “The Quest 




Summertime, and of his consequent revision of the narrative treatment given to the figure of the 
father in Boyhood; and it is also in this sense, I think, that we can understand the incorporation of 






THE KAROO FARM 
 
1. The Sacral Space of the Farm 
 
In the previous chapter my aim was to give a sense of the way in which Coetzee re-inscribes the 
tradition of confessional writing in a body of work that foregrounds the aesthetic constitution of the 
subject. An important point of departure in that chapter was the notion, already implicit in the 
Confessions of St Augustine but focalized more clearly in the Romantic turn personified by 
Rousseau, that the ideal of redemption depends on a belief that the confessional text gives access to 
an authentic self, one that already exists before the confessional procedure is set in motion. 
Coetzee's writing, by contrast, operates in the knowledge that the being of the confessional subject 
is indelibly bound up with the narrative that describes it, to the extent that the idea of a “real”, or 
authentic self features only in a negative sense, as a kind of desire of that subject to transcend the 
mediated (and hence compromised) nature of its reality. Toward the end of the chapter I also 
suggested, by referring to an important moment in Youth (namely John's discovery of Burchell's 
travel journals in the British Museum), that the aesthetic paradigm of Coetzee's fiction derives a 
great deal of its impetus by drawing on the sense of association his protagonist feels with the land 
that lies closest to his heart, namely the Coetzee family farm in the Karoo (“the country of his 
heart,” Coetzee, Youth 137). In this chapter, my aim is to explore the complex engagement with the 
site of the farm in Coetzee's writing more thoroughly, with a particular focus on the role that it plays 
in the formation of the subject in his autobiographical fiction. The farm becomes, in my reading, a 
cultural source for Coetzee's recasting of the Romantic ideal of redemption in a textual paradigm 
that denies access to a prior, more authentic version of the self (and hence the site that provides a 






My argument stems from the observation that the Romantic pursuit of redemption can be 
understood as an attempt, on the part of the poet, to regain a sense of subjective unity. This unity is 
often depicted as belonging to a past in which the self enjoyed an uninterrupted communion with 
nature, and through nature with a pantheistic life force. The conceptual structure that underlies the 
Romantic appropriation of nature, and the ways in which that appropriation enables the creation of a 
unified sense of self, is an important point of departure for my readings of Coetzee in this chapter, 
and to this end I trace, in the next section, its expression in the work of Wordsworth in particular. 
However, to begin with, I would like to situate my argument by making a few general remarks 
concerning the significance of the natural environment to the Romantic sensibility. Raymond 
Williams makes the observation, in The Country and the City, that the Romantic emphasis on the 
natural environment forms part of a longstanding pastoral tradition that had defined itself over the 
course of successive generations by invoking an idealized notion of the past: a mutable and ever-
receding “Golden Age” that works as a corrective, in literary form, for feelings of disillusionment 
with the socioeconomic distortions of the present. For the Romantics, writing in a time in which 
agrarian reform was becoming increasingly mechanized (Williams, The Country and the City 127) 
and the spirit of community increasingly “dispossessed” (131), nature became a source in which 
organic human truths that were being threatened by the atomization of society could be 
rediscovered. An important shift during that time, says Williams, was the internalization of the 
creative principle embodied by nature, so that “a new emphasis is placed on the act of poetry itself, 
the act of creation” (132). Consequently, in the Romantic image of “the man driven back from the 
cold world and in his own natural perception and language seeking to find and recreate man,” it 
becomes harder to distinguish the boundaries between the poet-as-creator and the subject of his 
poetry (132). Romantic poetry thus becomes an articulation of the poet's desire to reconnect with an 
underlying life force by recalling, in the imagery and structure of his poem, the pure connection that 




the poet recreates the possibility of a unified consciousness from within a state of contemplation – a 
state that is marked by an awareness of the subject as an entity who enters the world through the 
medium of language. 
 
If we are to understand Coetzee's recasting of this dynamic in a literary form that takes the 
culturally demarcated space of the farm as its point of origin (rather than nature in a broader, more 
encompassing sense), it is important to have a clear notion of what the Romantic gesture of 
subjective identification entails. The novelist Orhan Pamuk provides a useful perspective when he 
writes, in his Charles Eliot Norton Lectures (collected under the title The Naive and the Sentimental 
Novelist), about the distinction between two different kinds of writer, namely the “sentimental” and 
the “naive” (The Naive and the Sentimental Novelist 14). It is a distinction, Pamuk tells us, that was 
first made by the German Romantic Friedrich Schiller, and it describes the difference between those 
writers who write in the unquestioning confidence that their work is a direct representation of 
reality (“naive”), and those who have become conscious of the constructed nature of their 
representations, or of the literary artifice that shapes the version of reality they present in their work 
(“sentimental”, or reflective). Naive writers, says Pamuk, are “at one with nature”: 
 
For them – in contrast to contemporary writers – poetry is like an impression that nature 
makes upon them quite organically and that never leaves them. Poetry comes 
spontaneously to naive poets from the natural universe they are part of. The belief that a 
poem is not something thought out and deliberately crafted by the poet, composed in a 
certain meter and shaped via constant revision and self-criticism, but rather something 
that should be written unreflectively and that may even be dictated by nature or God or 
some other power – this Romantic notion was advocated by Coleridge, a devoted 
follower of the German Romantics, and was clearly expressed in the 1816 preface to his 
poem “Kubla Khan”. (Pamuk, The Naive and the Sentimental Novelist 14) 
 




the Romantics held an “organic” mode of being, or their admiration for a kind of existence that lays 
claim to a spontaneous communion with “nature or God or some other power”. In the preface to 
“Kubla Khan” that Pamuk mentions, for example, we find Coleridge's rather awed recollection of 
the way in which the lines of the poem descended upon him while he was in an unconscious, or at 
best a half-conscious state: 
 
The Author continued for about three hours in a profound sleep, at least of the external 
senses, during which time he has the most vivid confidence, that he could not have 
composed less than from two to three hundred lines; if that indeed can be called 
composition in which all the images of rose up before him as things, with a parallel 
production of the correspondent expressions, without any sensation or consciousness of 
effort. (Coleridge, Coleridge's Poems 163) 
 
The principle underlying the image of the “naive” poet is that he or she exists in a state of seamless 
connection with some kind of primal life source – that the lines of poetry rise up before his or her 
inner eye spontaneously, as “things”, without any effort of the conscious will – and that this 
connection carries over, by extension, to the literature produced by that poet: the work itself 
becomes imbued, via the agency of the naive poet-self, with an essential and deep-seated truth 
concerning the nature of reality. The Romantic conceit of subjective identification revolves around 
the idea that by recapturing the spirit of an earlier, naive self in a poem, that poem would become 
expressive of a similar truth. The reflective poet, of which Schiller is the self-avowed 
personification (Pamuk, The Naive and the Sentimental Novelist 17), is constantly trying to recreate 
this sense of communion with the essential nature of things through the medium of his poetry. 
 
It is this principle of creative identification that is put under interrogative pressure in Coetzee's 
autobiographical fiction, and especially so when we consider the farm as the setting in which the 
younger self experiences those moments of cosmic affiliation that are so suggestive of the Romantic 




conceived as the sacral place where the soul can expand in freedom,” writes Coetzee in his 
appraisal of landscape in South African writing (White Writing 180), and it is in returning to the 
farm that the South African poet experiences “the same intimation of a return to the true self and 
primitive moral sources that Wordsworth feels in returning to the dales and fells” (180). For 
Coetzee, as we shall see, the problem with the farm is that the connection which the younger self 
experiences with the natural environment there is from the outset compromised by a sense of 
contingency, or a sense of not properly belonging. Coetzee's writing about the farm draws 
substantially on the Romantic yearning for an ideal version of the self in a natural setting, but the 
past in which the Romantics locate that self is, for him, already marked by feelings of fraudulence: 
the desire for “naivety” cannot justify itself by harking back to a memory of pastoral innocence. 
 
2. Wollstonecraft, Wordsworth and the Natural Subject of the Romantics 
 
The figure who best represents the prominent role of nature in the Romantic project of literary self-
expression, at least as far as its influence on Coetzee is concerned, is William Wordsworth. Tracing 
the exact measure of this influence is not an easy task. “There are works of literature whose 
influence is strong but indirect because it is mediated through the whole of culture rather than 
immediately through imitation,” writes Coetzee in response to a question from David Attwell 
concerning his literary forebears; and Wordsworth is the writer he singles out as a prime example of 
this influence-through-cultural-diffusion: “I see no marks of Wordsworth's style of writing or style 
of thinking in my own work, yet Wordsworth is a constant presence when I write about human 
beings and their relations to the natural world” (“An exclusive interview with JM Coetzee”). 
Despite the intangible form of this influence, we take note that the element in Wordsworth that 
features most strongly in Coetzee's literary sensibility – the area where it is a “constant presence” – 
is in his writing about “human beings and their relations to the natural world.” In a different 




significant impact on his understanding of autobiography, on what it means to write autobiography 
(the other writer that receives special mention is Roland Barthes) (Coetzee and Attwell, “All 
autobiography is autre-biography” 214). From these two telling references we can infer that the 
point at which Wordsworth's influence is most keenly felt by Coetzee is at the juncture between 
writing about nature and writing about the self. Or, to put it differently, Coetzee's indebtedness to 
Wordsworth is most clearly evident at the point in his writing where the aesthetics of representing 
the natural environment overlaps with the more overtly existential question of what it means to 
write about the self. What I would like to do in this section, then, is to explore the subjective 
dynamics of natural representation in the work of Wordsworth, in order to understand better its 
consequences for Coetzee's writing about the farm in his autobiographical fiction. 
 
For Wordsworth, as for the Romantics more generally, the idea of nature is not a simple matter, and 
to attempt to define it in any narrow sense would be ill-advised. As a concept it feeds into and 
sustains a complex network of associated literary themes and concerns. One strand of this network 
that is especially relevant to my reading of Coetzee – an aspect of it that I touched on briefly in the 
previous section – is the tradition of pastoralism in English letters. The development of this 
tradition, with its many twists and turns and its subtle localized variations, is articulated with a great 
deal of perspicuity by Raymond Williams, who traces its literary origins to ancient bucolic poetry, 
to Virgil and Theocritus, and before them as far back as Hesiod's Work and Days, composed in the 
ninth century before Christ (Williams, The Country and the City 14). An element that provides a 
measure of continuity to the otherwise multifaceted pastoral tradition is its “note of idealisation” – 
the sense, as Williams explains, that the natural abundance of the bucolic setting has always been 
contrasted, as in Hesiod, with “the iron time of modern men, in which labour is necessary and is 
admired” (17). When we read a Romantic poet like Wordsworth, and we are confronted with the 
striking self-assurance of his investment in the natural environment, it is important not to lose sight 




the sense of entitlement that it suggests: the belief that the absence of the bounties of nature from 
general life is due, at least in part, to some error or malignancy on the part of the socio-historical 
dispensation, and that it is the rightful task of the poet to rediscover, and indeed to embody, the 
spirit of natural communion that is being threatened by said deprivation. 
 
I mention this historicized view of pastoralism, and its influence on the Romantics, because it 
provides us with a perspective from which Wordsworth's investment in the natural environment 
acquires something of an ethical character, in the sense that the poet's search for redemption among 
the natural scenes of his youth becomes at the same time a search for some kind of communal ideal 
that falls perennially by the wayside of social realities. In Coetzee's writing about the farm, as we 
shall see in the next section, the implied moral sanction behind this Romantic gesture of continuity 
between the self and the natural environment is quite severely compromised, and it becomes 
necessary to reconsider the terms on which the self might claim any sort of privileged experience of 
nature. The question of nature thus forms part of a larger complex of meaning in which the creative 
act of self-expression, on the one hand, and the ethical carriage of the relationship between the 
individual and his or her social milieu, on the other, are both strongly involved. 
 
It would be disingenuous to suggest, however, that the Romantic preference for natural scenery 
drew its impetus exclusively from the tradition of pastoralism. On a more immediate level, the 
origins of this preference might be traced to any number of literary sources. Madame De Staël 
locates it in Germany, where the harsh climate compels the independent figure of the poet to seek 
personal transcendence
45
; Goethe’s young Werther finds in the natural landscape an ideal 
companion for his violently fluctuating emotions
46
; and the widely influential writings of Rousseau, 
as we have seen, is full of imagery involving the ideal existence of primitive man in his natural 
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(see chapter one, section 1 – “Coetzee, Rousseau and the Problem of the Self”). The 
source I would like to single out for special consideration here is Mary Wollstonecraft's A Short 
Residence in Sweden – not least because it speaks to the emergence of the taste, in Romantic 
literature, for scenes that evoke an experience of the sublime, and thus provides us with a key to 
understanding the importance of this concept for a Romantic, and especially a Wordsworthian, 
approach to nature. 
 
Richard Holmes has pointed out the fascination that Wollstonecraft's Scandinavian correspondence 
held for the younger generation of English writers at the time, a list that includes Coleridge, 
Southey, Hazlitt and Wordsworth (Introduction 36). “A Short Residence,” writes Holmes, “may be 
said to have entered into the literary mythology of Romanticism within a single generation”: 
 
Its combination of progressive social views – Wollstonecraft's “favourite subject of 
contemplation, the future improvement of the world” – with melancholy self-revelation 
and heart-searching, came to have an almost symbolic force within that extraordinary 
circle of poets, travellers, philosophers and autobiographers. (Holmes, Introduction 41) 
 
Wollstonecraft's account of her journey contains many scenes that are reminiscent of images which 
would later become familiar in Wordsworth's poetry. Notable among these are her descriptions of a 
cataract outside Frederikstad in Norway – a “sublime object” that raises in her “tumultuous 
emotions” and turns her mind to thoughts of eternity (Wollstonecraft, A Short Residence 153) – and 
another one outside Trollhättan that likewise elicits intimations of a “solitary sublimity” (160).
48
 
One moment that resonates quite strongly with the image of nature as it would appear later in 
Wordsworth's poetry takes place while Wollstonecraft is staying in the coastal town of Tønsberg. 
She has been detained there for some time (98), and makes use of the opportunity to avail herself of 
                                                 
47
  Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi des hommes, 1755. 
48
 Richard Holmes adds these vivid descriptions of waterfalls to the long list of possible sources for the sacred river in 
Coleridge's Xanadu (“Kubla Khan”): “[I]t is hard not to believe that the great echo-chamber of Coleridge's mind did 




the “beauty of the season” (99) and of the pleasing natural scenery that surrounds her there. 
Reclining by the seashore, she is lulled into a state of reverie: “Every thing seemed to harmonize 
into tranquillity,” she writes: 
 
[E]ven the mournful call of the bittern was in cadence with the tinkling bells on the 
necks of the cows, that, pacing slowly one after the other, along an inviting path in the 
vale below, were repairing to the cottages to be milked. With what ineffable pleasure 
have I not gazed – and gazed again, losing my breath through my eyes – my very soul 
diffused itself in the scene – and, seeming to become all senses, glided in the scarcely-
agitated waves, melted in the freshening breeze, or, taking its flight with fairy wing, to 
the misty mountains which bounded the prospect, fancy tript over new lawns, more 
beautiful even than the lovely slopes on the winding shore before me. – I pause, again 
breathless, to trace, with renewed delight, sentiments which entranced me, when, 
turning my humid eyes from the expanse below to the vault above, my sight pierced by 
the fleecy clouds that softened the azure brightness; and, imperceptibly recalling the 
reveries of childhood, I bowed before the awful throne of my Creator, whilst I rested on 
its footstool. (Wollstonecraft, A Short Residence 110) 
 
What is striking about this rather “empurpled” passage (Holmes, Introduction 38) is the balance that 
it achieves between the calm homeliness of the pastoral imagery – “the tinkling bells on the necks 
of the cows … repairing to the cottages to be milked”, the “inviting path in the vale below”, the 
“scarcely-agitated waves” – and those aspects which obtrude upon the scene more sharply and 
imbue it with a sense of the sublime: the “mournful call of the bittern”, the “misty mountains which 
bounded the prospect”,  the “sight pierced” by the clouds in the “vault above”. About the sublime 
features of this passage, and about the way in which it foreshadows Wordsworth's treatment of the 
natural environment, we might remark on a number of things. Firstly, we notice that the arrival of 
the sublime, in the schematics of the scene, occurs along a vertical axis. Wollstonecraft turns her 
eyes from the “expanse below to the vault above”, and it is in this upwards movement that her 




“awful throne of [her] Creator”. The thrilled sensation (“I pause, again breathless, to trace, with 
renewed delight”) that is thus induced by a move from a horizontal to a vertical plane underscores 
the Burkean origins of the notion of the sublime at work in Wollstonecraft's writing: the perception 
of visual grandeur, which might, under less picturesque circumstances, impress upon the human 
instinct for self-preservation and elicit a terrified response, produces here instead an overwhelming 
and altogether exquisite sense of astonishment and awe.
49
 Without going too deeply into the visual 
schematics of the sublime, and at the risk of running ahead of myself, it is worth mentioning that 
Coetzee has written about this peculiarly European configuration of the sublime, with its emphasis 
on verticality, or on the vertiginous aspect of landscape, and about how this topographical 
preference precluded the sublime from gaining a foothold in a South African literary aesthetic, 
where it is the vast, flat expanses of the interior, and of the Karoo especially, that makes the 
strongest claim on those feelings which would speak to the profound and the eternal in human 
experience – “feelings such as fear and ecstasy, and values such as transcendence and 
unattainability” (Coetzee, White Writing 54). 
 
The second facet of Wollstonecraft's passage that draws our attention relates to the balance that it 
achieves between these two contrasting aspects of the natural environment, i.e. the pastoral and the 
sublime. Into her description of the scene, Wollstonecraft slips the observation that it called to mind 
similar dream-like moments from her youth: “and, imperceptibly recalling the reveries of childhood, 
I bowed before the awful throne of my Creator” (A Short Residence 110, my emphasis). It is this 
gesture of childhood reminiscence, I think, that situates the passage squarely in a Romantic idiom, 
and it does so by creating a condition (a condition in the form of a precedent) in which the homely 
and the unearthly (or the pastoral and the sublime) may occupy the same subjective moment 
without threatening the integrity of the experience. Wollstonecraft is able to find pleasure and 
fulfilment in this latticework of contrasting natural impressions, in other words, because there is a 
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thread that runs from the moment of writing (“I pause, again breathless, to trace, with renewed 
delight”), through the actual experience (“sentiments which entranced me”) and all the way back to 
a subjective origin that precedes the eventualities of the moment (“the reveries of childhood”). 
 
The word on which the functioning of this conceptual unity depends, in this case, is 
“imperceptibly”. If one looks at it again – “imperceptibly recalling the reveries of childhood” – it 
becomes more and more evident that “imperceptibly” is doing some rather complicated work in that 
sentence. It has the implication that the process of recollection is a gradual one – that the memories 
of childhood settle into place seamlessly, without causing a disturbance – but even more 
significantly, it distinguishes Wollstonecraft's process of recollection from the sensory reality of the 
moment: the perceived and the im-perceived. What the word thus appears to signal is the process by 
which the sensual input from the natural environment, in all its bewildering diversity, converges in a 
subjective framework that is able to hold it all together, or that enables Wollstonecraft's sense that 
“every thing seemed to harmonize into tranquility” (A Short Residence 110). The passage thus 
creates a deliberate form of association between Wollstonecraft's sense of self and those impressions 
which derive from the natural environment – an association that is integral rather than fortuitous, 
and on which the cohesion of her experience of the natural world depends. 
 
In a passage that follows closely on the one mentioned above, Wollstonecraft describes a moment 
that reinforces this spirit of accord between the self and the natural environment – a spirit that 
would soon also become characteristic of Wordsworth's poetry. The passage occurs while 
Wollstonecraft is out rowing on a boat in the bay at Tønsberg, accompanied by a pregnant 
companion: 
 
[M]y train of thinking kept time, as it were, with the oars, or I suffered the boat to be 
carried along by the current, indulging a pleasing forgetfulness, or fallacious hopes. – 




the only thing of which I have ever felt a dread – I cannot bear to think of being no more 
– of losing myself – though existence is often but a painful consciousness of misery; 
nay, it appears to me impossible that I should cease to exist, or that this active, restless 
spirit, equally alive to joy and sorrow, should only be organized dust – ready to fly 
abroad the moment the spring snaps, or the spark goes out, which kept it together. 
Surely something resides in this heart that is not perishable – and life is more than a 
dream. (Wollstonecraft, A Short Residence 112) 
 
Coetzee has pointed out how, in Romantic schemes of representation, “[b]odies of still water lend 
themselves to metaphors of thinking” (White Writing 46), and indeed it seems as if Wollstonecraft's 
reflection on her own mortality here sustains the contemplative posture that is associated with calm 
surface water (especially so when we consider that she has just described the bay at Tønsberg, on 
which she is currently rowing, as “scarcely-agitated”, A Short Residence 110). The rhythms of her 
thought reflect the movement of the boat on the water: ordered and in “train” with the regular 
dippings of the oar, or free-flowing and speculative when the boat is set loose on the current. The 
untethered sensation of drifting freely on the water induces in her a feeling of dread when it calls up 
the thought that she will one day be “cease to exist” – that she will “lose” herself – but then she 
finds reassurance in the belief that there is something in her that is “not perishable,” or that connects 
her to a force that is larger than her own self. The tranquil waters of the bay thus become a kind of 
scenic correlative for a moment of cognition that begins with a hyper-awareness of the self, and an 
attendant premonition of the loss of that self, before moving on to an affirmation of the connection 
that exists between the self and a more pervasive, more diffuse reality: a sense of the eternal. Even 
in its more unsettling moments (thoughts of annihilation, thoughts of human life as nothing more 
than “organized dust”), Wollstonecraft's description suggests an organic connection between the 
realm of nature and the individual self, or between the subject of contemplation and the subject who 
contemplates. Coetzee reveals his concern in these matters when he points to “the near absence of 
surface water on the South African plateau” as one of the features that compromise an integral 




46). The absence of this naturally reflective medium, he writes, creates a “lacuna in the repertoire of 
the artist” – the artist who has been weaned on European models of representation – and disables 
the possibility of carrying on a meaningful dialogue with the land (46). 
 
Now, if we move on to Wordsworth, we discover that there is a passage in The Prelude in which 
many of these conceptual strands that emerge from Wollstonecraft's descriptions of nature are 
woven together, and in which the relationship between the self and nature, as it is made manifest in 
Romantic writing, begins to assume a more tangible force. The passage I have in mind is the boat 
scene from Book I of The Prelude. The young boy Wordsworth, while on holiday in the village of 
Patterdale, goes rambling along the shore of the lake one evening and comes across “A Skiff that to 
a Willow tree was tied/Within a rocky Cave” (Wordsworth, The Prelude lines 374-375). Without 
giving it a moment's thought, and being led only by “Nature” (line 372), he unloosens the skiff from 
the tree and rows out onto the lake. It was, he says, “an act of stealth/And troubled pleasure” (line 
361), and indeed one would be able to read the passage quite productively as an instance of 
confessional writing, but I would like to focus here instead on the peculiar shaping influence which 
the natural surroundings have on the psyche of the young poet. At first the scene that surrounds him 
is placid and calmly beautiful, albeit tinged with a sense of the ethereal: 
 
The moon was up, the Lake was shining clear 
Among the hoary mountains; from the Shore 
I push'd, and struck the oars and struck again 
In cadence, and my little Boat mov'd on 
Even like a Man who walks with stately step 
Though bent on speed. It was an act of stealth 
And troubled pleasure; not without the voice 
Of mountain-echoes did my Boat move on, 
Leaving behind her still on either side 
Small circles glittering idly in the moon, 




Of sparkling light. … 
(Wordsworth, The Prelude lines 383-394) 
 
Again, as in Wollstonecraft, we notice the emphasis that is placed on the rhythmic motion of the 
oars, striking and striking again, “in cadence,” carrying the solitary figure of the boy safely away 
from the shore and deeper onto the still waters of the lake. The artistry of the passage is such, 
however, that we are able to discern the early signs of a quickening in these measured depictions of 
the movement of the little boat, or a foreshadowing of the visitation that is about to befall young 
Wordsworth. The image around which these foreshadowings accumulate is the image of the 
mountain. In line with the Romantic visual scheme mentioned earlier, in which vertical surfaces are 
associated with sublime impressions, the presence of the mountain in the passage figures as a force 
of disturbance in the otherwise tranquil scene. In the second quoted line, for example (line 384), the 
“hoary mountains” are juxtaposed quite distinctly with the clearly-shining lake. This effect is 
intensified by the shift in tone that accompanies the first part of the line – the audible lowering of 
“Among”, and its prolonged assonance with “hoary” and “mountain” – before the semicolon 
abruptly closes off the image. The mountain also brings about the understated shift in mood that 
occurs through the repetition, in lines 386 and 390, of the phrase that describes the “boat moving 
on”. In the first instance, the “little Boat mov'd on” in “cadence” (line 386), and the image is 
associated with the sure purpose of a man “who walks with stately step” (387). Wordsworth's 
rowing, in this instance, happens in accordance with a set purpose, a kind of secure carrying out of 
his desire to sample the mildly transgressive pleasure of going out on the lake in a purloined skiff. 
This configuration of his activity occurs against the backdrop of the silent, accommodating lake, 
and is in fact goaded on by the natural environment, with the moonlight “glittering idly” (line 392) 
on the surface water and leaving a track behind him, as if to point the way. In the second occurrence 
of the phrase, however, the presence of the mountain is superimposed over his activity and becomes 
a kind of portentous reminder that all is not what it seems: “not without the voice/Of mountain-




words, is organized in such a way that a subtle link is established between these two contrasting 
aspects of the natural environment. The inviting, familiar scene of the moonlit lake provides a 
passage for the young poet's encounter with nature in its wilder, more disturbing form. 
 
The passage culminates in a sudden intrusion of the sublime on the scene, in the form of a cliff (a 
“huge” cliff) that rears its head between the rower and his unspoilt view of the stars (Wordsworth, 
The Prelude lines 405-412). The effect of this confrontation with the sublime on the boy is rather 
drastic. He rows back to the shore with “trembling hands” (line 412) and for some days afterwards 
he feels himself at a loss to form any coherent thoughts. Instead, Wordsworth tells us, his brain 
“Work'd with a dim and undetermined sense/Of unknown modes of being” (lines 419-420), and: 
 
[H]uge and mighty Forms that do not live 
Like living men mov'd slowly through my mind 
By day and were the trouble of my dreams. 
(Wordsworth, The Prelude lines 425-427) 
 
The upshot of the episode, we are made to understand, is that it gave the young boy a sense of the 
eternal, or put him in touch with a transcendent force that supersedes the “vulgar” world of man 
(Wordsworth, The Prelude line 435) and “giv'st to forms and images a breath/And everlasting 
motion” (lines 430-431). Primed by the promptings of nature, then, the young Wordsworth has been 
led to a climactic moment in which his soul became infused with a knowledge of the deep-seated 
harmony of things. The peculiarly Romantic way in which the passage configures this harmony is 
as a sense of correspondence between the aesthetically pleasing forms of nature – the 
accommodating surface of the lake, in which the boy finds a reflection of his own desires – and the 
sublime energies that supply these forms with an enduring, or transcendent value – the looming cliff 
that rises like a sentinel from the subtly pervasive mountain-echoes encircling the scene. 




workmanship that reconciles/Discordant elements, and makes them move/In one society” (lines 
352-355). What we have here, in other words, is a description of the moment in which the young 
poet receives the ability that will allow him, in later experience, to harmonize the “perceived” and 
the “im-perceived”. The point is to notice the extent to which Wordsworth's poetic intelligence, 
semantically as well as syntactically, corroborates the overarching theme of The Prelude, in which 
nature (or “Nature”) is figured as both the origin and the medium for the poet's ability to synthesize 
the diversity of his experience into a subjectively coherent whole. The passage thus becomes an 
evocation of – and indeed a key moment in – the Romantic tendency to connect the literary 
expression of the self to an originative moment in a childhood experience of nature. “Fair seed-time 
had my soul,” writes Wordsworth elsewhere in the book, “and I grew up/Foster'd alike by beauty 
and by fear” (lines 305-306). 
 
The strong sense of harmony between the self and nature that informs The Prelude, and the 
conceptual moves which link that harmony to the creative formation of the youthful mind through 
the agency of the natural environment, finds a memorable expression in another of Wordsworth's 
poems, namely “Tintern Abbey”. In that poem, there are two Wordsworths: Wordsworth the poet, 
reminiscing from the present of the poetic discourse, and Wordsworth the young boy, bounding 
through the landscape with “glad animal movements” (Wordsworth, “Tintern Abbey” line 75), a 
feral creature who enjoys direct, unmediated correspondence with his natural environment. The boy 
becomes, in Wordsworth’s depiction of him, an unreflective node of perception who feeds off the 
“colours” and “forms” (line 80) of nature. His passage through the landscape carries a sense of 
immediacy and urgency: the “sounding cataract/[haunts] him like a passion” (line 77). The 
“sounding cataract” – which is, as we have seen, a familiar image in the Romantic archive – returns 
as a point of reference in Coetzee's Boyhood, but for now it is enough to emphasize that 
Wordsworth uses the figure of his younger self in nature to provide a subjective point of departure 




present reflective moment. He acknowledges that he “cannot paint/What then [he] was” (“The 
Prelude” line 76), which leads us to understand that the young boy is embodied in the poem not as 
an external figure, a metaphor for something else, but rather as a point of origin for the grand 
project of subjective unification that underscores the redemptive features of Romantic poetry. 
Wordsworth’s own presence in the poem is a continuity of the young boy’s experience of nature: 
just as he cannot “paint” (line 76) his younger self, he does not have access to an objective point of 
reference outside the poem from which to articulate his own subjective being in language. The boy's 
communion with the force of nature is thus not merely an emblem or metaphor for the possibility of 
redemption – it is rather a subjective position from which the descriptive language of the poem 
emerges, organically. 
 
3. “Tree-names but no trees yet” 
 
It is typical of Coetzee’s writing to find traces of the Romantic heritage scattered about, clues or 
half-clues which may lead somewhere, or nowhere, or which may be assembled and reconstructed 
in our reading of him to reveal aspects of his work which would otherwise remain submerged. 
Disgrace is perhaps the one book where the traces of Romanticism coalesce most readily to point us 
toward a post-pastoral reading, a reading in which the dystopian aspects of the narrative engage 
most clearly with what Rita Barnard calls “the passing of a rural way of life” (“J.M. Coetzee’s 
Disgrace and the South African Pastoral” 203). In her reading Barnard argues that the novel 
performs a sociolinguistic interrogation of the pastoral mode (a mode that has its roots, in South 
Africa, in the tradition of colonialism),
50
 and remarks on the abject failure of Lurie's attempts to 
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 He strolls over, exchanges greetings. “You must have heard, we had a big robbery on Wednesday while 




“transfer the Romantic sublime to an African landscape” in his Mont Blanc-lecture  (Barnard, 
“Disgrace and the South African Pastoral” 216; Coetzee, Disgrace 22).
51
 Barnard makes the 
striking observation that the ending of the novel suggests a mode of being that utterly transcends the 
tired and morally bankrupt conventions of South African pastoralism, embedded as it is in notions 
of “kinship, labor, ownership or debts” (“Disgrace and the South African Pastoral” 222), thus 
suggesting that the Romantic ideal of a transcendent reality (or, more precisely, of a self that is 
aligned to the transcendent through the agency of the sublime) finds an unexpected purchase in the 
novel. 
 
I will return to these thoughts in the concluding section of this chapter, but my focus here turns 
rather to Coetzee's autobiographical fiction, and to the many suggestive indications that are to be 
found in it of Coetzee's preoccupation with the literary afterlife of Romanticism. The first lines of 
Boyhood present us with an example: 
 
They live on a housing estate outside the town of Worcester, between the railway and 
the National Road. The streets of the estate have tree-names but no trees yet. Their 
address is No. 12 Poplar Avenue. All the houses on the estate are new and identical. 
They are set in large pots of red clay earth where nothing grows, separated by wire 
fences. (Coetzee, Boyhood 1) 
 
The book begins by delineating the topographical features of the environment in which the 
protagonist will have some of his early formative experiences. The description contains a few 
                                                                                                                                                                  
  “Yes,” says Petrus, “I heard. It is very bad, a very bad thing. But you are all right now.” 
  Is he all right? Is Lucy all right? Is Petrus asking a question? It does not sound like a question, but he 
cannot take it otherwise, not decently. The question is, what is the answer? (Coetzee, Disgrace 114) 
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 There is a great deal to be said about the Romantic resonances in Disgrace. In my Masters thesis, “Embedded 
Subjectivity in the Work of J.M. Coetzee” (Stellenbosch University, 2007), I devoted a chapter to it, and in particular 
to tracing the way in which Coetzee, in Disgrace, inscribes subjective experience in an aesthetic structure that 
derives its co-ordinates from a Romantic tension between the ideal and the real – a tension that figures 
predominantly in Lurie's lecture on Wordsworth's The Prelude. In this thesis, however, my aim is to explore these 





interesting peculiarities. Of these, perhaps the most striking, at least for the purpose of my 
argument, is the observation that the streets of the estate “have tree-names but no trees yet.” In 
addition to surface waters and mountain peaks, Coetzee suggests in White Writing, trees are a 
feature of the environment that provide a “locus of meanings as well as an element of construction” 
in traditional Romantic representations of the landscape (White Writing 46). Trees, in Coetzee's 
view, are one of those focal points in the natural world that enable the artist to carry on a dialogue 
with the land, or that aid in the creation of a sustained sense of communion between the self and his 
or her environment. Thus, while the enumeration of the protagonist's physical address (“No. 12 
Poplar Avenue”) serves the general narrative purpose of creating for the reader a clearly identifiable 
sense of place (“In poetry the action can take place everywhere and nowhere … Prose, on the other 
hand, seems naggingly to demand a specific setting,” opines John in Youth, 62), we can also read 
into its specific form here (“the streets have tree-names but no trees”, Coetzee, Boyhood 1) a kind of 
veiled allusion to the post-Romantic ambit of Coetzee's autobiographical project. That is to say, 
while the reference to trees calls on the Romantic, and explicitly Wordsworthian tradition of setting 
the scene via recourse to the natural markers of the landscape – a convention that enables an 
immediate sense of communion between the poet-self and his natural environment
52
 – the way in 
which these signifiers are stripped of their potency in the opening lines of Boyhood is at the same 
time an indication of the foreignness of that tradition in the literary milieu where it has taken up 
abode. In short, it is as if Coetzee signposts the Romantic tradition of locating the self in nature, but 
then proceeds to neuter that tradition by voiding it of substance and by explicitly decontextualizing 
it. What if, instead of describing the streets that have “tree-names but no trees yet,” he had begun 
his book by writing about the mountain ranges that encircle the town of Worcester? Or what if he 
had moved the initial formative descriptions of early childhood to Cape Town, a habitat to which 
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 Compare, for example, the opening lines of The Prelude, in which Wordsworth hails “the gentle breeze/That blows 
from the green fields and from the clouds” (lines 1-2), naming it as a “Messenger” and a “Friend” that welcomes 




the young protagonist believes himself – in no uncertain terms – to be better suited?
53
 These are of 
course purely rhetorical questions, but they bear out the point that Coetzee's autobiographical 
venture appears from the start to be situating itself self-consciously in a literary mode that draws on 
the ideals of Romanticism, with its promise of a unified sense of self that is achieved through 
communion with the natural environment, but is at the same time quite resolute in its refusal to 
grant those ideals any tangible purchase in his imaginative exploration of childhood in small-town 
South Africa. 
 
Another, less oblique reference to Romanticism occurs later in the book. John's father has given him 
a collection of Wordsworth's poems to read and quotes from “Tintern Abbey”: “The sounding 
cataract haunted me like a passion,” he says (Coetzee, Boyhood 105). John is not impressed by his 
father’s enthusiasm for nature poetry. He finds it hard to imagine his father as having a passion for 
anything at all: when he thinks of him as a boy, all he can imagine him doing is “joking and 
laughing and smoking cigarettes behind the bushes” (105). Yet it is through this uninspiring figure 
of his father that John has access to the place he loves more than any other place on earth: 
Voëlfontein, the Coetzee family farm, near Merweville in the Karoo. At a first glance, one might 
infer from the Romantic trace in this exchange that John associates Romantic nature poetry with the 
vulgar image of his father, and consequently as an insufficient carrier for what he believes to be his 
own unique passion for the farm and its dramatic, sprawling landscape. On the other hand, we have 
seen that there is in Coetzee's critical writing about the representation of the farm in South African 
literature a recognition that it draws into itself “many of the energies of European Romanticism, 
many of the feelings of cosmic identification and engulfment originally attributed to the relation not 
of farmer to farm but of man to the wilderness, to forest and moor and mountain” (Coetzee, White 
Writing 90), and furthermore that these energies feed into the notion of the farm novel as a site for 
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  “There are ants in Worcester, flies, plagues of fleas. Worcester is only ninety miles from Cape Town, yet everything 
is worse here. He has a ring of fleabites above his socks, and scabs where he has scratched. Some nights he cannot 




working out “the problematics of consciousness” (91). If we bear in mind this critical awareness of 
the farm novel's indebtedness to the Romantic tradition, then we might consider the Romantic trace 
in the passage quoted above – the offhanded reference to the “sounding cataract” (Coetzee, 
Boyhood 105) – as a signal that what is at stake for Coetzee in writing about the farm is still “the 
problematics of consciousness”, but that these problematics are being worked out in a structure of 
representation that draws on the idea of the text as a system of layered meanings and assembled 
traces rather than as the projection of a unified, linear consciousness. 
 
The first mention of the farm in Coetzee’s autobiographical fiction occurs early on in Boyhood, 
when we learn that John loves listening to the stories that come from it: 
 
He is never happier than when listening to these stories, to the teasing and 
laughter that go with them. His friends do not come from families with stories 
like these. That is what sets him apart: the two farms behind him, his mother’s 
farm, his father’s farm, and the stories of those farms. Through the farms he is 
rooted in the past; through the farms he has substance. (Coetzee, Boyhood 22) 
 
Here, the farm supplies a sense of historical depth to the narrative that John constructs around his 
understanding of himself.
54
 It provides a point of origin for the imaginative activity – the telling of 
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  In “The Dertigers and the plaasroman: two brief perspectives on Afrikaans literature,” Gerrit Olivier makes the 
point that the tradition of farm writing in South Africa has, since its early beginnings, expressed an ambiguity in the 
relationship between the farm dweller and the land. The fear of dispossession, originating in memories of the Anglo-
Boer War, meant that even in its early evocations as a celebratory symbol of occupation and stewardship, the farm 
was “a place of triumph as well as vulnerability, a place of happiness as well as anxiety” (Olivier, “The Dertigers 
and the plaasroman” 317). By creating for John a sense of rootedness in “stories” about the farm, and by situating 
that very rootedness in a structure of meaning that compromises its expression, or that introduces a note of 
dissonance in the promise of spiritual fulfilment that it contains, Coetzee positions his writing about the farm as a 
subtle continuation or elaboration of the tradition of the plaasroman. Olivier also notes the contribution that Coetzee 
has made, in White Writing, to our understanding of the genre, namely that it “represents a creative and symbolic 
appropriation; that it is, therefore, never simply a descriptive genre” (Oliver, “The Dertigers and the plaasroman” 
316). The specific form of Coetzee's contribution derives from his analysis of the farm novels of C.M. Van den 
Heever, whose creative challenge, as Olivier paraphrases it, was to find a way “to generate an ideological 
justification for ownership of the farm” (315) – a challenge that culminates in the farmer-protagonist “reaching a 
state of awareness in which Romantic notions of nature are combined with the experience of a symbiotic 
relationship between nature and agricultural endeavour” (316). It is thus no accident that Coetzee's evocations of the 
farm – a space, as Olivier notes, that has retained “its potential to be a site of symbolic contestation” in South 




stories – through which John elects to articulate his emotional affinities. Similarly to the river 
Derwent that winds its way through Wordsworth's memories of infancy and feeds his early creative 
promptings
55
, we have in this passage a suggestion that the farm is the early beginnings of John's 
narrative conditioning. There is, however, a paradox that inheres in his relation to the farm. That 
which gives him “substance” is simultaneously that which “sets him apart” from his peers: the farm 
becomes a figure for the aesthetic predisposition that gives life to his interiority while at the same 
time compromising the expression of that inner being. The figure of the farm, even while it serves 
as a symbolic point of origin for the subjective being that finds expression in the narrative, already 
sets in motion a discrepancy between the experience of subjectivity and the articulation of that 
experience. 
 
The early suggestion of dissonance in John's relation to the farm finds a fuller expression when he 
visits Voëlfontein for the Christmas holidays (Coetzee, Boyhood 79), and the reader discovers that 
the farm comprises various layers of meaning. There is the natural landscape, the rocks and the 
animals and the dusty plains, but overlaying that landscape is a socio-political dispensation of 
family members and farm workers, sheep shearers and girl cousins, a network of relationships that 
spans over the palimpsest of nature and troubles the unsullied communion with the Karoo landscape 
that the young John wishes to claim for himself. He is derisive of the “tame patter of genteel 
conversation” (78) which he must endure in order to go to the farm, but endure it he must, “because 
there is no place on earth he loves more or can imagine loving more” (79). Notably, it is the natural 
aspect of the farm that becomes the object of his love: 
 
[H]e loves every stone of it, every bush, every blade of grass, loves the birds that 
give it its name, birds that as dusk falls gather in their thousands in the trees 
around the fountain, calling to each other, murmuring, ruffling their feathers, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
even while Coetzee’s writing strongly resists the ideology of ownership that the Romantic gesture of assimilation 
with the land has traditionally fed into, in the genre of the plaasroman. 
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settling for the night. It is not conceivable that another person loves the farm as he 
does. (Coetzee, Boyhood 80) 
 
John’s secret love of the farm is disturbed, however, when it is compared to the experience of the 
farmworkers, people like Outa Jaap who “[knows] more about it, about sheep, veld, weather, than 
the newcomer ever will” (Coetzee, Boyhood 84), and Freek, who cycles all the way to town and 
back and who seems to belong there “more securely than the Coetzees do – if not to Voëlfontein, 
then to the Karoo” (87). Similarly, when a band of sheep shearers descends on the farm, John 
reflects on the mystery of their origin, asking himself if there is “a country deeper even than the 
country of Voëlfontein, a heartland even more secluded from the world” (93). The presence of these 
socially ostracized and politically excluded farm workers, who seem tied to the land in a way that 
surpasses John’s wildest ambitions, raises the notion that the farm itself is a structural imposition on 
the Karoo landscape, and that there is a submerged layer of meaning which will remain forever 
closed off to the reflective subject who wishes to establish unity with nature through the mediated 
space of the farm. What emerges from these passages is that the figure of the farm occupies a rift 
between John’s desire to unite with the landscape and the realization that his desire emerges from a 
space that does not quite conform to the quasi-mythical status he imagines for it. Whereas 
Wordsworth reads the possibility of personal redemption into a past where the subject is so close to 
nature as to become one with it, the text of Boyhood gives us instead a subject whose desire to 
articulate himself as a child of nature is from the outset the product of a contested, mediated space. 
The farm situates itself in the wake of a pastoral tradition that reaches back to Romanticism, but it 
also stands in the text as a figure for the process of displaced consciousness. 
 
4. A Detour in the Country of Baboons 
 
The space of the Karoo farm is revisited time and again in Coetzee’s writing. In his early novel, In 




the protagonist’s intense and hallucinatory attempt to establish some form of personal identity 
against the impervious backdrop of nature. The farm landscape in that book is unforgiving at best, 
yet it is precisely its bareness, its naked insistence, that compels Magda to conceive of herself as “a 
poetess of interiority” (Coetzee, In the Heart of the Country 35). The farm thus overturns the facile 
identification with nature inherited from the Romantic tradition, but even while it does so, it 
compels the subject to work out a form of inner redemption for herself in the face of the collapse of 
the unified sense of self accompanying that tradition. Magda’s struggle, in this sense, becomes an 
articulation of Coetzee’s reconfiguration of the tenets of Romanticism in a poststructuralist milieu, 
taking the Karoo farm as its cohesive aesthetic manifestation. 
 
The emphasis on the space of the farm in Coetzee's early fiction deepens our understanding of the 
influential role it plays in the development of the young writer’s literary sensibility. In Summertime, 
when John returns to Voëlfontein, we learn that what the farm evokes in him most strongly is a 
sense of melancholy. One evening he goes for a walk through the veld with his cousin, Margot, and 
while they are reminiscing about their childhood on the farm he compares his feeling to the 
melancholy of a baboon at sunset, as recorded by Eugène Marais: 
 
‘...I understand what the old male baboon was thinking as he watched the sun go 
down, the troop leader, the one Marais was closest to. Never again, he was 
thinking: Just one life and then never again. Never, never, never. That is what the 
Karoo does to me too. It fills me with melancholy. It spoils me for life.’ 
She still does not see what baboons have to do with the Karoo or their childhood 
years, but she is not going to let on. 
‘This place wrenches my heart,’ he says. ‘It wrenched my heart when I was a 
child, and I have never been right since.’ (Coetzee, Summertime 97) 
 
Margot’s puzzlement about the baboons is understandable; it is indeed a peculiar allusion to make at 




to her – that is to say, he is trying to speak his heart, or referring to a time when such 
communication was still possible for him
56
 – he is unburdening the impossibility of unburdening – 
and it is not immediately obvious why he would choose to associate his own melancholy with that 
of a baboon. Readers who are familiar with Coetzee’s attitude toward animals will perhaps not be 
surprised at John’s identification with the mute baboon, and it is worth noting that a few pages 
earlier, around the dinner table, there has been talk of his budding vegetarianism and the 
concomitant outsidership that this implies in the hearty Karoo tradition of mutton eating (Coetzee, 
Summertime 93)
57
, but we may also infer another meaning from the association of the protagonist’s 
melancholy with the baboon’s emergent sense of mortality. It is a meaning that derives from my 
reading of the farm and its landscape as a reconfiguration of the Romantic conception of nature, and 





In order to explain the significance of John's reference, it is necessary here to refer at some length to 
a series of representations of baboons in South African literature. The point, as we shall see, is that 
John is situating himself according to a localized version of those conceptual moves in the 
Romantic tradition that would create a sense of association between the self and the sublime aspects 
of the natural environment. To begin with, I would like to consider two anthologized poems about 
baboons, poems that are revealing for the conceptual shift in their treatment of the subject. The first 
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 I have already discussed this moment in a different context, in the chapter on confession. See chapter one, section 4 
– “Quaquaqua.” 
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 In “Converging Convictions: Coetzee and his Characters on Animals”, Karen Dawn and Peter Singer argue quite 
convincingly that the attitude of Coetzee’s characters toward animals (autobiographical and otherwise) reveals a 
belief in vegetarianism and the ethical treatment of non-human beings that is shared by the author himself. 
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 I am especially indebted to Mike Marais for pointing to the conceptual significance of the figure of the baboon in an 
article on Justin Cartwright’s White Lightning. In the article, entitled “‘We know bugger-all about baboons’: Nature 
and exile in Justin Cartwright’s White Lightning”, Marais demonstrates how the exchanges between the protagonist 
and his pet baboon, Piet, illuminate the underlying conceptual problematics of subjective identification. Marais pays 
considerable attention to the apparent inscrutability of the baboon, and argues that the consequent failure of 
subjective self-knowledge (a ‘sublime’ experience, “‘We know bugger-all about baboons’” 83) occasioned by this 
inscrutability is at the same time the condition of possibility for subjective redemption, in the form of an experience 
of that which exceeds the subject. Cartwright's novel, I might add, presents an account of the problems of 
identifying with the South African milieu that resonates quite strongly, in its spirit of disillusionment, with Coetzee's 




poem, “Bongwi”, by Kingsley Fairbridge (1885–1924), situates the baboon as the denizen of a 
landscape that draws substantially from a Romantic notion of nature as a sublime space: 
 
Upon the summit of the height, 
 Where only wind-swept lichens grow, 
Bongwi, lit by the dawning-light, 
 Watches the plain below. 
 
Fierce eyes, low brow, protruding mouth, 
 Short hands that twitch and twitch again, 
The hairy gargoyle of the South – 
 A man without a brain; 
Upon the highest krantz he waits 
 Dim-lit by golden streak of dawn, 
Guarding the interests of his mates 
 Who wreck the fields of corn. 
(Fairdbridge, “Bongwi” lines 5-16) 
 
The landscape in the poem is threatening, and indeed almost gothic in its portentousness – we are 
reminded of the boy in “Tintern Abbey”, who experiences nature “more like a man/flying from 
something that he dreads, than one/who [seeks] the thing he loves” (Wordsworth, “Tintern Abbey” 
lines 71-73) – and the baboon emerges like an avatar from its sublime reaches to wreak havoc on 
the domesticated space of the farm on the “plain below”. Fairbridge’s poem speaks to the tenuous 
status of the farm in the wilderness, where the neatly apportioned “mealie-gardens” (“Bongwi” line 
17) are under constant threat from an irruption of something savage that emerges from the “open 
veld” (28), or from nature itself. As such, it betrays an awareness that proprietorship and tilling of 
the land does not in and of itself secure for the inhabitants of the farm (who are notably absent from 
the poem) a harmonious, or even a stable relationship with their natural environment. 
 




natural authority over the land. The troop of baboons have “gorg’d” themselves on mealies 
(“Bongwi” line 27), and they flee in the approaching dawn: 
 
And Bongwi sees. But turns his view – 
 Brown-eyed – towards the breaking morn, 
And gazes through the soundless blue, 
 The golden distance of the dawn. 
(Fairbridge, “Bongwi” lines 29-32) 
 
Disconcertingly, we now discover that the baboon has become the node of perception to which the 
landscape speaks. Nor is it a wild or savage eye to which the view belongs – it is “Brown-eyed”, 
familiar, and its gaze is calm. “The hairy gargoyle” (Fairdbridge, “Bongwi” line 11), which has 
been transplanted from the image vault of the Romantic gothic onto a “krantz” (line 13) in 
(presumably) Fairbridge’s Rhodesia, has all of a sudden asserted itself as an unwitting proprietor of 
the landscape by virtue of its gaze. Thus the baboon, who enters the scene as a conventional 
manifestation of the Romantic sublime, interrupting the labour of domestication taking place on the 
farm below, finds itself transformed all of a sudden into the subjective centre of the poem. It is a 
transformation that occurs, prosaically, at sunrise. 
 
In the second poem, “The Theology of Bongwi, the Baboon”, by Roy Campbell (1901–1957), we 
find the baboon trying to come to terms with its newfound agency. Campbell, it must be said, does 
not appear to have taken too seriously the failure of the South African fauna and flora to 
accommodate conventional models of Romantic pastoralism. His poem is a satirical representation 
of primate theology, and it is more concerned with poking fun at the tendency of man to conceive 
God in his own image than with working out the subjective agency of baboons. Nevertheless, it is 
quite revealing that it is precisely the baboon that gives body to a scathing (and comical) indictment 




human subject the position of unified being at the centre of meaning. What is revealing about the 
poem is that it offers no apology or framing device for its straightforward, iambic characterization 
of the mischievous baboon deity, other than asserting that what we are being presented with is, 
simply, “the wisdom of the Ape” (Campbell, “The Theology of Bongwi” lines 1-2): 
 
‘Tis God who made me in his shape 
 He is a Great Baboon. 
‘Tis He who tilts the moon askew 
 And fans the forest trees, 
The heavens which are broad and blue 
 Provide him his trapeze; 
... 
And when I die, His loving care 
 Will raise me from the sod 
To learn the perfect Mischief there, 
 The Nimbleness of God. 
(Campbell, “The Theology of Bongwi” lines 3-8; 12-16) 
 
Whatever Campbell’s intentions may have been, it is telling that, however rudimentary and lacking 
in gravitas, the next move in the baboon’s fledgling consciousness, after taking the first step in the 
direction of subjective agency in Fairbridge’s poem, is to try to work out a cosmic identity for itself. 
The knowledge of mortality that is evident in the last lines (“And when I die...”) is an important 
component of cosmic awareness and goes a long way toward explaining the baboon’s desire to posit 
“God”, as origin and destination of being, in a primate mould. 
 
The mode of consciousness that Campbell projects onto the baboon in his poem is cocksure and 
naive, which has an interesting double effect. It reveals, on the one hand, the inadequacy of 
(Western) man’s theological belief system, at least in Campbell’s conception of it, and perhaps 




the metaphor for a moment, that the baboon is a suitable subject for a commentary on activities that 
occupy, in Campbell’s satirical view, the spectrum of human spiritual preoccupations. The point is 
that the baboon begins to accrue a certain textured meaning by virtue of its persistence as a 
metaphor for human affairs. The type of meaning that it accrues is akin to the dawning of 
realization in Fairbridge’s poem, where the baboon as a metaphor for the Romantic sublime begins 
to approach an awareness of itself as a site of subjectivity, in the same sense that Wordsworth’s 
young boy in “Tintern Abbey” is a site of subjectivity: he is not conscious yet, but he becomes the 
point of origin for the poetical consciousness that comes after, a mythical site that draws to itself the 
disparate flux of perceptions and gives them cohesion. The baboon thus becomes at once a figure 
for the failure of traditional modes of natural (and cosmic) description and the site of possibility for 
an alternate subjective awareness and consequent codification of the natural world (and of the 
position of the subject in that world). 
 
Which brings us to Eugène Marais’s baboon and the emergence of melancholy, which is the next 
step in the evolution of the literary baboon and the aspect of its nature that John invokes in his 
conversation with Margot. Baboons, in Marais, are painfully aware, in their rudimentary fashion, 
that death circumscribes their existence, that it signals a threshold on the other side of which is 
something that baboon consciousness cannot comprehend. In the final chapter of Marais’ Burgers 
van die berge (which translates, appropriately, as ‘citizens of the mountains’) we find a moving 
description of the baboon’s confrontation with mortality. The leaders of the troop (Marais calls them 
the ‘council of leaders’, Burgers van die Berge 156) gather around his hut one night, ominously 
silent, as if to communicate the occurrence of some “great tragedy” (158). In the morning Marais 
learns that a number of baboon infants had died during the night, and when he carries away the 
bodies for examination, one of the mothers trail him. What she wanted, says Marais, 
 




unexpectedly in the night. The leaders wanted our help in staving off the 
imminent death of their little ones – the imminent death of which in all probability 
they had been well aware the previous day. And the mother wanted us to heal her 
child. The immense and implacable condition which she had come to know in her 
environment as death, she wanted changed. Somewhere in her mind the belief had 
taken root that these miracle workers with which she had become acquainted 
might have it in their power to restore life to her child.” (Marais, Burgers van die 
berge 159, my translation, my emphasis) 
 
Marais’ anthropomorphic diction and talent for characterization contribute substantially to the 
reader’s identification with the baboons, but whether or not we take him at his word regarding their 
intimations of mortality, it is clear that we have come a long way, in the literary depiction of 
baboons, from Fairbridge’s “hairy gargoyle” (“Bongwi” line 11) to these respectable citizens of 
nature. The baboon in Marais has graduated from being a mischievous monkey with a caricatured 
cosmic awareness (Campbell) to a sentient, solemn creature who despairs at the finitude of life, and 
even more than that, a creature who experiences these emotions as a natural consequence of its 
existence in the Southern African landscape, which is its proper “environment”. 
 
When John refers to the melancholy of baboons to describe the effect of the farm landscape on his 
psyche, therefore, he invokes an alternative evolution of the problematics of consciousness in 
Southern African literature, one that runs parallel to Romantic notions concerning the role of nature 
in the formulation of subjective being. What is striking about the figure of the baboon, as I have 
tried to show here, is the extent to which it continues to function as a metaphor for changing 
attitudes regarding the role of nature while at the same time resisting inscription into the ideologies 
which inform those attitudes. Or, to put it differently, the baboon continues to resist the 
programmatic tendencies of literary appropriation, even while it seems to provide an amenable, 
home-grown metaphor for those programmes. Or, to put it differently yet, the figure of the baboon 




which it finds itself playing a part: the baboon does not remain inert. 
 
The same holds for John’s baboon, who emerges from the pages of Eugène Marais,
59
 stares 
melancholically into the sunset, and receives a refined literary sensibility when its mournful 
thoughts are voiced in words that remind one of Rilke: “Never again, he was thinking: Just one life 
and then never again. Never, never, never” (Coetzee, Summertime 97). These thoughts, projected 
onto the baboon by John, echo a passage from the ninth of Rilke’s Duino Elegies: 
 
...Once 
for everything, only once. Once and no more. And we, too, 
only once. Never again. But to have been, 
this once, if only this once: 
to have been of the earth can never be taken back. 
(Rilke, “The Ninth Elegy” lines 13-17) 
 
The baboon’s melancholy thus surpasses the primitivistic and rudimentary intuition of death in 
Eugène Marais’ depiction and refines itself into a poetic speculation on the singularity of existence. 
But it does more than that: it infuses the words of Rilke with its own particularity; it speaks back to 
the late German Romanticism of Rilke’s verse with the plangency and immediacy of its own 
experience “of the earth”. The baboon makes an unselfconscious claim for its own environment, the 
arid landscape of the Karoo farm; it arrives at the problem of the singularity of subjective existence 
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 The shadow of Eugène Marais that presides over John’s affiliation with the baboon reveals an intertextual depth that 
sustains the strategy of belonging I have been describing here. Dirk Klopper has noted that Marais consciously 
positioned himself, in the role of Afrikaner, as someone with a native knowledge of the land and a privileged insight 
into the behaviour of the animals who inhabit that land. He suggests that this constitutes a deliberate inversion of the 
imperialist trope of the ‘wild Boer’ and that it implies a realignment of the rational categories of identification which 
the imperial subject imposes, by way of the Enlightenment, on the colony (Klopper, “Boer, Bushman and Baboon” 
15). Elsewhere, in a review of the film The Guest, Coetzee writes about Marais’s difficulties in negotiating a 
position for himself in the Afrikaner fold, burdened as he was (according to the popular imagination) by the blight of 
higher consciousness (Coetzee, Doubling the Point 116-7). Both of these observations revolve around the idea of 
Marais as someone who stands in a troubled relation to conventional structures of understanding, and suggest that 
John’s purported identification with the baboon (and, by association, with Marais) signals a desire to go beyond the 
established forms of association that govern life on the farm. Furthermore, we might speculate that John's feelings of 
melancholy acquire a nuance of meaning that derives from Eugène Marais’s failure to find a role for himself in the 




along its own trajectory; it insists on the validity of the problematics of its own consciousness. The 
baboon is insensible to its status as a creature of a lower order in a hierarchy of meaning that posits 
the human self as the node of subjective authority. 
 
5. The Earth Speaks Its Silence 
 
Jean-François Lyotard points to the emergence of the sublime in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries as the condition under which aesthetics asserted its critical rights over the arts in Europe 
and thus as the condition under which Romanticism came to prevail (“Le sublime et l'avant-garde” 
104). He goes on to trace the continued relevance of the sublime for the avant-garde, which breaks, 
he says, from “the eloquence of Romantic art, but does not reject its fundamental task”, which is “to 
bear witness to the inexpressible” (104, my translation). The sublime, for Lyotard, is very much a 
matter of the “here and now”, that is to say, of that which resists reduction to a formal structure of 
comprehension but insists instead on its own arrival, its own immanence, its own irrefutability (103, 
105). Alain Badiou describes a politics of resistance for Lyotard, in broadly Marxist terms, based on 
this refusal of homogeneity,
60
 but my interest here lies rather in establishing the relevance of this 
poststructuralist understanding of the sublime for Coetzee’s engagement with the problematics of 
consciousness in the Karoo landscape. 
 
We have seen, in the presence of the baboon as a kind of literary correlative for the feelings of 
melancholy which the farm has evoked in John since childhood (“‘This place wrenches my heart,’ 
he says. ‘It wrenched my heart when I was a child, and I have never been right since,’ Coetzee, 
Summertime 97), that there is indeed an attempt in Coetzee's writing to establish some form of 
connection between the profundity of his experience and the natural landscape of the farm. We have 
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 “In ontological terms, the incommensurability of genres of events, the heterogeneousness of what happens, cannot 
but persist, cannot but insist. The intractable remains intractable, silent under the rule that orders its reduction [i.e. 




also seen, however, that John is innately aware of the tenuous status of his claims for sublimity 
when they are set against the realities of daily life on the farm, where his strategies of identification 
are frequently at odds with the accepted patterns of social behaviour among his family, and where 
the disenfranchised community of farm workers have a far stronger claim than he has to natural 
kinship with the land. There is a passage in Boyhood that evokes the contradictory experience of 
self brought about by his predicament, and that suggests the continued influence of the sublime 
within a structure of meaning that refuses the harmonious sense of being which has been inherited 
from the Romantic tradition. The passage occurs after a description of a graveyard that lies half a 
mile from the farmhouse, a graveyard in which the presence of the family patriarch, John's 
grandfather, still looms large in the form of a marble headstone. There is also, Coetzee tells us, 
another graveyard on the farm: 
 
On the other side of the road is a second graveyard, without a fence, where some of the 
grave-mounds are so weathered that they have been reabsorbed into the earth. Here lie 
the servants and hirelings of the farm, stretching back to Outa Jaap and far beyond. 
What few gravestones still stand are without names or dates. Yet here he feels more awe 
than among the generations of Botes clustering around his grandfather. It has nothing to 
do with spirits. No one in the Karoo believes in spirits. Whatever dies here dies firmly 
and finally: its flesh is picked off by the ants, its bones are bleached by the sun, and that 
is that. Yet among these graves he treads nervously. From the earth comes a deep 
silence, so deep that it could almost be a hum. (Coetzee, Boyhood 97) 
 
In line with a tradition that is at least as old as Schreiner's Story of an African Farm, Coetzee makes 
no attempt here to soften or ameliorate the severity of the Karoo environment.
61
 Nature does not 
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 Schreiner's novel rejects outright the colonial stereotypes surrounding the kind of story that is appropriate to a 
Southern African setting (“Such works are best written in Piccadilly or the Strand: there the gifts of the creative 
imagination, untrammelled by contact with any fact, may spread their wings,” she writes in the preface to the novel, 
xiv), but what I have in mind here concerns especially her treatment of the natural surroundings in which her story is 
set, namely the Karoo farm. Here, for example, is Schreiner's description of a particularly severe drought: 
 
 Man and beast turned their eyes to the pitiless sky, that like the roof of some brazen oven arched 
overhead. On the farm, day after day, month after month, the water in the dams fell lower and lower; the 




accept human life warmly into her bosom: she goes to work swiftly and efficiently to strip away the 
remains of her children. The ants pick clean the bones and the sun bleaches what is left, reducing 
human existence to an almost mineral form. The flat grave-mounds, which have been “reabsorbed 
into the earth”, disassociate the scene at once from the patriarchal tradition that is represented by the 
phallic tombstone presiding over the Coetzee family from the graveyard across the road, as well as 
from the Romantic visual scheme that would associate sublime feelings with vertical natural 
features. And yet, the passage resonates with the same kind of primordial energy that we associate 
with Romantic evocations of the sublime. Like Wordsworth's description of the impact of the cliffs 
during his boat escapade in the The Prelude, we have a sense here that we are in the presence of 
“huge and mighty Forms that do not live/Like living men” (Wordsworth, The Prelude lines 425-
426), a sense of “blank desertion” (line 422) in the face of some immeasurable and wholly alien 
grandeur that pulses from the centre of the earth. This Romantic quality of the scene is made 
manifest most clearly in the feelings of “awe” that it elicits from the young John. The last sentence 
of the quoted paragraph, however, gives the experience a sense that leans more towards Lyotard's 
poststructuralist characterization of the sublime as an experience of absence, or as a lacuna that does 
its work by bearing testimony to that which falls outside the normative tendencies of 
representational structures of meaning: “From the earth comes a deep silence, so deep that it could 
almost be a hum.” If we consider John's experience of the farm as a kind of originative moment for 
the sense of being that finds expression in Coetzee's autobiographical fiction, then, we see that that 
sense of being locates itself from the outset in a kind of schism or fold between that which is deeply 
– indeed, almost transcendently – felt, and the equally powerful sense that the material and social 
realities in which those feelings have their being denies the legitimacy of their expression. 
Consequently, the young John navigates his way “nervously” between the servants' graves, filled 
with a sense of awe that does not, or that cannot belong to him. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
search of food. Week after week, month after month, the sun looked down from the cloudless sky, till the 
karoo-bushes were leafless sticks, broken into the earth, and the earth itself was naked and bare; and only 
the milk-bushes, like old hags, pointed their shrivelled fingers heavenwards, praying for the rain that 





The uneasy, fractured sense of being that comes to the fore in the dissonance between the 
transcendent and the material in John's experience of the farm is prolonged, as we have seen, in 
Summertime. In that book, John distances himself from familial conventions pertaining to the 
texture of life on the farm. He refuses to partake of the meat; he speaks a strained and awkward 
Afrikaans; he recoils from the codes of conduct which the other members of the family assume as a 
natural state of affairs. Margot’s puzzled and sometimes irritated response to her cousin is an 
indication of the extent to which he has managed to estrange himself from the established order. 
Instead, as we have seen, he aligns himself with baboons, and when Margot asks him if he 
remembers pulling the legs off a locust when they were children, he responds by saying that he 
prays for forgiveness to Kaggen, the mantis god, every day (Coetzee, Summertime 96). These are 
strategies which would surprise even Outa Jaap (see Boyhood) in the scope of their ambition to 
belong properly to the farm. John shuns the level of engagement enacted by the nominal inhabitants 
of the farm and attempts to situate himself according to a semiotic structure that incorporates traces 
of a prehistory of natural life in the Karoo. What unsettles Margot is the foreignness of these traces 
to the existing layer of codified exchange on the farm, but if they were merely foreign, or no more 
than foreign – if John had spoken about the melancholy of polar bears, for example – they would 
have very little impact on the collective discourse happening in and around the space of the farm. It 
is of course only John, with his specialized knowledge of literature and linguistic structures, who is 
aware of the claim of these traces to a rightful place in a semiotic structure of representation for the 
Karoo, and hence of their ability to unsettle a conventional codification of the relationship between 
the self and the landscape of the farm. 
 
What occurs, then, is that the natural model inherited from Romanticism finds itself subjected to a 
surprisingly Romantic insurgence of the sublime, embodied in this instance by the gods of the San, 




text upsets the notion of a complacent identification with nature by insisting on the possibility of a 
counterclaim. And because the trace remains opaque – because it does not fit readily into any of the 
existing schemes of social interaction on the farm, because it has a history of opaque engagement 
with conventional literary models – it signals the tenuous status of a subjectivity that wishes to 
claim for itself a linear, privileged relationship with the landscape that informs its being. We find 
here that John’s method of self-expression begins to overlap with the mode of representation at 
work in the book, in the sense that the structure of Summertime insists on the opacity of its 
protagonist by describing him through a series of counterclaims. John’s subjective being arrives as 
the confluence of the multiple traces of him that comprise the various interviews in the book. That 
being said, the interviews are of course all the work of a single authorial intelligence, which implies 
that the notion of the self as a refracted multiplicity of traces might be understood as a form of 
wishful thinking, or if not as wishful thinking, then at least as a self-conscious attempt to 
reconfigure the Romantic notion of the authorial subject as a unified, harmonious entity. 
 
Pieter Vermeulen has argued that Coetzee’s autobiographical project is a “distinctive 
reconfiguration of the Wordsworthian model” as it derives from The Prelude, and furthermore that 
this “reconfiguration is presented as a distinctively South African one” (“Wordsworth and the 
Recollection of South Africa” 56). One of the more cogent aspects of this reconfiguration, says 
Vermeulen, is Coetzee’s insistence on a topographical inclusion of the “real” in his texts (Vermeulen 
calls it “[t]he onslaught of the real,” 55): 
 
It is South Africa’s nagging need for a storied web of description, for a connection 
to particulars that are not spirited away into harmonious universals, that obligates 
what I want to call Coetzee’s prosaics of enumeration – an account of particulars 
which need no longer be harmonized into a meaningful poetic whole ... It is only 
through prosaic enumeration, and not through the imposition of the 
Wordsworthian sublime, that the particulars of South Africa are allowed to remain 




“Wordsworth and the Recollection of South Africa” 57) 
 
I would go one step further, and argue that the “prosaic enumeration” of “particulars”, or the 
occurrence in the text of material traces which threaten to disrupt the harmony of the social codes 
that order the life on the farm – and in particular those traces which originate in the natural 
landscape – are a manifestation, in a poststructuralist milieu, of the energies of the sublime, 
specifically in Lyotard’s sense of the sublime as that which “bear[s] witness to the inexpressible” 
(Lyotard, “Le sublime et l'avant garde” 104). The disharmonious effect of these traces reflects back 
on the self as a figure of structural cohesion. That is to say, the fiction of the self, which is presented 
in Coetzee’s autobiographical project as a confluence of insistent traces, is the principle according 
to which the particularities of existence maintain their right to be present. We can thus understand 
Coetzee’s appraisal of the farm and its landscape as a self-conscious aesthetic reconfiguration of the 
Romantic attempt to redeem the self by claiming for the subject a privileged position in nature: a 
source, in other words, for the discord between the idea of a transcendent self and the ever-present 
insistence of historical and discursive pressures that throbs at the centre of Coetzee's creative 
output. 
 
There is a passage in Youth that sheds light on Coetzee’s treatment of the farm in Boyhood and 
Summertime. It occurs while the protagonist is in London, eager to attract those types of 
metropolitan experience that he imagines will transfigure him into an artist: 
 
Tired out, one Sunday afternoon, he folds his jacket into a pillow, stretches out on 
the greensward, and sinks into a sleep or half-sleep in which consciousness does 
not vanish but continues to hover. It is a state he has not known before: in his very 
blood he seems to feel the steady wheeling of the earth. The faraway cries of 
children, the birdsong, the whirr of insects gather force and come together in a 
paean of joy. His heart swells. At last! he thinks. At last it has come, the moment 




put a halt to the clatter of thought, tries simply to be a conduit for the great 
universal force that has no name. (Coetzee, Youth 117) 
 
At a glance, the passage appears to describe exactly the type of Wordsworthian unity with a 
pantheistic life force that informs the literary intelligence of a poem like “Tintern Abbey”. The 
choice of diction (“greensward”, “in his very blood”, “paean of joy”, “ecstatic unity with the All”, 
“great universal force”, etc.) situates the passage in a semantic field that reaches back (via D.H. 
Lawrence, perhaps) to Romanticism. The passage thus appears to represent a straightforward 
attempt to respond to the tradition of English Romanticism on its own terms, i.e. by employing a 
lexical range and a cosmic terminology that is familiar to it. However, it is an affect that does not 
bear the scrutiny of a second glance. If the question of sincerity were not so pertinent to the 
autobiographical fictions as a whole, it would be tempting to label this particular passage as a 
moment of patent insincerity. It is preceded by the protagonist’s speculation about his fate, which is 
to remain forever the descendant of his gloomy South African forebears, “sweating in their dark 
clothes in the heat and dust of the Karoo” (Youth 116), and it is framed by his wish to belong, 
instead, to the metropole. If we cannot call it an insincere moment, we may perhaps call it a 
suspiciously opportune one, coming as it does in the midst of these thoughts about the failure of his 
environment to live up to his desires. The moment passes without a fuss and does not resurface in 
the narrative. In the subsequent pages John frets about ways to save money (118). For all intents and 
purposes, he has not yet been transformed, or at least not as transformed as he would like to be. It 
appears that he will have to return to the Karoo farm and its arid landscape in order to work out his 






POLITICS, VOICE AND THE SELF 
 
1. The Soiled Condition 
 
In the previous chapter I focused on the role of the farm in Coetzee's autobiographical fiction, and 
argued that his representation of it involves a strategic reconfiguration of the Romantic dynamics 
concerning the relationship between the self and nature. In Romantic writing, and in the poetry of 
Wordsworth in particular, the psyche of the child-self is shaped by the guiding hand of nature, and 
the mature poet, who is an extension of that younger self, is able to imbue his work with the same 
sense of transcendent harmony that informs the originative childhood moment. The redemptive 
feature of these Romantic moves – the way in which the identification between the poet and his or 
her childhood self is situated within a transcendent natural order, and the subsequent conceit that the 
process of creative self-exploration is tantamount to a discovery of authentic, perennial truths about 
the nature of being – is compromised in Coetzee's work by an awareness that the yearning for 
kinship with the land is at odds with the social realities that govern life on the farm. My aim in this 
chapter is to explore this politicized sense of reality in Coetzee's work more extensively, and to 
determine the ways in which it conditions the formation of the subject in his autobiographical 
fiction. The point, as we shall see, is that the self becomes a site, in Coetzee's writing, where the 
incommensurability of these opposing forces – the desire for an autonomous, transcendent sense of 
being and the insistence of socio-political realities that are inimical to the expression of such desires 
– finds a form of expression. 
 
The first notebook entry in Summertime plunges us directly into the deprivations of the political 
milieu to which the young writer returns after his time in America, and provides a useful point of 




politically motivated murder of South African citizens in Botswana. This murder, we are told, is one 
in a long chain of political crimes, reported “week after week” by the press (Coetzee, Summertime 
4) , along with denials by the apartheid government that it has anything to do with them. The effect 
of these reports on the protagonist is to send him into helpless “fits of rage and despair” (5): they 
constitute a “moral dilemma” from which he can envision no escape (5). His articulation of the 
dilemma in his notebook presents us with an opportunity to examine more closely what it means for 
him to be subjected to the political situation in South Africa in the 1970s: 
 
He reads the reports and feels soiled. So this is what he has come back to! Yet where in 
the world can one hide where one will not feel soiled? Would he feel any cleaner in the 
snows of Sweden, reading at a distance about his people and their latest pranks? 
(Coetzee, Summertime 4) 
 
The use of the word “soiled” evokes a specific inflection of meaning for the process of political 
involvement that is being described here. In a literal sense, it means simply that John has been made 
(or feels himself to have been made) dirty. It carries along with it connotations of the crudest kind, 
connotations that gather around images of incontinence and defecation. These connotations impart a 
sense of shame to the figurative meaning of the word, which denotes a state of devaluation: the self 
has somehow been tarnished, or compromised by an exposure to the political. The image of the self 
is thus set up in opposition to the political. In particular, the political is characterized as that which 
has the capacity to devaluate the experience of self – a self which would otherwise exist, 
presumably, in some mythically pure state. The devaluation of the self by the political is an 
altogether shameful experience.   
 
However, if we take into account the wider context of the passage, namely John’s homecoming after 
several years abroad, then it becomes hard to ignore the further connotative meanings that attach to 




it evokes. This layer of allusive meaning suggests that the shameful invasion of the self by the 
political is in fact the proper environment for that self: John’s native soil is the condition of being 
“soiled”. The axis on which these paradoxical meanings turn is the notion that John’s sense of self 
comes into being at the moment of recognition that it is undergoing a shameful penetration by that 
which it perceives as the corrupt domain of the political, and furthermore that it is an expression of 
this impure state which offers the closest approximation to the reality of that self. John flickers into 
life at the precise moment of his devaluation, which is being staged here as an interpenetration 
between an elusive, pure sense of self and the base materials of political rhetoric. All these 
meanings, in this particular context, are figured in the use of the word “soiled”. It would be possible 
to extrapolate related sequences of meaning from other aspects of the passage cited above, but for 
the purpose of my argument I would like instead to consider the ramifications of the way in which 
the self finds itself embroiled here in political realities. 
 
In its notion of the political as a constitutive aspect of what it means to be a self, the first passage of 
Summertime recalls the opening of Coetzee’s previous book, Diary of a Bad Year. The first section 
of that book comprises an essay on the origins of the state,
62
 ostensibly written by the protagonist, 
JC, who shares with the protagonist of Summertime an open-ended autobiographical relation to his 
author. The essay describes, in a tone of unmitigated frustration, the primacy of the state in the 
constitution of what it means, in terms of identity, to be human. “The state is always there before we 
are” writes JC (Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 3): “From the moment of our birth we are subject” (4). 
In his conclusion, he bemoans the futility of trying to find a position outside politics from which to 
talk about politics (9), suggesting that it is not possible for the self to consider itself in relation to 
the state without participating in the very discourse, namely political discourse, from which it seeks 
to redeem itself. 
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 I have already mentioned this passage from Diary of Bad Year briefly in the first chapter, with a particular emphasis 
on its relation to Coetzee's writing about Jean-Jacques Rousseau (see section 1 – “Coetzee, Rousseau and the 





Nevertheless, he presents us with an example of what it might mean to pursue a state of being that is 
not from the outset subjected to the impersonal machinations of power that characterize, in his 
description, the politics of statehood. He points to the retreat of German forces from France at the 
end of the Second World War and asks whether this might not have been an opportunity for the 
French people, who were for a few golden (and perhaps hypothetical) moments “ruled by no one” 
(Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 7), to “roll back the state” (7) and to envision for themselves an 
alternative way of being in the world. Quite bitterly he concedes that the “poet” (7) who might have 
spoken such thoughts would have been silenced at once by the agents of power who filled the space 
left by the Germans. 
 
The hypothetical scenario that JC sketches for the French people demonstrates a curious blend of 
utopianism and fatalism. He concedes the possibility of an alternative arrangement for society but 
posits the impossibility of such a society ever seeing the light of day. It exists only as a flicker of 
hope, a word that is spoken and then erased. In Summertime we discover similar sentiments being 
spoken on John’s behalf by a French interlocutor, Mme Sophie Denoël, a former colleague and 
lover of the protagonist. In the course of much prodding and prompting by her interviewer, Mr 
Vincent, she reveals that John dreamed utopian dreams without investing any hope in their political 
fruition (Coetzee, Summertime 229), or indeed without bothering to consider their application to his 
immediate political environment, namely the struggle for liberation in apartheid South Africa (230). 
When she is pressed to describe the particular form of his utopianism, she presents us with a 
vignette of society that is so utterly radical that one does not wonder at her dismissive tone: “The 
disbanding of the armed forces. The abolition of the automobile. Universal vegetarianism. Poetry in 
the streets. That sort of thing” (230). 
 




protagonists, with a kind of visionary poetic capability – take us back to Martin's description of 
John, in one of the previous interviews in Summertime, as someone who had a secret affinity for 
“the more vatic poets” (Coetzee, Summertime 213).
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 The vatic poet whose spirit appears to preside 
over the Romantic idyll of a free society that Sophie describes for John, in this case, is William 
Blake. The type of societal afflictions that John would get rid of in his anti-political fantasy (armed 
forces, automobiles, meat-eating), and perhaps more centrally the image of the poet as someone 
who takes to the streets to proclaim his creative visions (“Poetry in the streets. That sort of thing,” 
Summertime 230), echoes the sensibility that is expressed in a poem like Blake's “London”, where 
the poet wanders “thro' each charter'd street” (“London” line 1), identifying the “mind-forg'd 
manacles” (line 8) that bound the human spirit, and that derive, in the conceit of the poem, from the 
regulatory controls imposed on the populace by the unholy trinity of dogmatic religion, state-
sanctioned warfare and monarchical rule: 
 
[T]he Chimney-sweepers cry 
Every blackning Church appalls, 
And the hapless Soldier's sigh, 
Runs in blood down Palace walls 
(Blake, “London” lines 9-12). 
 
Blake's singular and untrammelled rejection of “chartr'd” existence figures as an extreme example 





The sheer conviction of Blake's poetic protest against the social and political orthodoxies of his day 
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 I discussed this passage from the Martin-interview in my introduction (see section 4 – “Conflicting Sources of the 
Self”. 
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 James Fenton writes about the singular force of Blake's radical dissent when he remarks about one of the other 
poems in the “Songs of Experience”-cycle (“The Chimney Sweeper”): “No one had ever written anything remotely 
like this before. No one had thought to attack the Church and the monarchy and parenthood in a single short poem” 




is grounded in his belief in the transcendent roots of imaginative inspiration. It is a belief that finds 
an especially powerful expression in one of the “memorable fancies” that are collected in The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell. Blake writes that he was sharing a meal with the prophets Isaiah and 
Ezekiel, and made use of the opportunity to ask them “how they dared so roundly to assert that God 
spake to them” (The Marriage of Heaven and Hell 40 – I have retained Blake's original spelling in 
my citation): 
 
Isaiah answer'd. I saw no God nor heard any, in a finite organical perception; but my 
senses discover'd the infinite in every thing, and as I was then perswaded, & remain 
confirm'd; that the voice of honest indignation is the voice of God, I cared not for 
consequences but wrote. 
 Then I asked: does a firm perswasion that a thing is so, make it so? 
 He replied. All poets believe that it does, & in ages of imagination this firm 
perswasion removed mountains; but many are not capable of a firm perswasion of any 
thing. (Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell 40) 
 
Ezekiel then elaborates on the nature of this “voice of God” that is discernible as “the infinite in 
every thing,”
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 and that is the source of the prophets' conviction of their own opinions (their 
“perswasion”): 
 
Then Ezekiel said. The philosophy of the east taught the first principles of human 
perception some nations held one principle for the origin & some another, we of Israel 
taught that the Poetic Genius (as you now call it) was the first principle and all the 
others merely derivative, which was the cause of our despising the Priests & 
Philosophers of other countries, and prophecying that all Gods would at last be proved 
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 A more well-known expression of the prophets' conception of infinity can be found in the opening lines of Blake's 
“Auguries of Innocence”: 
 
 To see a World in a Grain of Sand 
 And a Heaven in a Wild Flower 
 Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand 
 And Eternity in an hour 





to originate in ours & to be the tributaries of the Poetic Genius, it was this that our great 
poet King David desired so fervently & invokes so patheticly... (Blake, The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell 40) 
 
“Poetic Genius,” according to Blake's prophets, is the original transcendent force, and all opinion 
that springs from it should be expressed fully, without reservation or fear of prosecution. By 
establishing for his protagonist a secretive (secretive in the sense of being rarely expressed)
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rapport with Blake's imaginative mode of social critique, Coetzee involves the Romantic belief in 
the transcendent reality of poetic inspiration in his view on politics in a very peculiar way. Instead 
of challenging the status quo forthrightly, as Blake does, John prefers to remain silent, to internalize 
his views, to work them out via oblique references to potential vatic sources of creative inspiration. 
In the figure of John, Coetzee thus appears to be staging a contest between an alluded-to ideal of 
poetic truth as the essence of his autobiographical subject, and the ever-present sense that the actual 
realm of the self is, in fact, the “soiled” world of politics. 
 
John’s radical utopian ideas are not to be thought of as a political position, says Sophie, but rather as 
a variety of philosophical idealism that is, at its very core, “anti-political” (Coetzee, Summertime 
228). Concurrently with this idealism, she says, ran his belief that humans “will never abandon 
politics” because it affords us an opportunity to play out our “baser emotions” and thus expresses 
itself as “a symptom of our fallen state” (229). On the face of it, then, we have in John someone 
whose fantasies of a prelapsarian state of grace are foreclosed by the very conditions under which 
they come to exist, namely the fraught and political condition of being human. His version of 
utopianism thus has the surprising effect of consolidating the species of fatalism that sanctions his 
sense of being in the world. Or, to put it differently, his visions of utopia appear to function in a 
negative sense, as a hypothetical position that serves to affirm the “fallen state” as the proper locus 
of reality. 
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 “[John] was very scrupulous about not preaching. His political beliefs you discovered only when you got to know 





At this point we might recall that John experiences the “soiled” nature of his being – his ontological 
complicity in the political – as a “moral dilemma” (Coetzee, Summertime 5). What this implies is 
that for John, the utopian vision of an ideal, “anti-political” (228) existence is aligned with an ideal 
of moral purity. For the subject to escape a condition of moral compromise, it would be necessary to 
live in a world that is free of politics. However, as I have mentioned above, John's utopian ideal has 
the contradictory effect of reinforcing the ubiquity of the fallen state. In similar fashion, then, we 
might say that the desire for moral purity points us to the notion that the self is in fact always 
already morally compromised. That is to say, the subject finds itself always in the midst of moral 
turmoil – it is never outside the dilemma. The notion of moral purity thus acts retrogressively in 
Summertime, by providing a negative space, or an absence, against which the contours of the 
blemished moral being of the subject, John, takes shape. 
 
John's compromised moral being becomes all the more pertinent if we bear in mind that 
Summertime is a work of autobiographical fiction. The question of the moral being of the subject 
(and, more precisely, of its moral redemption) is closely tied, as we saw in the first chapter, to the 
writing of an autobiographical text, insofar as it figured in the history of confessional writing.
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 In 
Coetzee's work, the question is given an added layer of complexity by the persistent ambiguity that 
surrounds the nature of the relationship between the writer and his subject, “John”. The depiction of 
moral depravity, which is conventionally justified as one of the necessary steps in a road that leads 
finally to redemption, or at least to absolution, acquires a shadowy moral status all its own when it 
becomes impossible to determine the subjective locus of the moral being that reveals itself in this 
way. In short, if we are to understand the depiction of moral depravity in Summertime as something 
more than sensationalism, it becomes necessary to establish a connection between “John” and his 
author, or at least to understand the significance of the relationship between them.  
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If the professed aim of the writer of an autobiography is to depict the truth about him- or herself, 
then we can identify in Coetzee's autobiographical fiction an embodiment of the idea that this aim 
must be prolonged – or indefinitely suspended – for as long as the writing continues. While the 
notion of identification between the writer and his subject serves to drive Coetzee's 
autobiographical fiction (or to give it a sense of “truth-directedness”, to return to Attridge's term, 
“Confessing in the Third Person”, 160), it is at the same time a notion that operates in a negative 
sense, as something that exerts its influence on the narrative through its absence rather than its 
fulfilment. The reader is compelled and drawn forward by the question of the historical veracity of 
the narrative, but then finds him- or herself immersed instead in the imaginative descriptions that 
occupy the evasions of that very question. It is as if the writer incorporates the problem of veracity 
in his text and then proceeds to skirt it, or as if the problem that is there, haunting the text, serves 
mainly to set in relief the proper substance of the narrative, which is the imaginative description of 
things as they might have been. That this could be so is an unsettling thought, because what it 
implies is that the writer deliberately refrains from imparting a sense of moral closure to his 
narrative, which has a marked consequence for the ethical measure of his work. It brings to the fore 
the problem of accountability: what does one do with the ethical questions raised by Coetzee's work 
if the work itself strives to unsettle the existential determinacy of the subjective position in which 
those questions originate and cohere? Or, to put it differently, how do we account (do we account at 
all?) for the privilege that is accorded to imaginative activity – the privilege of the imagination – in 
works that are inflected to a very high degree by a consciousness of the individual's historical and 
socio-political responsibility? 
 
2. Echoes of Negative Capability 
 




work is the collection J.M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on Literature (edited by 
Anton Leist and Peter Singer). While the collection does contain some insightful discussion on what 
Gillian Dooley calls the “author/character nexus” (Review, 1) in Coetzee's writing (see, for 
example, Karen Dawn and Peter Singer's argument, in “Converging Convictions”, that Elizabeth 
Costello's views on vegetarianism and on the treatment of animals are shared by her author; or 
Jonathan Lear’s “Ethical Thought and the Problem of Communication,” which traces the 
displacement of opinion through the tripartite structure of Diary of a Bad Year), these essays from 
the camp of philosophy are concerned more with the ethics of Coetzee's representation of animal 
being, and less with the question of accountability raised by his autobiographical practice. Another 
example – one that is more closely aligned to the purposes of my argument here – is David Attwell's 
essay “The Life and Times of Elizabeth Costello,” from a collection edited by Jane Poyner (J.M. 
Coetzee and the Idea of the Public Intellectual). In his essay, Attwell traces the strategic ways in 
which Coetzee has resisted the demands of public engagement. Instead of taking a stand on 
important public issues under his own name, Attwell says, Coetzee prefers to “absorb the public 
domain into the codes of fiction,” thereby attempting to “give to fictionality an authority to 
challenge the demand for public accountability” (“The Life and Times of Elizabeth Costello” 34). 
The ethical importance of doing so is located in the possibility of creating a position (or a 
“nonposition”) from whence it is possible to engage with socio-political issues without “falling into 
the dominant rivalries” (34) that tend to characterize such issues. Attwell draws on Coetzee's own 
articulation of this problem in his essay on Desiderius Erasmus, “Erasmus: Madness and Rivalry” 
(collected in Giving Offense: Essays on Censorship) – the problem of speaking from a position 
which is not a position, or of engaging with the structures of power without succumbing to the 
ideologies of power – and suggests that the figure of Elizabeth Costello presents him with a solution 
(Attwell, “The Life and Times of Elizabeth Costello” 36). 
 





One may see her as a compromise and a surrogate: a compromise because through her 
Coetzee goes some way toward meeting the demands placed on him to step into the 
public limelight, and a surrogate because she does, to some degree, speak for him – 
when called on to speak publicly, Coetzee ushers her into [the public sphere] instead, 
enabling him to stand back and observe the ironies and the play of positions. 
(Attwell, “The Life and Times of Elizabeth Costello” 33) 
 
That the surrogacy is a genuine one is confirmed by their shared general beliefs, at least insofar as 
one may deduce these beliefs from the concerns which inform Coetzee's previous work (Attwell, 
“The Life and Times of Elizabeth Costello” 36) – concerns like the nature of animal being, the 
problem of representing evil, the conflict between desire and responsibility, the work of the 
sympathetic imagination and indeed the embattled position of the writer-as-public-intellectual, to 
name a few. The point is that Costello has a similarly autobiographically-inflected connection with 
her author as, for example, John in Summertime or JC in Diary of a Bad Year, albeit in a less 
pronounced (and more obviously distinguishable) way. And in Costello, Coetzee comes closest to 
confronting the ethical questions raised by precisely such an investment in the imaginative 
displacement of his moral being via the subject of his narrative. 
 
The passage that embodies this confrontation best, to my mind, occurs in the final, allegorical 
chapter of Elizabeth Costello (“At the Gate”). In that chapter the eponymous writer-protagonist has 
to defend her beliefs before a panel of judges. Although it is never spelt out, the suggestion is that 
the reason for Costello's presence there is that she must convince the judges that her lifelong 
commitment to fiction writing is sufficient justification to grant her passage to the hereafter. The 
confrontation that is staged is thus one in which a writer has to defend her investment in the life of 
the imagination before a sort of tribunal of the soul – a tribunal that does not accept (indeed, has not 
the slightest interest in) the idea that the work of imagining oneself into the being of others is in 




her moral being beyond her activity as a writer. They are singularly unimpressed by her pleas that it 
is precisely the duty of a writer to suspend his or her moral being in the interest of his or her work. 
In one of their interviews, or hearings, Costello explains her lack of clearly defined beliefs as a 
moral obligation to keep “opinions and prejudices at bay” (Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello 200). One of 
the judges wonders indifferently, but also with a whiff of recognition, whether she is referring to the 
idea of “negative capability” (200). 
 
It is not for nothing, I think, that Coetzee incorporates the Keatsian notion of negative capability 
here. It is a reference that echoes the way Costello is described in the opening pages of the book, 
when her son John finds her look of “blank receptiveness” (Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello 4) 
reminiscent of Keats. What the literary-minded judge alerts us to is the fact that Costello's insistence 
on the privilege of the imagination can be read as an idea with its own intellectual history and 
ideological background, an idea that reaches back, in this case, to the early nineteenth century and 
Romanticism. Keats's notion of “negative capability” is one of the abiding formulations of the spirit 
of uninhibited creative absorption that we associate with that period in literary history. The term 
comes from a letter that Keats wrote to his brothers, Tom and George, on the 21
st
 of December, 
1817: 
 
I had not a dispute but a disquisition with Dilke, on various subjects; several things 
dovetailed in my mind, & at once it struck me, what quality went to form a Man of 
Achievement, especially in Literature & which Shakespeare possessed so enormously – 
I mean Negative Capability, that is when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, 
Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason – Coleridge, for 
instance, would let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude caught from the Penetralium of 
mystery, from being incapable of remaining content with half knowledge. This pursued 
through Volumes would perhaps take us no further than this, that with a great poet the 
sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all 
consideration. (Keats, “Letter to George and Thomas Keats” 41, my emphasis) 
 
What Keats is expressing here is the right claimed by literature to free itself from the demand that it 




demanding of Costello (and, we might add, what the hypothetical public demands of Coetzee). 
Keats's claim is quite large. He is not only arguing for the primacy of aesthetic considerations (“the 
sense of Beauty”) in the writer's sensibility, but also, and perhaps more powerfully, that the very 
being of the writer is invested in the uncertainty and ambiguity that characterizes the aesthetic play 
of the imagination (“when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts”, my 
emphasis). The idea of “negative capability” thus seems to be a historical marker for Costello's 
declared inability to separate her moral being from the fictional play of her work. 
 
Keats's influence on Costello resurfaces a few pages later, when a line from one of his poems enters 
her mind, seemingly unprompted. The line concerns a girl “[k]eeping steady her laden head across a 
brook” (Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello 222), and its origin is Keats's To Autumn (1819), one of the last 
poems he wrote during his productive years (1817-1819), shortly before his death (Gittings, 
Introduction 11). The poem is resonant with Costello’s situation for various reasons, not least of 
which is its insistence on describing the autumnal moment, so to speak, from within the stylistic 
paradigm that characterizes the author’s opus. When Keats reaches the end of his productive period 
(Sheats, “Keats and the Ode” 97) he channels the winding down of his creative energies into an ode 
that bespeaks the mellifluous abundance of that very moment, to the extent that he dismisses any 
nostalgia for the antecedent “songs of Spring” (Keats, “To Autumn” line 23) and celebrates instead 
the music that is particular to his subject, namely the in-between time of autumn (Sheats, “Keats 
and the Ode” 98). Similarly, in Elizabeth Costello, when Coetzee confronts the idea of a writer who 
is passing from the stage of productive activity to what lies beyond, he approaches it with his 
sensitivity to the affective properties of language intact. To Autumn thus seems to be an appropriate 
model for Costello when she insists that even here, at the end of the line, metaphorically speaking, 
she does not have access to a position that lies outside an aesthetic sense of being, with all the 





Costello's appropriation of Keats reveals the extent to which the project of self-writing, for Coetzee, 
has been influenced by a Romantic emphasis on the primacy of subjective experience, or on the 
freedom of the individual to give voice to his or her experience in an aesthetic form. The way in 
which this influence manifests most clearly, I think, is in Coetzee's refusal to account for the self in 
instrumental terms. That is to say, it is possible to trace the incorporation of autobiographical 
elements in his fiction – or, conversely, the essentially fictional nature of his autobiography – to a 
Romantic notion of self-expression as the freedom to represent, in irreducible terms, the ambiguities 
that characterize the activity of the subjective imagination. The absence of closure in Coetzee's 
fictional autobiography – his resistance to the idea of achieving a sense of identification with the 
moral being of his subject – thus has the paradoxical effect of positing the invisible presence of 
exactly that which eludes the text, namely the reality of a personal, or subjective experience. 
Despite the various ways in which Coetzee displaces the subjective locus of her being, we have a 
sense, when we listen to Elizabeth Costello, of a clearly defined voice, and it is precisely this voice 
(to use Attwell's terms) that “lingers as a mark of ethical accountability” (Attwell, “The Life and 
Times of Elizabeth Costello” 36). That which must be held to account, in other words, is the 
consistency and full-blooded realization of the voice in which the various ambiguities, mysteries 
and uncertainties surrounding the nature of the subject in writing is articulated. 
 
These ambiguities are certainly sustained in Coetzee's work, and especially so in those books which 
incorporate a sense of the autobiographical. In Summertime, for example, the method of 
representation, which describes the protagonist through a series of interviews and notebook entries, 
is already indicative of the liminal modality of the subject. Beyond the formal properties of the 
work, however, we find that the language itself embodies the paradox of subjective being, as I have 
tried to demonstrate at the beginning of this chapter by describing the use of the word “soiled” in its 
particular context: an expression of the corruption of the self that is at the same time an expression 




language, Coetzee's writing evokes a strong awareness of the contesting semantic fields from which 
a literary utterance derives its meaning – semantic fields, in my reading, which often stand in a 
deeply uncomfortable, even agonistic relationship toward each other. 
 
The layered, simultaneous presence of disparate fields of meaning in Coetzee's autobiographical 
fiction calls to mind, in certain respects, the theory of the novel put forward by Mikhail Bakhtin.
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Thus, in “Discourse in the Novel,” Bakhtin describes language as a heteroglot system (raznorecie: 
“heteroglossia”) of overlapping fields of discourse (“social dialects, characteristic group behaviour, 
professional jargons, generic languages, languages of generations and age groups, tendentious 
languages, languages of the authorities, of various circles and passing fashions, languages that 
serve the specific sociopolitical purposes of the day, even of the hour,” “Discourse in the Novel” 
674, my emphasis), and argues that “this internal stratification present in every language … is the 
indispensable prerequisite for the novel as a genre” (674). The novelist (and for Bakhtin the novelist 
par excellence is Dostoevsky) incorporates the multiple, intersecting points of view that are 
expressed in the variety of speech genres into his work “for orchestrating his themes” and “for the 
refracted (indirect) expression of his intentions and values” (676).
69
 For Bakhtin, the confluence of 
contradicting socio-ideological language systems (676) that are drawn into the fabric of the novel 
does not nullify the possibility of authorial intent; on the contrary, “[t]he prose writer makes use of 
words that are already populated with the social intentions of others and compels them to serve his 
own new intentions, to serve a second master” (678). In these technical aspects, it is hard not to see 
the links between Bakhtin's thought and Coetzee's novelistic craft. When Michael Holquist says 
about Bakhtin's theory of the utterance that it describes a “give-and-take between the local need of a 
particular speaker to communicate a specific meaning, and the global requirements of language as a 
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generalizing system” (Bakhtin and his World 60), we can discern a tension that is analogous to the 
way in which the subject in Coetzee's autobiographical fiction defines itself in the conflict between 
the desire for pure, autonomous being and the recognition that being is in fact contingent on the 
social environment from which it takes its coordinates. It is in the constant expression of this 
dialogic exchange, at the level of structure as well as the level of language, that the self has its most 
marked reality in Coetzee's writing, and that we hear in his work the presence of a voice that will 
not go away, even as it is beset by the doubt of its own moral legitimacy. 
 
But the dialogic resonance that is discernible in Coetzee's writing has to be qualified (as Clarkson 
points out in the introduction to Countervoices, 9) by the reservations he has expressed in a few 
select places concerning the universal applicability of Bakhtin's theory. In his review essay of 
Joseph Frank's biography of Dostoevsky, collected in Stranger Shores (“Joseph Frank, Dostoevsky: 
The Miraculous Years”), Coetzee maintains that the entry of Bakhtin's thought into mainstream 
academic criticism has entailed a certain “vulgarization”: that “'dialogical' has become a term of 
approval, 'monological' a term of censure,” presented as alternatives “between which a writer is free 
to choose” (“Joseph Frank” 145). Against this mechanistic appropriation of Bakhtin's thought, 
Coetzee argues that we need to recognize the singularity of the dialogic method that arises in 
Dostoevsky's work: that “dialogism as exemplified in the novels of Dostoevsky is a matter not of 
ideological position, still less of novelistic technique, but of the most radical intellectual and even 
spiritual courage,” and that “to the degree that Dostoevskian dialogism grows out of Dostoevsky's 
own moral character, out of his ideals, and out of his being as a writer, it is only distantly imitable” 
(145, my emphasis). These thoughts echo the sentiments expressed by JC in Diary of a Bad Year 
concerning Dostoevsky (about which I have written in section 3 of my introduction – “A Close 
Reading of Authority”), and are similarly expressive of Coetzee's continued preoccupation with the 
ways in which authorial being plays itself out in writing. Coetzee's thoughts on Bakhtin acquire a 




published in Salmagundi in 1997. Asked about the “manipulation of single voices” in his own work, 
and his “interest in Bakthin's concept of 'dialogism'” (Coetzee and Scott, “An Interview” 89), 
Coetzee responds by drawing attention to the cultural situatedness of Bakhtin's theory: 
 
Dialogism? More and more I suspect I don't understand the concept. The more I read 
Bakhtin, the less I'm sure what dialogism is. Not, I think, because Bakhtin doesn't know 
what he means, but because there's something he's assuming in the way of shared 
cultural knowledge, specifically of Russian literature and maybe of Russian philosophy, 
that I don't have and very likely most of the people who take over the term dialogism 
from him don't have either. (Coetzee and Scott, “An Interview” 89) 
 
So, over and against the idea that Dostoevsky's dialogism grows out of his own “being as a writer” 
(Coetzee, “Joseph Frank” 145), we have here an assertion that the theory itself, and consequently 
the practice that it describes, cannot be understood separately from the specific cultural milieu in 
which it resides. The upshot of these reflections on Bakhtin is that even while we discern in 
Coetzee's work a dialogic refraction of authorial voice in the conflict that arises between contesting 
appeals for the determination of the subject in his writing, the particular way in which this voice 
speaks, through Coetzee's protagonists, calls for a nuanced understanding of both Coetzee's 
personal investment in the persistence of the individual, irreducible being of the self, and of the 
specific socio-cultural contexts that give shape to his writing. The work in which the tension 
between these disparate fields is most clearly manifest – i.e. the expression of a highly individual 
sense of self against the equally forceful insistence of the culturally specific (and politically 
antagonistic) milieu from which the writing emerges – is Age of Iron. 
 
3. Age of Iron and the Question of Voice 
 
The question of voice is crucial to my understanding of the sustained dualism in Coetzee's writing 




in which those rights have only the most tenuous standing, on the other. Age of Iron is arguably his 
novel in which this conflict is most strongly felt. Even though it is not usually considered in the 
company of those of Coetzee's books that have a more direct autobiographical resonance, I would 
like to examine it at some length in this section, because it is a novel that explicitly dramatizes the 
problematic I have set myself in this chapter. Specifically, I aim to explore the various perspectives 
which the novel grants on the idea of a personal voice – or on what is at stake in the act of self-
expression – in order to gain some sense of the ways in which Coetzee refocuses the relationship 
between the individual imagination and the world of socio-political affairs in which that 




In Age of Iron, the political tremors that we discern in Boyhood, Youth and Summertime are thrust 
onto the centre stage, so to speak. The insistence of political realities is made manifest very 
explicitly in the historical framework in which the protagonist, Elizabeth Curren, finds herself 
embroiled. In postcolonial terms, the characteristics of such a society, seething with unrest and on 
the brink of revolutionary outburst, is perhaps best expressed by Frantz Fanon. In The Wretched of 
the Earth, Fanon describes the atmosphere that prevails when an oppressed people is on the point of 
erupting into revolution. One characteristic of this atmosphere is that it does not leave the “blissful 
existence” of the oppressor “intact” (Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 56). Instead, the oppressor – 
or the “settler”, in Fanon's terms – becomes aware “that something is afoot”: “‘Good’ natives 
become scarce, silence falls when the oppressor approaches; sometimes looks are black, and 
attitudes and remarks openly aggressive” (56). Police and military presence is increased; “the smell 
of gunpowder” is in the air (56). “The atmosphere becomes dramatic,” says Fanon, “and everyone 
wishes to show that he is ready for anything” (56). 
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In this “embryonic” stage of the revolution, any show of violence serves only to bolster the 
aggression of the oppressed (Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 56), because it confirms to the 
native what he has known all along in his bones, namely that violence is the only mode of 
expression that has any real currency in the social dispensation of the colony. Those values which 
have been inculcated for generations in the schoolrooms of the colony, namely the values of 
universal dignity and respect for the individual, for individualism, are called out and dismissed as 
purely Western constructs, an ideology in the service of Western domination (36). “All the 
Mediterranean values – the triumph of the human individual, of clarity and beauty –”, writes Fanon, 
“become lifeless, colourless knick-knacks. … Those values which seemed to uplift the soul are 
revealed as worthless, simply because they have nothing to do with the concrete conflict in which 
the people is engaged” (36). 
 
The figure of the colonized intellectual serves to demonstrate the shift in values that occurs during 
the pre-revolutionary period. This figure has had “hammered” into his mind “the idea of a society of 
individuals where each person shuts himself up in his own subjectivity, and whose only wealth is 
individual thought” (Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 36). If and when he has the opportunity to 
return to his people, however, the colonized intellectual soon repudiates the sophistry of the West 
and reinserts himself into the fold of brothers and sisters who are united, as one, in their struggle for 
liberation. The movement that occurs is thus one from a tradition of individual subjectivity – 
“[i]ndividualism is the first to disappear”, says Fanon (36) – to an awareness of the common goal of 
liberation as the only relevant concern. Furthermore, the force which binds this new, collective 
identity to reality is its canalization and expression of violence (45). Fanon thus makes the point 
that the movement from individualism to collectivism is accompanied, in the racially oppressed 
state, by a transition from “lethargy” and “petrification” (73) to a condition of robust violence. The 
mark of the native's decision to leave behind the abstract principles of the Western cultural tradition 





Although it is perhaps not entirely accurate to designate the Cape Town of the late 1980s as a pre-
revolutionary site in a strict Fanonian sense – most jarring in the analogy would be perhaps the 
absence of a motherland – there are nevertheless some striking affinities between the two, most 
notably the fact that the struggle between oppressor and oppressed played itself out along lines of 
racial differentiation. In Age of Iron, which is set in a bleak and wintry Cape Town during the “state 
of emergency” period in South African history, the resonance with Fanon's description is amplified, 
and we find ourselves in a world that is characterized quite strongly by an emphasis on violence, by 
a growing disillusionment with the precepts of individualism that emerge from the tradition of 
Western culture, and by a collective purpose that presents itself to the protagonist as a stony silence, 
an impenetrable mask, a resolve that cannot be breached (a “hardened rhetoric of absolutes,” as 
David Attwell puts it in J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing 120). 
 
Age of Iron was first published in 1990. It is, in the words of Mike Marais, a “stark, yet full, 
depiction of the indigence and distortion of life under apartheid” (Secretary of the Invisible 103). 
The novel presents itself to us in the form of a letter, addressed by the protagonist, Elizabeth 
Curren, a former classics professor, to her unnamed daughter, who has turned her back on the 
petrification of life in apartheid South Africa and made a new life for herself in America. In the 
letter, Elizabeth describes the events which befall her during the last days of her life, from the 
moment when she is diagnosed with terminal cancer, to what may or may not be read as the 
moment of her death. It is a period in her life that coincides with the arrival of a stranger, a vagrant 
who goes by the name of Vercueil and who takes up intermittent residence in her home. Apart from 
her relationship with Vercueil, the narrative also portrays her growing involvement in the life of 
Florence, her domestic worker, and of Florence's family. It is an involvement that draws her from 
her secluded life in the suburbs of Cape Town into a confrontation with the naked realities of the 




her perception of what it means to be alive in her particular time and place, which we might perhaps 
describe as the wrong end of history. In short, Elizabeth is drawn from her sheltered life spent in the 
company of the classics and brought face-to-face with the demand for accountability that is made 
by the political situation in the country. 
 
The novel resonates quite strongly, as I have mentioned, with Fanon's description of the 
transformational period that precedes the outbreak of a revolution. This is most evident in the 
realistic depictions of civil unrest and confrontation between the security forces and the budding 
revolutionaries, who are typified in this instance by Florence's son Bheki and his ambiguously 
named friend, “John” (Coetzee, Age of Iron 147). It is also evident, if less overtly so, in the 
confrontation which is staged for us in Elizabeth's sustained belief in the importance of speaking in 
her own voice – a belief that derives from her immersion in classical literature and expresses itself 
as a concern for the passing of her individual soul – and the realization that this tradition has not 
furnished her with a sufficient response to the pressing realities of the social reality that defines her 
life – a reality that is equally firm in its wholesale rejection of individualism. That is to say, the shift 
of values and behaviour which characterizes the larger socio-political period of transition in which 
the story takes place is intertwined in very complex ways with her private musings concerning her 
passage towards death.  
 
I will refer to one of the key passages in the book to demonstrate my point. The passage occurs as 
one of the various soliloquies that Elizabeth delivers to Vercueil concerning the meaning of her 
death. This particular speech is spoken while they are lying together on a piece of cardboard, in a 
“wooded space”  under the stars (Coetzee, Age of Iron 161). Vercueil has carried her away from an 
overpass in Buitenkant Street, where she had been lying comatose on the pavement, in the depths of 
ignominy after she had fled from the police who had raided her house and assassinated the young 




attends her life by virtue of having lived as a person privileged by the oppressive regime, the most 
she has hoped for is an honourable death, “honesta mors” (164), a notion that derives directly from 
her classical education.
71
 Then she goes on: 
 
What I did not know, what I did not know – listen to me now! – was that the price was 
even higher. I had miscalculated. Where did the mistake come in? It has something to 
do with honor, with the notion I clung to through thick and thin, from my education, 
from my reading, that in his soul the honorable man can suffer no harm. I strove always 
for honor, for a private honor, using shame as my guide. As long as I was ashamed I 
knew that I had not wandered into dishonor. That was the use of shame: as a touchstone, 
something that would always be there, something you could come back to like a blind 
person, to touch, to tell you where you were. (Coetzee, Age of Iron 165) 
 
Elizabeth is aware here that there is something wrong with the “notion” of honour that she has 
clung to like a “blind person”, despite the evidence of her senses – that is to say, despite the 
challenges which the realities of circumstance may have levelled at it. Her notion of honour has 
sprung untempered from her immersion in the classics and taken up residence as a universal value 
in her moral being. Her description of the value of honor – of the value of the value, so to speak – 
reads like a truism: “in his soul the honorable man can suffer no harm”. In its generalization of 
gender (“the honorable man can suffer no harm”), the truism reveals a marked lack of particularity 
in Elizabeth's notion of honour; or, to put it differently, it shows us to what extent the idea of “a 
private honor” has taken root in her being without in fact being aware that it is her being in which it 
has taken root. 
 
This is rather perplexing, because along with its emphasis on the individual soul (“in his soul the 
honorable man can suffer no harm”), it suggests that the idea of honour, taken by Elizabeth as is 
from her classical education, does not concern itself much with the situation of the particular soul 
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in which it resides. As a vehicle for honour, it seems, one individual soul is as good as another. 
What counts is not the actual, de facto private honour of a particular soul, but rather the idea of 
private honour, disembodied, interchangeable from being to being. What Elizabeth seems to signal 
here is an awareness of her embeddedness in an irredeemably Western system of cultural 
transmission. When Fanon tells us that the rebellious native turns his back on the preaching of 
individualism, we may understand it as his perception that what is being taught is not any concern 
for this or that particular soul, but rather an attempt to transmit and further entrench those self-
serving Western values of which the oppressor is the inheritor and master. Elizabeth's musing on the 
meaning of her own life and death thus becomes interlaced with the larger rejection of cultural 
values that characterizes the historical moment of resistance in which her life takes shape. 
 
There is a certain phrase in the novel – or a trope, if you will – that seems to encapsulate the 
transmission of the value of individualism that characterizes the oppressive society to which 
Elizabeth, by definition, belongs. At the beginning of the narrative, when Elizabeth discovers the 
terminal nature of her illness, her doctor tells her: “We will do everything we can … we will tackle 
this together” (Coetzee, Age of Iron 4). However, she is not convinced. Here are her thoughts on the 
matter: “[A]lready, behind the comradely front, I could see he was withdrawing. Sauve qui peut. His 
allegiance to the living, not the dying” (4). Her concern in this particular instance has to do, of 
course, with the private matter of her death, rather than with the cultural transmission of the 
philosophy of individualism which I have been describing. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the 
motto she selects for the tribal allegiance in which she and the doctor have their common being is 
precisely one that emphasizes the well-being of the individual above all else: “sauve qui peut”, save 
yourself. This phrase, with its allusion to a state of savage disorder, and its echoes of indebtedness 
to French letters, has a rich and manifold significance for various aspects of the novel. I would like 
to focus specifically on its encapsulation and transmission of the idea that each person is 






Let us consider first the extent to which this value of self-preservation (and its twin, self-reliance) 
functions as a description of the larger society to which Elizabeth belongs. We have already noted 
that it exists as a sort of unspoken code between her and the doctor, an acknowledgement that that 
which underlies their performance of camaraderie is the recognition that there exists no true 
obligation to care for the other. It is an attitude that resurfaces when Elizabeth visits the injured 
young friend of Bheki in the hospital – the same friend who is later killed by the police – and has a 
vision of white people as “a herd of sheep … milling around on a dusty plain”, uttering “the same 
bleating call in a thousand different inflections: ‘I!’ ‘I!’ ‘I!’” (Coetzee, Age of Iron 80). Elsewhere, 
in a passage of considerable satirical bite, Elizabeth rails against the flight of the rich and the 
powerful from the “worm-riddled ship” of the apartheid state, which is “clearly sinking” (128) – a 
description in which it is hard not to hear the resonant cry of sauve qui peut! as a vindication of the 
rights of self-preservation. Suffice to say that the value which privileges individualism and 
responsibility to the self is an integral aspect of Elizabeth's criticism of the culture from which she 
has emerged, and from which she tries so hard to distance herself. It is this political sense of 
individualism that riles the spirit of the revolutionaries, and which Elizabeth herself finds so 




Yet in the aforementioned speech that she makes to Vercueil while they are sharing their cardboard 
bed under the starry sky, a speech in which she is trying her best to come to terms with the meaning 
of her position as a voiceless old woman on the point of dying, we find that the one things she 
wishes to communicate to those who will not hear her, the one value that captures the message she 
wishes to transmit before she goes, is precisely this value of sauve qui peut. Specifically, when she 
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thinks of Florence's daughters imbibing the lesson of “Freedom or death!” (Coetzee, Age of Iron 
163) – the battle cry of the young revolutionaries – she wants nothing more than to cry out to them: 
“No! … Save yourselves!” (163). That which forms the basis of her criticism against the petrifying 
regime of apartheid and that which has stripped her of her voice from the opening pages of the 
book, namely the value which justifies the promotion of self-interest above any other concern, is the 
same value she wishes to transmit with her dying breath, so to speak. 
 
What we have here is the confounding ambiguity of a criticism that is at the same time an assertion 
of that which it wishes to criticize. It is an ambiguity, I would suggest, that emerges from the 
complex intertwining of the two distinct spheres of transition that inform the structure of the 
narrative, namely 1) the socio-historical collapse of the political regime (that which I have 
described, following Fanon, as the pre-revolutionary state); and 2) Elizabeth's passage from the land 
of the living to the land of the dead, a transitional stage that draws extensively on various classical 
and mythico-religious topoi for its imagery. The referential ambiguity of the notion of sauve qui 
peut, the fact that it serves at once to criticize the oppressive mentality of individualism and to 
assert the rights of the living soul, results from this double-situatedness of the subject who speaks it, 
Elizabeth. 
 
Critics have drawn attention to Coetzee's subtle negotiation of the complications that surround the 
positioning of the subject in writing, and its implications for what might broadly be described as an 
ethics of community. Patrick Hayes, for example, is especially preoccupied, in his book J.M. 
Coetzee and the Novel, with what he sees as the capacity of Coetzee's writing to transform our 
understanding of what political community entails. Hayes argues that Coetzee's prose style – a style 
that he describes as “jocoserious” (J.M. Coetzee and the Novel 4), pointing to Coetzee's borrowing 
of the term from Joyce in his essay on Erasmus's In Praise of Folly, and that he traces in particular 




“most truly amenable to an anti-foundational imagining of moral community” (71), one that “tries 
to hold open, and bring about dialogue between divergent ideas of what makes for a good 
community” (130). Hayes describes the position of the self in relation to the other that is brought 
about by Coetzee's writing as a position in which fixed identities are resisted in favour of an 
indefinitely sustained and “potentially transformative alertness to … the difference the other might 
bring” (30) – a situation, in turn, that invites a re-imagining of how people relate to each other in 
political communities. If we follow Hayes's thought here, we can read the ambiguity of Elizabeth's 
position in the novel as an attempt to hold open the notion of individual subjective being while at 
the same time allowing that being to be infused with or altered by the culturally specific and 
materially distinct aspects of her particular socio-historical environment. 
 
Carrol Clarkson provides another perspective on the ambiguous positioning of the subject in 
Coetzee's writing when she asks us, in a chapter in her book Countervoices that is dedicated to the 
topic of voice, to consider the “importance” that is accorded in Coetzee's work to “the speaker's 
construction of the place from which he or she speaks” (Countervoices 78). Clarkson arrives at the 
conclusion, via a consideration of Coetzee's engagement with Bakhtin and Erasmus, that “even 
when all rhetorical and narrative strategies are purposely deployed to disturb the attributing of 
positions and dispositions to speakers and listeners, to writers and readers, still the writing seems to 
effect the realization of an authorial voice” (97). While the focus of Clarkson's argument concerns 
specifically “the positions and dispositions of the writer and reader” (78), I believe it is also 
possible to draw on her thought here to elaborate on the peculiar ambiguity of Elizabeth's role in the 
two distinct domains that give shape to her life. That is to say, by virtue of the paradox that inheres 
in Elizabeth's speech concerning the value of individualism, we are able to see her as someone who 
occupies a sort of fold between the cultural and artistic heritage of the West, on the one hand, and 
the contingencies of her historical reality, on the other, and furthermore that this position enables 




a voice). What it comes down to, I suggest, is that Elizabeth's voice in the novel is precisely one in 
which the conflict between individual expression and collective, revolutionary purpose is given 
scope to articulate itself. 
 
To explain what I mean, I turn once more to the speech that Elizabeth makes to Vercueil under the 
starry sky. Directly after she has expressed her wish to tell Florence's daughters that they must not 
heed the call to revolution, she bemoans the fact that she has no voice in which to speak, no voice 
that entitles her to an audience: 
 
“Whose is the true voice of wisdom, Mr. Vercueil? Mine, I believe. Yet who am I, who 
am I to have a voice at all? How can I honorably urge them to turn their back on that 
call? What am I entitled to do but sit in a corner with my mouth shut? I have no voice; I 
lost it long ago; perhaps I have never had one. I have no voice, and that is that. The rest 
should be silence. But with this – whatever it is – this voice that is no voice, I go on. On 
and on” 
 Was Vercueil smiling? His face was hidden. In a toothless whisper sticky with sibilants 
I went on. (Coetzee, Age of Iron 164) 
 
To my mind, this passage gives distinct expression to the notion of a voice that persists despite its 
constitutional impossibility, or despite the rhetorical emphasis on the fact that there exists no 
legitimate position for it from which to speak. But what kind of voice is this that continues to speak 
despite the fact that it has no place? It is certainly an evocatively described voice: “a toothless 
whisper sticky with sibilants”. I would recommend to the reader to read the speech out loud, to him- 
or herself, in a “toothless whisper sticky with sibilants”, in order to experience the measure of 
pathos that attaches to Elizabeth's words if we hear it in that voice. It is an uncanny and 
mesmerizing voice, one that is haunting as much as it is comic. In a very material sense, then, a 
very vivid sense, this voice that has the properties and dimensions of a real voice finds its way to us 





However, that is not all there is to it. The qualifiers that attach to this particular voice, namely 
“toothless”, “whisper”, “sticky” and “sibilants”, all resonate in very particular and meaningful ways 
with the textual plane from which it speaks. I would like to consider each of them in turn, to 
appreciate in full the measure of this voice that speaks where no voice is possible. First, we have 
“toothless”, which evokes for us the graphic image of Elizabeth as an aged and destitute person, one 
who has just had a stick poked into her mouth by street children in search of golden dentures 
(Coetzee, Age of Iron 159, 161). It also suggests, to speak metaphorically for a moment, the lack of 
bite in her words, reflecting the non-authoritarian position from which she speaks – a position 
which Coetzee considers in some depth in his essay on Erasmus's In Praise of Folly. 
 
The next qualifier is “whisper”, which has the curious effect of combining Elizabeth's lack of 
authority with the force of penetration. That is to say, despite the desiccation of her voice – despite 
its having been stripped of the full-bodied resonance of the vocal chords – it is still a voice of some 
potency. It is, if you will, a voice that gains its expressive quality precisely from its threadbare 
existence. As such, it is a voice that reflects Coetzee's notion of the voice of the writer in apartheid 
South Africa, namely that it suffers from a “stuntedness and deformity” (Coetzee, Doubling the 
Point, 98) as an inevitable result of its psychic association with the “unnatural structures of power 
that define the South African state” (97). 
 
The “stickiness” of the voice seems to recall – gratuitously, perhaps, but also to remind us of the 
material reality of her situation – the aforementioned stick that has been pushed into her mouth. 
More than that, however, it appears to insist on the peculiar staying power, or persistence, of her 
voice. A “sticky” voice is a voice that inserts itself into the cracks between the official avenues of 
discourse and binds together the disparate elements that may have fallen by the wayside of that 




between the oppressive rhetoric of politics and the neutered classical heritage which is its 
inheritance. 
 
The fourth qualifier, namely the “sibilance” of the toothless whisper, takes us back, I would suggest, 
to that classical heritage, by way of a detour through modernism. In the passage quoted above, 
Elizabeth tells us a few things about her position. She avers that hers is the “true voice of wisdom”; 
and furthermore, that with her voice of wisdom, a “voice that is not a voice”, she goes on: “On and 
on” (Coetzee, Age of Iron, 164). A disembodied voice that despite itself cannot refrain from 
preaching its wisdom and belongs to an old woman who is somewhere between life and death, 
beyond the pale; a voice that speaks in “sibilants”: to my mind, this voice recalls quite distinctly the 
Sibyl of Cumae, who furnishes the epigraph to T.S. Eliot's The Waste Land. Coetzee's indebtedness 
to Eliot is evident from the way in which Eliot frequently resurfaces in his writing (I have in mind 
here especially the pivotal role that Eliot plays in Youth, and Coetzee's essay on the classic in 
Stranger Shores, “What is a Classic? A Lecture”), and it is not my purpose here to draw an 
extensive comparison between Elizabeth Curren and the unhappily immortal seer of Cumae. What I 
would like to draw attention to, rather, is the implication that the notion of the classic is refracted in 
Age of Iron through the collapse of structural integrity that is characteristic of Eliot's emblematic 
poem. In his guide to the poem, C.J.D. Harvey puts it thus: 
 
The metaphorical 'Waste Land' in which the entire poem is enacted is waste, both 
physically and spiritually, because its inhabitants do not want to live and yet they will 
not die and 'let go' of their individual identities, the only things they can attach value to, 
either. (Harvey, A Complete Guide to T.S. Eliot's “The Waste Land” 7) 
 
Elizabeth's ambiguous attachment to the idea of “individual” identity, which has been challenged 
quite severely, as we have seen, by the discourse of the pre-revolutionary state, as well as by her 




dimension through its association with the modernist questioning of those values which have been 
inherited from the cultural tradition of Western thought. What she appears to be resisting is the 
censure against individual voice that is implicit in both the practice of high modernism and the 
political realities of the environment in which she has her being. It is indeed not an enviable 
position from which to speak the meaning of one's own death. 
 
In Clarkson's aforementioned study of Coetzee, she emphasizes the persistence of a singular 
authorial voice despite the contingency of that voice on the cultural and historical milieu that gives 
it shape (Countervoices 105). She makes the point that it is precisely the fact of the voice's 
responsiveness to the various layers of discourse which make up its habitat that allows us to identify 
that voice as a position from which it is possible to speak (105). A different way of saying this, is 
that the singularity of a voice is constituted precisely in the inflection that it gives to the multiple 
demands that is made on it by its environment. In the case of Elizabeth, then, we might say that her 
resistance does not take the form of asserting her individualism despite the stone-faced collectivism 
of the revolutionaries, or despite the perversion of Western culture that is the ideology of the 
apartheid state, or despite the structural collapse of subjective autonomy that is implicit in the 
artistic productions of high modernism. Rather, we might say that her resistance, or even her 
defiance, lies in her willingness to include these historical and cultural realities in her discourse, to 
articulate that which is foreign to her sympathies in her own voice. 
 
In his treatise on the art of poetry, Aristotle places considerable emphasis on the distinction between 
the modes of diction that are appropriate to the rhetorician and historian, and those that are 
appropriate to the poet. The difference between poetic truth and historical truth, he writes, is that “it 
is not the poet's function to describe what has actually happened, but the kinds of thing that might 
happen, that is, that could happen because they are, in the circumstances, either probable or 




entails the safeguarding, or reinvigoration, of precisely such a position, namely one in which it is 
possible to engage in an imaginative exploration of the multiple possibilities that are contained in 
the realities of circumstance. It is a resistance, as we have seen, that involves a fraught and often 
violent intrusion of social realities into the scope of that which is spoken about, and which becomes 
more potent precisely because it makes space for those intrusions. 
 
There is a passage near the centre of the book that dramatizes the dynamic tension between these 
distinct modes of expression (i.e. the creative and the rhetorically persuasive). It is a passage that 
represents for us the tenacity with which Elizabeth occupies her fold between the twin demands of 
historical accountability and imaginative expression. She is standing in the rain, surrounded by a 
“ring of spectators” (Coetzee, Age of Iron 98), and is pressed by Mr. Thabane to account for the 
injustice of what they have just witnessed, namely the destruction of countless homes in Site C, near 
Gugulethu. Elizabeth fails quite miserably as an orator: 
 
“These are terrible sights,” I repeated, faltering. “They are to be condemned. But I 
cannot denounce them in other people's words. I must find my own words, from myself. 
Otherwise it is not the truth. That is all I can say now.” 
“This woman talks shit,” said a man in the crowd. (Coetzee, Age of Iron 98) 
 
The passage is reminiscent of a classical oration, i.e. one in which the speaker's task is to impress 
the audience with his rhetorical skill. Mr. Thabane has issued his challenge; it is up to Elizabeth to 
rise to the occasion by harnessing or responding to the restless, revolutionary energy around her. 
The moment is one of political decision: she must either take up the position of spokesperson for 
the apartheid government, or she must renounce all ties to that government and side with the cause 






It is quite evident that she fails to meet their expectations. The anonymous man in the crowd does 
not simply agree or disagree with her position; what he gives voice to instead is the notion that what 
she has said (“shit”) falls beyond the scope of intelligible meaning in the context in which it has 
been spoken. Elizabeth's response, it seems, is entirely the wrong order of response. She has been 
called upon to make a speech; what she has done instead is give voice to her own personal 
discomfort with the rhetorical practice of speech-making (“it is not the truth”). Thus we see that the 
notion of artistic truth that is presented in Age of Iron has a particularly complicated relationship to 
the historical actuality of its setting. Even while it takes account of that actuality – as is evinced by 
Coetzee's staging of this passage in the very thick of the struggle, so to speak – it does not 
relinquish that which is vital to its position, namely the privilege of being able to speak in one's own 
voice. 
 
What I have tried to demonstrate in this reading of Age of Iron is that we might conceive of 
Elizabeth's position in the novel as the embodiment of a sort of poetics of resistance. It is a position 
that we can define as the struggle to define her own voice despite her awareness, in the face of 
approaching death, of the contingency of her being on the oppressive dictates of the society that 
surrounds her. The signature that signs off the novel tells us that the author began writing it in 1986. 
It so happens that this date provides us with a historical contingency that feeds well into my 
argument. I refer to two articles that Coetzee published in The New York Review of Books in 1985 
and 1986 respectively. The first article, “Satyagraha in Durban”, is a straightforward literary review 
of a novel by Sheila Fugard, namely A Revolutionary Woman. It is a scathing review, and in it 
Coetzee criticizes the novel for its “failure of craft” (“Satyagraha in Durban” 3) and its apparent 
lack of historical awareness. The second article, “Waiting for Mandela”, is, among other things, a 
review of a work of non-fiction by Richard John Neuhaus, namely Dispensations: The Future of 
South Africa as South Africans See It. In that article, Coetzee himself evinces a strong working 




apartheid state. Taken together, these two pieces seem to point to the level of historical engagement 
that Coetzee envisions as the proper responsibility of the novelist. They also indicate, if we consider 
what Age of Iron excludes, namely a political response to the political problems of the nation, that 
he does not quite conceive of creative expression as an efficacious tool in the service of political 
justice. As the novel progresses, we begin to see that a personal voice, in its literary form, is not 
simply a matter of finding a place from which to speak that is unaffected by, or protected from the 
discomfiting realities of the social milieu in which one lives and breathes – it is not, in a manner of 
speaking, a case of shutting oneself off from the world and composing sonnets to the birds. On the 
contrary, the voice becomes more poignant, more powerful and affecting, if we conceive it as a 
literary imprint that carries the fine traces of its author's personal inclinations and desires, but that 
weaves its patterns from the socio-historical realities in which those desires come to life. 
 
4. The Sympathetic Imagination 
 
What happens, then, is that the Romantic emphasis on the freedom of individual expression – or, as 
Keats would have it, the belief that the being of the writer is wholly invested in the ambiguous play 
of the aesthetic imagination – is tempered in Coetzee's work by an acute sense of the socio-
historical context in which that aesthetic play occurs. It would be disingenuous to suggest that this 
dimension of historical awareness is completely absent from Keats's sensibility;
73
 the point is rather 
to note that in Coetzee's work it comes to the fore explicitly as a powerful antagonistic force against 
which the rights of the aesthetic imagination finds itself in a constantly beleaguered state. A 
common response from Coetzee critics, as I have pointed out in my introduction,
74
 has been to 
argue that the continued insistence of an aesthetic sensibility in his work (i.e. his refusal to offer up 
his voice indiscriminately to a politics of revolution, or his insistence on continuing to speak from 
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what Keats might call “the Penetralium of mystery,” “Letter to George and Thomas Keats” 41) can 
best be justified as a literary manifestation of an “ethics of otherness”. A part of my aim in this 
chapter has been to suggest, however, that the moves of self-effacement involved in such an ethics 
of identification are compromised when we perceive the historical, or socio-political situatedness of 
the subject as a constitutive aspect of the voice that speaks from the pages of Coetzee's writing. 
 
Mike Marais, who is an advocate of such an ethical reading of Coetzee, has registered the problems 
raised by the strong sense of cultural location in his writing. For Marais, the “sympathetic 
imagination” is the literary correlative that enables an ethics of identification with the other. In 
Secretary of the Invisible, however, he mentions the extent to which the possibility of sympathetic 
identification suffers from the fact that the imagination is “located in the self,” and that the “desires 
and antipathies” of that self are “situated by the self's location in a particular cultural and historical 
context” (Marais, Secretary of the Invisible 177). The point is demonstrated in Disgrace, says 
Marais, by Lurie's failure of sympathy when he strikes Pollux, one of the perpetrators of the rape on 
his daughter, Lucy (Secretary of the Invisible 176). Marais thus draws our attention to the idea that 
the ethical imperative of self-abnegation is compromised by the dialogic nature of the subject. That 
is to say, if the subject were to give itself over entirely to an imaginative act of sympathetic 
identification, it would be necessary for that subject to assume a kind of “non-position” (178), one 
which is divested of all relational sense. In short, we may say that purely ethical being – a being that 
is able to account for itself fully in terms of the demand made on it by the other – would require a 
purely autonomous subject, one that was entirely in possession of itself, with no investment at all in 
the “natural and cultural configurations we lump together as 'the world'” (Holquist, Bakhtin and his 
World 30). Only such an isolated subject would be able to take full responsibility for the 
transcendence of self that is required by a pure ethics of identification with the other. The act of 
deterritorialization by which the imagination seeks to invest the self in the other now appears to 




subject instead as a site of flux, a site that coheres as a meeting point for the various aesthetic 
configurations that make up the work of the imagination. 
 
I would like to explore this notion more fully by returning to Elizabeth Costello, and in particular to 
the chapter entitled “The Poets and the Animals”, which deals extensively with the sympathetic 
imagination and its ethical implications. In that chapter, Elizabeth gives a reading of two poems by 
Ted Hughes, namely “The Jaguar” and “Second Glance at a Jaguar”, in which she argues firstly that 
the poems allow us to feel, when we “recollect it afterwards in tranquillity” (Coetzee, Elizabeth 
Costello 98), what it feels like to be a jaguar, and secondly that this form of identification “falls 
within an entirely human economy in which the animal has no share” (96). Elizabeth makes the 
point that even while there is something ethically attractive about the primitive poetics of 
identification with animal being that Hughes espouses, “[i]ts ramifications into politics are not to be 
trusted” (97). It is not to be trusted because in the final analysis, the world view that underlies it, 
namely an ecological world view, concerns itself less with the individual beings that make up the 
world, and more with the idea of a larger ecological harmony, a harmony in which the “actual role 
players” (98) function as mere temporary instalments of the life of the species (99). What Elizabeth 
seems to be suggesting is that a poetics of embodiment, of which Hughes's poems are an example, 
is not in and of itself enough to guarantee an ethical engagement with the world and its inhabitants. 
It is not enough to merely imagine oneself into the body of the other; there is another dimension that 
is required. 
 
This other dimension of which the sympathetic imagination needs to avail itself is described by 
Elizabeth through a reference to Gulliver's Travels, and in particular to his stay among the ultra-
civilized, horse-like Houyhnhnms. A member of the audience has asked her whether it is fair to 
expect human beings to forego their natural inclination to eat meat in order to take up residence in 




Houyhnhnms. After a prolonged contextualization of her understanding of Swift, Elizabeth comes 
to the following conclusion: 
 
So – excuse the confusion of this response – yes, we are not horses, we do not have 
their clear, rational, naked beauty; on the contrary, we are subequine primates, otherwise 
known as man. You say there is nothing to do but embrace that status, that nature. Very 
well, let us do so. But let us also push Swift's fable to its limits and recognize that, in 
history, embracing the status of man has entailed slaughtering and enslaving a race of 
divine or else divinely created beings and bringing down on ourselves a curse thereby. 
(Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello 103) 
 
The meaning of Elizabeth's response here is, as she concedes, not at all clear. She has, on the one 
hand, removed Swift's fable from its satirical origins and read it instead as an insufficient 
representation of the history of colonialism and the violence that is attendant on that history. 
Furthermore, she has insisted that in order to embrace what it means to be human requires not only 
that we pay attention to our cultural history, but also that we acknowledge the violence that is part 
of that history, that we take that violence upon ourselves and assume responsibility for it. Her 
thought here seems to be going in the opposite direction to the shamanistic effacement of the self 
that she encounters in the poetry of Ted Hughes. Instead, we might say that for Elizabeth the work 
of the imagination, or a part of its work, consists precisely in delineating more carefully the 
contours of what it means to be a self, and specifically in tracing those contours along the lines of 
history. The ethical imperative of the sympathetic imagination in Coetzee's work would then be not 
to negate the self in an attempt to embody the being of the other, but rather to grasp in its fullness 
the implication of the “curse” we have brought down upon ourselves, namely that we are always 
complicit, ontologically, by virtue of the way that subjective being is constructed – that is to say, 
historically and politically – in the savage ways of the world. Elizabeth's plaintive call for the 
ethical treatment of animals has thus once again situated the self in a liminal space that is 











1. A Thread of Conflict 
 
In my introduction, I stated that the central observation informing my thesis is the idea that 
Coetzee’s oeuvre might best be understood as the literary expression of a perpetual state of conflict. 
I took the notion of authority as my starting point, asking what it might mean to speak of the 
persistence of authority in the wake of a poststructuralist denunciation of the author. The terms of 
the conflict in that discussion arose from the Romantic ideal of the author as a figure whose 
communion with transcendent, ahistorical truths occurs in a kind of synthesis with the larger 
movements of what Hazlitt describes as “the Spirit of the Age” (The Spirit of the Age 252). The 
point was to suggest that the lingering presence of the figure of the author in Coetzee’s work can be 
read as a strategic departure from the Romantic model, in the sense that it comes to life precisely in 
the staging of a contest between an anachronistic belief in transcendent values and the socio-
historical and literary contexts that give shape to his writing. 
 
Over the course of the ensuing chapters I expanded on this initial observation by investigating the 
ramifications of the conflicted sense of self that emerges in Coetzee's writing through a related set 
of thematic co-ordinates. The first chapter considered the problem of self-expression as it is brought 
to light through the theme of confession. I argued that the conflict between the desire to tell the 
truth about oneself, and the realization that the “self” that speaks in writing is already a product of 
the confessional narrative itself, is central to our understanding of Coetzee's autobiographical 
project. In the second chapter I focused the terrain of the conflict more narrowly by tracing the 
particular significance of the site of the Karoo farm in Coetzee's explorations of subjectivity. The 




plays an important role in Coetzee’s representations of the farm, but it is an influence that is 
refracted through his historical awareness of the farm as a site in which these transcendent moves 
can have no real purchase. The third chapter picked up on the sense of socio-historical dislocation 
that pervades Coetzee’s protagonists’ experience of the Karoo farm, and approached the notion of 
conflict more explicitly from the point of view of politicized reality in Coetzee’s work. An 
important line of thought in that chapter revolved around the idea of voice, and the realization that 
voice itself, even while it expresses a resistance to the idea of politics, or dreams of a place beyond 
politics from which to speak, is strongly inflected by the socio-political milieu from which it does 
speak. The voice that speaks from Coetzee’s writing is thus textured by the antagonism that prevails 
between the desire to speak from beyond the dictates of politicized reality, and the awareness that 
politicized reality is a defining aspect of its ability to express itself in the first place. 
 
It is probably an exercise in reductive logic to attempt to identify a common term among these 
various scenes of conflict that animate Coetzee’s work, especially since it is the conflict itself, 
rather than the variety of situations which that conflict describes, that reverberates most consistently 
throughout the oeuvre. My aim in organizing my material according to the scheme described above, 
however, has been to create a sense of trajectory in my reading of Coetzee. The movement inscribed 
in this trajectory is one from initial observation (situating the conflict in a kind of schism between 
poststructuralist and Romantic influences), on to a general appraisal of its role in a project of 
literary self-expression (the theme of confession), to a consideration of its meaning in a more 
personal sense (the importance of the farm in Coetzee's autobiographical writing), and finally to an 
articulation of its emergence in a writing praxis that confronts the immediate political environment 
of the self. In doing so, I hope to have given a sense of the intensity with which the idea of conflict 
permeates Coetzee's work, and to have registered something of the interpretive possibilities that it 





What remains to be done in this concluding chapter is to tie together my observations concerning 
the centripetal force of conflict in Coetzee's writing by defining it more closely as a personal 
approach to writing. I would like to conclude my argument, in other words, by suggesting that there 
is a common thread that weaves its way through Coetzee's work – a thread that is strongly 
associated with the various manifestations of conflict I have been describing so far – and it is this: 
the constant testing of an idealism of the most radical kind against the scrutiny of a dogged and 
remarkably severe analytical intelligence. It is as if there have been two opposing forces at work in 
Coetzee's writing ever since Eugene Dawn found himself at odds with his pitiless manager, Coetzee 
(Coetzee, Dusklands 2); or as if the camp doctor is still running in pursuit of his enigmatic ward, 
Michael K (Coetzee, Life & Times of Michael K 167). It is easy to forget that Coetzee is often his 
own most stringent critic, just as it is easy to lose sight of the fact that what is at the other end of his 
critical approach is often the expression of a feeling of the most startling intensity. In the agonistic 
space that is opened between these two extremes (the intimation of pure feeling, on the one hand, 
and the cold glare of the analyst, on the other) we can begin to identify something like a personal 
signature, or a composite of the self who writes and the self who emerges from the writing. Thus, I 
begin my conclusion by considering a theme in Coetzee’s work where the conflict between the ideal 
of pure feeling and the insistence of a detached analytic sensibility is arguably most pronounced, 
namely in his depictions of love and making love. 
 
2. Erotic Encounters 
 
In Diary of a Bad Year, a novel that is in many ways the story of an old man's attempt to come to 
terms with the decline of his erotic powers, there is a passage in which JC relates the story of his 
Hungarian friend Gyula's active love life, a life that takes place entirely within the confines of his 
own mind. In his old age, writes JC, Gyula has dispensed with the need to make love in the real 




image” of the woman he desires in his head, where he is able to pursue his love affair “through all 
its stages, from infatuation to consummation” (Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 175). Even though he 
appears to take it quite seriously, JC is not convinced by his friend’s method and his reflection on it 
is troubled by a sense of its unsavouriness: 
 
I had every reason to get a grasp of this phenomenon that he called ideal love on the 
sensual plane, every reason to get a grasp of it and take it over and practise it on my 
own behalf. But I could not. There was the real thing, which I knew and remembered, 
and then there was the kind of mental rape Gyula performed, and the two were not the 
same. The quality of the emotional experience might be similar, the ecstasy might be as 
intense as he averred – who was I to dispute that? – yet in the most elementary of senses 
a mental love could not be a real thing. (Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 179) 
 
Gyula's method, which he has perfected over the years and which is based on his ability as a 
photographer – that is to say, on his belief in his superior eye, an eye for the telling detail – is to 
observe the woman he has taken a fancy to until she reveals, in “unique unconscious gesture” 
(Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 177), her erotic essence to him. On this gesture, or essence, he then 
elaborates in his imagination until he has constructed a version of her that is so complete he is able 
to tell how she would move and respond – how she would be, in a word – in her most intimate 
moments. Finally he is able to indulge his desire and make love to the mental replica at his leisure, 
conducting her to the “utmost transports” (175). When JC questions what appears to be an 
essentially masturbatory practice, Gyula dismisses his criticism and calls it instead a form of 
“poetic”, or “ideal” love (178). For him there is no distinction between making love to an avatar and 
making love to a real person. This is so because both of them – the “living image” of the woman in 
his head as well as the corporeal version of her walking around on earth – are manifestations of the 
same ideal essence, or the same “soul” (177). A woman, for Gyula, appears to be no more and no 
less than the physical emanation of an ideal core, and once he has found a way to access that core 





This is indeed a highly idealized notion of what it means to make love to someone. It is an idealism 
that has its roots, in this instance, in Plato, and in the Platonic idea of the indivisible soul as the 
essence of what makes us human.
75
 Gyula is an inheritor of the Platonic tradition of the soul 
because he is from Hungary, and thus considers himself privy to the secrets of the Greek tradition as 
it has filtered down through centuries of European culture. JC, on the other hand, is excluded from 
the practice of such a sophisticated art, based as it is on a refined perception of the soul in 
unconscious gesture, because he is from a “savage continent”, and what comes “naturally” to 
Gyula's eye will remain forever invisible to his (Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 178). Gyula, in turn, 
remains quite deaf to JC's barbed references to feminist tropes in his appraisal of his friend's 
method. This is most noticeable when JC compares Gyula's thoughts on womanizing to fishing, and 
observes that a womanizer and a woman belong together like “a fish and a hook” (177).
76
 It is hard, 
in short, not to detect an undercurrent of irony, or even of sarcasm in what is on the face of it a 
sincere recounting of a rather arcane erotic confession. 
 
What the passage brings to light is a certain scepticism on JC's part concerning his friend's boast 
about being able to grasp in a woman that which constitutes her authentic identity, or that part of her 
– secret, hidden from view – which forms the essence and continuity of her being. It is, however, 
not an unequivocal scepticism. Being himself an old man bereft of the power to seduce, JC would 
appear to have a special interest in Gyula’s circumvention of the physical enfeeblements of old age. 
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 I have in mind here Margaret Atwood's well-known poem from the collection Power Politics: 
  
 you fit into me 
 like a hook into an eye 
  
 a fish hook 
 an open eye 




He wants to believe in the truth of his friend's method, he wants to take it over as his own and 
“practise it on [his] own behalf” (Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year 179), but something prevents him 
from doing so. “[I]n the most elementary of senses a mental love could not be a real thing … we 
cannot do without the real thing, the real real thing; because without the real we die as if of thirst” 
(179), he says. Quite apart from his aversion for the chauvinistic sting in his friend's attitude, then, 
and apart from his own supposedly uncultured, or “savage” eye, there is something else in JC's 
makeup that prevents him from becoming initiate in the secrets of mental love. 
 
What this something else is, this attachment to the “real thing” (the “real real thing”), is never quite 
explained. An obvious implication could be that it refers simply to the physical side of making love, 
but while that is presumably an important part of it, I do not think it makes for the full story. JC’s 
scepticism, I think, is directed rather at the notion that such a thing as a person’s authentic core 
exists at all, and if it did exist, whether it could ever be identified and experienced – whether it 
could ever be fully known – in the way that Gyula supposes when he talks about making love to his 
mental constructs. The “real thing”, for JC, is then first and foremost a matter of coming to terms 
with the failure of the kind of idealism espoused by his friend, based not so much on any technical 
or ethical deficiencies in his method as on the fallacy of his presupposition that there is an “erotic 
essence” to be had at all. The “real thing”, in other words, is that which takes place in the 
knowledge of the failure of the ideal, or that which has the ideal as its unattainable horizon. 
 
Misfiring erotic encounters occur frequently in Coetzee's work. Almost without fail, one has a sense 
that they fall short of some vaguely defined, yet powerfully held ideal of what lovemaking should 
be. In some of Coetzee's books the failure of the erotic becomes a thematic preoccupation, as in 
Youth, where it is a constant topic of reflection for the brooding protagonist: “Is sex the measure of 
all things?” he asks himself. “If he fails in sex, does he fail in all things?” (Coetzee, Youth 133). 




suggestion of disillusionment in the face of sex. At the end of Life & Times of Michael K, for 
example, when Michael is on the receiving end of a sexual favour in a public toilet in Sea Point, the 
description goes out of its way to emphasize the unappealing nature of the event: “He wanted to 
push her off but his hands recoiled from the stiff dead hair of her wig” (Coetzee, Life & Times of 
Michael K 178). Coetzee's first novel, Dusklands, sets the tone when it gives the following 
description of a sexual encounter between Eugene Dawn and his young wife, Marilyn: “Though like 
the diligent partners in the marriage manuals we attend to each other's whispers, moans, and groans, 
though I plough like the hero and Marilyn froth like the heroine, the truth is that the bliss of which 




There are a great many examples of dismal sex in Coetzee's work and to list them all would make 
for dispiriting reading. The point is that erotic encounters in Coetzee’s work almost always take on 
a visage of disappointment, of frustrated desire, of desire that does not manifest in the space which 
has been allotted for its manifestation. Often one has the impression that despite the tactile intimacy 
of those involved – despite their physical, concrete togetherness – there is something lacking in 
their experience, something that fails to materialize. Physical togetherness is no guarantee for an 
evocation of the ideal in the erotic lives of Coetzee’s protagonists; on the contrary, descriptions of 
physical intimacy appear to work more readily as leaden reminders of the conspicuous absence of 
that ideal. 
 
But what precisely is the nature of this ideal that hovers around the depiction of sex in Coetzee’s 
work, this ideal that is invoked but never comes? I would like to attempt an answer by drawing on a 
passage from Summertime. The passage I have in mind describes one in a series of less-than-
felicitous erotic encounters in the life of John, the protagonist: 
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One night John arrived in an unusually excited state. He had with him a little cassette 
player, and put on a tape, the Schubert string quintet. It was not what I would call sexy 
music, nor was I particularly in the mood, but he wanted to make love, and specifically 
– excuse the explicitness – wanted us to co-ordinate our activities to the music, to the 
slow movement. 
Well, the slow movement in question may be very beautiful but I found it far 
from arousing. Added to which I could not shake off the image on the box containing 
the tape: Franz Schubert looking not like a god of music but like a harried Viennese 
clerk with a head-cold. 
I don’t know if you remember the slow movement, but there is a long violin aria 
with the viola throbbing below, and I could feel John trying to keep time with it. The 
whole business struck me as forced, ridiculous. Somehow or other my remoteness 
communicated itself to John. ‘Empty your mind!’ he hissed at me. ‘Feel through the 
music!’ 
Well, there can be nothing more irritating than being told what you must feel. I 
turned away from him, and his little erotic experiment collapsed at once. (Coetzee, 
Summertime 68) 
 
John’s partner in this episode is Julia Frankl, a woman with whom he once had an intermittent affair 
and who is now relating to his biographer, Mr Vincent – some years later and somewhat defensively 
– the part that John played in her life. The passage is one of many in which she describes John’s 
sexual manner, and the picture that emerges is not flattering: “I found this new lover of mine bonier 
than my husband, and lighter. Doesn’t get enough to eat, I remember thinking” (Coetzee, 
Summertime 37); “In his lovemaking I now think there was an autistic quality” (52); “Two 
inscrutable automata having inscrutable commerce with each other’s bodies: that was how it felt to 
be in bed with John” (53). What emerges most strongly from her criticism of John’s erotic persona – 
a criticism that is shared, for the most part, by the other interviewees in the novel – is his failure to 
connect, or his failure to invest himself in the shared act of physical intimacy. It is as if he is not 






The image of John as an insubstantial lover is emphasized, in the passage above, by his attempt to 
evoke a state of passion through the introduction of an external medium, the medium of music. 
Music, in this instance, is not meant simply to set the mood (“Music is not about foreplay. It’s about 
courtship. You sing to the maiden before you go to bed with her, not while you are in bed with her,” 
complains Julia, Summertime 69); rather, it is supposed to encompass the act itself, to become the 
substance and the medium in which intensity of feeling is produced and sustained, even while it is 
playing itself out. When John commands Julia to “[e]mpty [her] mind” and to “[f]eel through the 
music,” he is urging precisely for her absence from their lovemaking, just as he, presumably, is 
trying to absent himself. What he wants, it appears, is for both of them to suspend their sense of 
personal involvement in what they are doing and to transform themselves into vessels of pure 
experience. John's role in his own little “erotic experiment” is thus somewhat ambivalent: he is the 
orchestrator of the event – the one who brings the music and doles out the commands – but he is 
also the instrument, the one whose body is required, in a purely functional sense, to invoke the spirit 
of the erotic. He supplies the paradigm as well as the material for the event, but he does not supply 
– or does not aim to supply – its meaning. Its meaning is supposed to come from somewhere else. 
Julia explains it thus: 
  
He wanted to prove something to me about the history of feeling, he said. Feelings had 
natural histories of their own. They came into being within time, flourished for a while 
or failed to flourish, then died or died out. The kinds of feeling that had flourished in 
Schubert’s day were by now, most of them, dead. The sole way left to us to re-
experience them was via the music of the times. Because music was the trace, the 
inscription, of feeling. 
Okay, I said, but why do we have to fuck while we listen to the music? 
Because the slow movement of the quintet happens to be about fucking, he replied. If, 




experienced glimmerings of something quite unusual: what it had felt like to make love 
in post-Bonaparte Austria. (Coetzee, Summertime 69) 
 
What this passage suggests about the nature of erotic experience is quite unusual – perhaps even 
more unusual than the solipsistic practice advocated by Gyula in Diary of a Bad Year. There are two 
things about it in particular that are worth drawing attention to, and that help us to get closer to the 
peculiar form of idealism that forms such an integral part, in its absence, of the erotic lives of 
Coetzee's protagonists. The first of these is the notion that there is a realm of feeling that does not 
depend for its existence on those who experience it. For a feeling to have a “natural history” of its 
own typifies that feeling as a species of being, one that has its own active part in a world beyond the 
subject who perceives it. Whereas Gyula brings himself to the heights of erotic ecstasy by capturing 
what he believes to be the other person's authentic core, John divests the experience of the erotic 
from its origin in the depths of another's being and apportions it instead to a nebulous realm of 
impersonal feeling. John insists, at the cost of himself and his lover, that there is a reality outside 
their own sense of what they are doing, a reality that is somehow more worthwhile than whatever 
sensations they might produce for themselves when they make love. He conceives of what is right 
in front of his nose – his lover, her person – chiefly as a means to participate in a larger order of 
feeling – a feeling with its own “natural history”, or its own essence. It is not quite a sensual reality 
John is after, then; nor is it the reality of the individual soul. Rather, we could say that John is 
operating under the auspices of a different order of ideal – the ideal of aligning his erotic experience 
with a reality that supersedes the sensual and exists beyond the individual's inner being, and that has 
left behind nothing but its “trace” in the music of Schubert. 
 
The second aspect of the passage I want to draw attention to here is the notion that it is music that 
gives access to the realm of feeling John is trying so earnestly to reach. Specifically, I would like to 
consider the implications of his claim that music is capable of bearing the “inscription” of feeling. 




question of the erotic, and those concerns which may be said to influence Coetzee's work in a more 
pervasive sense - concerns which have to do with the meaning and value of artistic representation. 
Music, here, ties together the preoccupation with the real (“the real real thing”, Coetzee, Diary of a 
Bad Year 179) that underscores the erotic experience of Coetzee's protagonists, and the question that 
a book like Summertime raises about the fidelity of what is being represented to a reality beyond the 
narrative itself. When John asserts that the “sole way left to us to re-experience [the kinds of feeling 
that had flourished in Schubert's day] was via the music of the times” (Coetzee, Summertime 69), he 
is making a claim for the authenticity of the feelings evoked by that music: he is saying, in short, 
that his own experience is akin to the experience as it existed in its original form, and that gave rise 
to the music in the first place. 
 
However, if we look closely at the way in which John describes that original feeling – the feeling he 
hopes to reproduce for himself by sublimating his erotic being to Schubert – we notice that he 
qualifies it in certain important and revealing ways. Notably, he alerts us to the historical dimension 
of what he is trying to achieve: “He wanted to prove to me something about the history of feeling,” 
says Julia (Coetzee, Summertime 69, my emphasis). The kind of feeling John is aiming for here – 
the “glimmerings” he wants them both to experience – is something that comes into being “within 
time”, that exists only “for a while” and then “die[s] out” (69). To this mercurial symbiosis between 
a feeling and its historical setting, he gives some gravity by specifying, quite meticulously, the 
particular period he has in mind: “post-Bonaparte Austria” (69). If we set aside for a moment the 
ineptitude of John's lofty ideals here, and we take what he says at face value, we can discern 
something about the conception of history that underlies his peculiar theory of feeling, and that 
plays an important part in the way in which Coetzee sets up the conflict between the idealism that 
characterizes the inner lives of his protagonists, and the historical necessities against which those 





What strikes the reader immediately is that John’s description of the time in which Schubert 
composed his music is not conceived in strictly chronological terms. He does not say, for example, 
that by opening themselves to the music he and Julia would have experienced “what it had felt like 
to make love in early eighteenth century Austria,” or something to that effect. Nor does he refer to 
Europe in generic terms: it is Austria in particular he speaks of, an Austria that is defined quite 
narrowly by its existence in the aftermath of Napoleon's defeat. The way in which he describes the 
period from which the feeling he is after emerges reveals a conception of history that is strongly 
inflected by an awareness of the larger socio-political upheavals that define the narratives of place. 
The emphasis, in other words, is on the way in which epoch-defining structures of power (“post-
Bonaparte”) influence the historical context from which those feelings that constitute the reality of 
lived experience emerge. What this implies is that the authenticity of a feeling – the measure of its 
connection to reality – is somehow associated with the various historical power relations that give 
definition to the peculiar time and place in which that feeling originates. When John claims that he 
is able, through music, to “re-experience” a feeling, it is thus not quite a transcendent order of 
experience – it is not an emotional high pulled down from the aether through the pure aesthetics of 
tonal harmony – but is, rather, a continuity of the complex relationship that exists between 
individual feeling and the historical realities that give shape to that feeling. For John the reality of 
an emotional experience does not reside in its capacity to overwhelm the senses, or in its ability to 
elicit an intensity or ecstasy of feeling in one's private being (as it does for Gyula), but derives 
rather from the scope it affords for a sense of the relation between what one feels and the world in 
which that feeling comes to life. 
 
3. The Seduction of Music 
 
The notion of history that I am describing here – or, more precisely, the notion that the reality of a 




develops in his essay, “What is a Classic? A Lecture.”
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 In it he sets out to investigate, first through 
a consideration of T.S. Eliot's definition of the classic and then through an account of the historical 
reception of the music of Johann Sebastian Bach, what it might mean to claim that one has been 
spoken to, “across the ages”, by the classic (Coetzee, “What is a Classic? A Lecture” 10). At the 
heart of his investigation lies what can only be described as an autobiographical moment: the 
teenaged Coetzee, bored and housebound on a summer afternoon, hears the music of Bach (Well-
Tempered Clavier) drifting over from the student residence next door; he is transfixed; for as long as 
the music lasts, he is “frozen”, he “dare[s] not breathe” (9). That incidental contact with the classic, 
says Coetzee, was for him a “moment of revelation” and of the “greatest significance in [his] life” 
(10). 
 
It is against the background of this moment that Coetzee sets out to answer the question of what it 
might mean to be spoken to by the classic. From his critical assessment of Eliot, he draws two 
contrasting notions of the influence the classic has on our lives. The first of these (the 
“transcendental-poetic”, Coetzee, “What is a Classic? A Lecture” 9) takes seriously the claim that to 
come into contact with the classic is a kind of transcendental experience, a sublime moment that 
gives access to an Eliotic “transpersonal order” and that becomes the mythical point of origin for a 
subsequent artistic vocation. The second, opposing notion conceives of the classic in “socio-
cultural” terms (9). According to this notion, Coetzee's moment of transfixion when he heard Bach 
for the first time was actually a recognition of “high European culture” – and an unconscious 
decision to master “the codes of that culture” – as a way out of the “historical dead end” presented 
to him by his situation as a young white male in South Africa in the 1950s (11). “In other words,” 
asks Coetzee, “was the experience what I understood it to be – a disinterested and in a sense an 
impersonal aesthetic experience – or was it really the masked expression of a material interest?” 
(11). The question Coetzee asks himself becomes a question of how the classic obtains its meaning: 
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does it have an essential, substantive meaning that transcends the vagaries of circumstance, or does 
it draw meaning to itself based on what it stands for within a given socio-historical situation? 
 
The answer, it turns out, is neither, or not quite either. Instead, by way of a historical account of the 
survival of Bach's music through the generations – a survival that requires the rigorous “day-by-day 
testing” afforded by the traditions of musical apprenticeship – Coetzee makes the deceptively 
simple point that the classic is that which “emerges intact” from the passage of history, or that 
which exists because “generations of people cannot afford to let go of it and hold on to it at all 
costs” (“What is a Classic? A Lecture” 19). It is a deceptive answer because it does not resolve the 
opposition Coetzee has sketched for us between the two contrasting notions of the classic, namely 
the “transcendental-poetic” and the “socio-cultural”. By defining the classic as that which survives, 
he seems rather to be describing a situation in which the meaning of the classic emerges from the 
friction between the two: 
 
So we arrive at a certain paradox. The classic defines itself by surviving. Therefore the 
interrogation of the classic, no matter how hostile, is part of the history of the classic, 
inevitable and even to be welcomed. For as long as the classic needs to be protected 
from attack, it can never prove itself classic. (Coetzee, “What is a Classic? A Lecture” 
19, my emphasis) 
 
“[S]urviving”, “interrogation”, “hostile”, “protected from attack”: evidently Coetzee conceives of 
the space from which the meaning of the classic emerges – a space that is drawn between the 
pressures of historical materialism, on the one hand, and the insistence of transcendent value, on the 
other – as a space of unrelenting conflict. For him there is no easy resolution in the matter of the 
classic, no synthesis between that which we assume to be valuable and the assault on that value by 
the world of current affairs. To experience such a classic would not mean to reach through history in 




the classic as a site that bears the traces of the conflict that has shaped it into what it is today. What 
Coetzee is suggesting, I think, is that the value of the classic derives from how much it has been 
able to absorb of its passage through history without losing the ability to communicate those 
patterns of association that give it its distinct aesthetic being. The classic conceived in this way 
becomes a kind of event, one that is characterized chiefly by its struggle to retain a voice in which it 
may speak its own struggle. 
 
It is revealing that Coetzee uses an autobiographical moment to give voice to his argument 
concerning the value of the classic. By using the figure of himself and his own experience as a 
mooring point for his discussion, he seems to be implying that the self – or, properly speaking, the 
subject-in-writing – is involved somehow in sustaining the state of conflict that he has put forward 
as the condition of existence for the classic. The significance of such an involvement is twofold. In 
the first place, it suggests that the self may be thought of as a figure or entity in which the 
experience of conflict between socio-cultural and transcendent values becomes palpable. When 
Coetzee speaks about his younger self “mooning around” in the backyard and then being struck 
dumb all of a sudden by the music of Bach (“What is a Classic? A Lecture” 9), he is not merely 
presenting that self as a passive recipient of an external value. What he is doing can be understood 
rather as a kind of marking, or staking out of a terrain in which historical concerns and the idea of 
transcendent value have a kind of simultaneous, discordant existence. The self being represented 
here thus becomes a sort of terrain or terraneous condition for the textured conflict that gives rise to 
artistic meaning. 
 
The second implication of Coetzee's use of an autobiographical figure in his essay is related to the 
first, but it is also quite different in that it requires a shift in perspective. Let us say that the value of 
a work of art derives from the sort of productive antagonism between two different orders of 




to be possible, and for his argument to have a measure of sense outside the purely rhetorical, it is 
necessary to imagine or to present to ourselves in our minds a point of intersection where these two 
forces coincide. It is necessary, in other words, to make some room for their fraught and evidently 
hostile interaction to occur. The name that is given to this intersection, or to the space in which 
these two opposing orders of meaning coincide, is John. The shift in perspective occurs when we 
think of the autobiographical subject, John, not as a pre-existing condition for the relations between 
the two to occur, but rather as a product of their confrontation. The self that is thus imagined is very 
much a figure that comes into being or originates at the crosshatching of the “transcendental-poetic” 
and the “socio-cultural”. 
 
The autobiographical subject itself thus begins to acquire something of the paradoxical charge that 
Coetzee has been describing for the classic. Or, to put it differently, the pattern that Coetzee creates 
for the classic in his essay – the interrogation of a timeless, transcendent ideal of value by the 
uncompromising forces of socio-historical process, and the actual classic as that which results from 
this process of interrogation – is similar in kind to the pattern of antagonism I mentioned in the 
opening part of this conclusion as a kind of personal signature in his work, namely the constant 
testing of intimations of pure feeling against the scrutiny of a rigorous analytical intelligence. 
 
That this pattern is a defining feature of Coetzee's approach to the practice of writing, and more 
explicitly that his approach to writing provides an approximation of the sense of self that resides in 
his autobiographical fiction, can be seen in one of the early passages in Youth. Shortly after John has 
become embroiled in the first of a series of ill-fated love affairs, he comes home to his flat one day 
to discover that the lover in question, Jacqueline, has been reading his diary. Jacqueline is by no 
means impressed with what she finds written there (and, if the preceding passages are any 
indication of what John has told his diary about her, she has good reason not to be), so she packs her 




what is at stake in writing more generally: 
 
The question of what should be permitted to go into his diary and what kept forever 
shrouded goes to the heart of all his writing. If he is to censor himself from expressing 
ignoble emotions … how will those emotions ever be transfigured and turned into 
poetry? … Besides, who is to say that the feelings he writes in his diary are his true 
feelings? Who is to say that at each moment while the pen moves he is truly himself? At 
one moment he might be truly himself, at another he might simply be making things up. 
How can he know for sure? Why should he even want to know for sure? (Coetzee, 
Youth 10) 
 
This passage, with its implicit critique of the confessional impulse, and its questions about the 
relationship between the true self and the “truth” of that which is written, contains in kernel form 
Coetzee's assessment of the problems surrounding the mode of self-expression in Rousseau's 
Confessions, as discussed in the first chapter (see especially section 2.1 “Coetzee and the Question 
of the Self”). And then it goes even further, as Carrol Clarkson notes, by setting up, linguistically, 
“the sense of a dynamic dialogic interface between writing and written selves” (Countervoices 39), 
thereby allowing the process of interrogation itself to be interrogated while it is taking place. John's 
rumination leaps in no time at all from the basic question, namely which parts of himself should be 
kept out of his writing (writing as censorship), to the more pressing question, namely how he might 
know whether anything he writes emerges from his true self (writing as self-interrogation). It is this 
basic drive to question his own motives – an intense desire to get to the truth that is matched by an 
equally intense scrutiny of anything that presumes to speak in the name of truth – that forms the 








4. Reality Check: The Childhood of Jesus 
 
At the end of the first chapter (“The Subject of Confession”), I argued that we are able to sense a 
shift in register in Coetzee's more recent work: a reflection, from within the aesthetic paradigm of 
his fiction, that resembles the moves of atonement we discern in the tradition of confessional 
writing, or a kind of negotiation of the legacy of the self that emerges from “the massive 
autobiographical writing-enterprise that fills a life, this enterprise of self-construction” (Coetzee, 
Doubling the Point 17).
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 In the light of these observations, it seems fitting to conclude my thesis by 
considering what we may perhaps call the afterlife (now that John Coetzee has been killed off by 
his author in Summertime) of the dynamic tension in Coetzee's writing between the desire for a 
transcendent, subjective truth, and the realization that the experience of truth is always and 
incontrovertibly conditioned by the socio-historical context in which it arrives. I turn my attention, 
then, to Coetzee's most recent book, The Childhood of Jesus. It is a novel that can be read as a 
retrospective affirmation of the abiding importance in Coetzee's aesthetic sensibility of the conflict 
between the ideal of transcendence and the awareness of the mediated nature of reality. In order to 
understand the import of the novel, it is necessary to turn back the clock a few decades, to consider 
Coetzee's statements on what it meant to him to be writing from the historical moment of apartheid 
South Africa. 
 
In 1987, a time that corresponds with the genesis of Age of Iron, Coetzee received the Jerusalem 
Prize for fiction – a prize that is awarded biannually to “a writer whose work best expresses and 
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 Most recently, in an essay on the Australian author Patrick White (“Patrick White: Within a Budding Grove,” 
published in the New York Review of Books in November 2013), Coetzee devotes a number of paragraphs to the 
question of how a writer should go about ensuring that his papers are destroyed after his death (“The best answer 
seems to be: do the job yourself”), before describing a recently published, unfinished work by White (The Hanging 
Garden) in which the driving force behind one of the principal characters, Eirene Sklavos, appears to be a quest for 
transcendence. She is, in Coetzee's estimation, one of “White's elect”: “outsiders mocked by society yet doggedly 
occupied in their private quests for transcendence, or as White more often calls it, the truth” (Coetzee, “Within a 
Budding Grove”). Suffice to say that the tension between a private salvation, sought for in artistic form, and the 
implacable process of history appears to be as much an animating force in Coetzee's literary sensibility today as it 




promotes the idea of the 'freedom of the individual in society'” (“The Jerusalem Prize”). It was a 
time, as I mentioned in the previous chapter (“Politics, Voice and the Self”) of great political 
turmoil in South Africa. One year previously, in an attempt to bring to heel the surge of 
revolutionary unrest that was sweeping through the country, P.W. Botha had declared a nationwide 
state of emergency, a move that gave the apartheid government “well-neigh unlimited” powers of 
intervention, and that made itself manifest in all the usual instruments of authoritarian control: 
violent suppression of protests, indefinite detention of suspected activists, secret death camps where 
agents of the state could go about the business of torture at their leisure (Kannemeyer, J.M. Coetzee: 
A Life in Writing 375-376). Coetzee's acceptance speech for the Jerusalem Prize makes no bones 
about the devastating effects of these conditions (and of the heritage of colonialism that lies behind 
them) on the psyche of the writer. South African literature, he writes, “is a less than fully human 
literature, unnaturally preoccupied with power and the torsions of power, unable to move from 
elementary relations of contestation, domination and subjugation to the vast and complex human 
world that lies beyond them” (Coetzee, Doubling the Point 98).
 
Coetzee laments the invasive and, 
in his view, spiritually deforming realities of the South African situation and expresses a desire to 
follow in the footsteps of his contemporary Milan Kundera instead, who won the prize two years 
previously and who spoke, in his address, of Don Quixote, praising the novel (and the origins of the 
novel form) as an alternative to the grimly causal logic of history (a logic from which systems of 
retribution and reprise are the inevitable outflow): 
 
How I would like to be able to join him in that tribute, I and so many of my fellow 
novelists from South Africa! How we long to quit a world of pathological attachments 
and abstract forces, of anger and violence, and take up residence in a world where a 
living play of feelings and ideas is possible, a world where we truly have an occupation. 
(Coetzee, Doubling the Point 98)
  
 




latest novel, situates the pantomimic adventures of the self-appointed knight from La Mancha as a 
kind of Ur-text, and is about as far removed from the violent struggle and psychic perversions of 
apartheid politics as it is possible to get. Two refugees from an unspecified past, a middle-aged man 
named Simón and a young boy named David, arrive in the strangely out-of-sync, Spanish-speaking 
city of Novilla, where they attempt to settle into a new life. Apart from a few minor bureaucratic 
setbacks (“The answer is no. I am not going to give in, so don't press me… this is not the correct 
way to proceed,” says Ana, who receives them at the relocation centre, Coetzee, The Childhood of 
Jesus 19), things proceed quite smoothly for them. Simón obtains a job as a stevedore at the river 
docks, and within a few weeks they have been granted an apartment in the East Village, a 
comparatively desirable part of town (51). The food in Novilla is bland and lacking in variety – 
mostly they eat bread – and Simón soon discovers that his fellow citizens are unnervingly 
disinterested in sex, but these matters are less pressing to him than his primary quest, which is to 
find David's mother. Despite having no knowledge of her or what she looks like, says Simón, he or 
the boy (or both of them) will recognize her at once when they see her (19). Soon enough he does 
find someone who consents to being the boy's mother: a rather unsympathetically drawn character 
name Inés, who takes the boy as her own only to coddle him and keep him away from Simón, who 
relinquishes all claim to the boy once he has found him a mother. 
 
The Childhood of Jesus is very strange book. About their previous lives Simón and David retain no 
memory at all – their names were assigned to them upon arrival, and they had to spend six weeks in 
a transit camp learning Spanish – and there is a strong sense throughout the novel that they have 
passed into a kind of limbo – a vaguely defined, protean space in which everyone appears to have 
come from somewhere else, and in which it is only a matter of time before one’s memories – along 
with one’s appetitive desires – vanish completely. If it is an allegory, as Joyce Carol Oates remarks 
in her review of the book, then it is an allegory without a clearly defined correlative in the field of 




famously defined a kind of sliding scale for allegory, or a continuum according to which literary 
works occupy a spot on a line somewhere between the “naive”, in which the didactic import of the 
work is manifestly evident, and the “elusive”, or “paradoxical”, in which the writing employs a 
variety of techniques to disrupt the easy association between the so-called literal and descriptive 
aspects of symbolic language (Frye, Anatomy of Criticism 89-92). 
 
One way of reading Coetzee's novel – and it is the reading I follow here – is to say that it tries to 
situate itself in a space that is somewhere beyond Frye's allegorical continuum, in the sense that its 
denotative field – that which would correspond to the implicit, real-world situation for which an 
allegory is supposed to be the symbolic representation – appears to be the field of symbolic 
representation itself. The way in which this relationship makes itself felt in the writing is in the 
matter-of-fact appearance of a number of strangely jarring pronouncements relating to the epistemic 
substructure of the narrative universe in which the story unfolds: ruptures in the language of the 
story that offer glimpses of a world beneath it that is not the same as our own. A striking example is 
when Simón takes out a children's copy of Don Quixote from the library in order to teach David 
how to read. The boy asks him who wrote it, and he states quite simply that its author is a man 
named Benengeli (Coetzee, The Childhood of Jesus 154), who is in fact the mythical author created 
by the real-world Cervantes as the supposed chronicler of Quixote's adventures (Cervantes, Don 
Quixote 65-70). The limbo in which Simón and David find themselves is thus not quite the same 
limbo to which you and I might proceed when we depart from this life, but is rather a kind of limbo 
for fictional beings: a heaven that has as its earth the speculative realm of allegorical allusion and 
fictional play that exists in our world as the symbolic realm of literary language. Another way of 
saying the same thing is that we seem to have entered, so to speak, the world that lies beyond the 
gate that appears in the final chapter of Elizabeth Costello. 
 




universal key that will unlock all the closed doors in the novel (The Childhood of Jesus 4), it does 
indeed seem as if some of the more perplexing non sequiturs in the book begin to unravel 
themselves if we consider the novel as a sustained experiment in writing a story from a position that 
situates the realm of symbolic or allegorical play as its concrete field of reference, or as its real-
world analogy. Likewise, such a reading of the book provides a useful point of entry for making 
sense of those of its features that might otherwise strike the reader as rather wilfully obtuse, or 
deliberately naive. I have in mind here, as an example, a passage that occurs quite early on in the 
novel, in the second chapter, when Simón has to prove his mettle in order to get a job as a 
stevedore. What the work entails is the menial task of carrying heavy bags of grain from the hold of 
the ship, up a short ladder, across a gangplank and onto a horse-drawn cart parked on the wharf. The 
passage in which Simón tries to do this for the first time can be read in many ways; one way is to 
say that it comes across as a deliberately oversimplified example in an imaginary handbook for 
first-time fiction writers. Rule number one is that the protagonist must have an obstacle to 
overcome. And thus, we read: 
 
Perched on top of the heap is a big fellow with brawny forearms and a wide grin whose 
job it evidently is to drop a sack onto the shoulders of the stevedore waiting in line. He 
turns his back, the sack descends; he staggers, then grips the corners as he sees the other 
men do, takes a first step, a second. Is he really going to be able to climb the ladder 
bearing this heavy weight, as the other men are doing? Does he have it in him? 
“Steady, viejo,” says a voice behind him. “Take your time.” (Coetzee, The Childhood of 
Jesus 12) 
 
The banality of the situation is magnified when we discover, later on in the book, that the stevedores 
are actually a fraternity of sorts who esteem their labour according to a variety of philosophical 
Stoicism,
80
 one that derives, in all probability, from the evening classes in philosophy which they 
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 “So you would like to liberate us from a life of bestial labour. You want us to quit the wharves and find some other 
kind of work, where we would no longer be able to hoist a load onto our shoulders, feeling the ears of grain in the 




earnestly attend at a centre for self-improvement called the Institute, and where they discuss such 
things as chairs and tables, and the ideal types of chairs and tables (Coetzee, The Childhood of Jesus 
120). The brief how-to section demonstrating the workings of dramatic tension that I just mentioned 
is deflated even further when we realize that the larger purpose behind the work has more to do with 
the philosophical self-actualization of the brotherhood of stevedores than with anything as 
pressingly actual as supplying the community with food. 
 
The sense one has, in other words, is that there is something lacklustre about the source of dramatic 
tension in the book. In the example I just gave, there is a kind of bare-bones feeling to the episode, 
as if it is the remnant or wreckage or phantom of a more full-blooded dramatic scene, and this lack 
is compounded by the aura of philosophical complacency that hangs over the city of Novilla. If an 
allegory is an attempt to recreate, in however simple (“naive”) or complex (“elusive” or 
“paradoxical”) a form, a relationship between the elements of some substructure of “historical 
events” or “moral precepts” according to the symbolic codes of another, literary form (Frye, 
Anatomy of Criticism 90), then we seem to have to do, in The Childhood of Jesus, with a 
representational structure that attempts to recreate (or struggles to recreate) the elements that are 
involved in the form of allegorical representation itself. And in the same way that an allegory of the 
“elusive” or “paradoxical” variety at the far end of Northrop Frye's scale – say, for example, T.S. 
Eliot's The Waste Land – appears to sacrifice its structural integrity by self-consciously divorcing 
itself from the field of the actual – or by disrupting the easy association between the literal and 
descriptive aspects of its language – so, too, Coetzee's novel appears to be sacrificing something of 
its cohesive force by divorcing itself (or insulating itself) from the rhetorical techniques embedded 
in the mode of the allegorical. If The Waste Land can be read as a metaphor for the disassociation 
between the field of the symbolic and the field of the actual, we might read The Childhood of Jesus 
as a kind of extended metaphor for the disassociation between the continuity of a narrative and the 
                                                                                                                                                                  





substructure of allegory that gives it its pulse. 
 
Which brings us, finally, to the boy, David, and to the recurring suggestion in the novel that he is 
“gifted” in some way. The most obvious hint of what this “gift” might entail occurs when Simón is 
trying to convince the boy that there is no such thing as a private language: 
 
He looks into the boy's eyes. For the briefest of moments he sees something there. He 
has no name for it. It is like – that is what occurs to him in the moment. Like a fish that 
wriggles loose as you try to grasp it. But not like a fish – no, like like a fish. Or like like 
like a fish. On and on. Then the moment is over, and he is simply standing in silence, 
staring. (Coetzee, The Childhood of Jesus 186) 
 
If we take seriously the titular conceit that the child in the novel is supposed to have some kind of 
redemptive promise or feature, then we might identify this feature precisely as the metaphorical or 
allegorizing spark that is absent from the weirdly dissonant composition of the narrative. That is to 
say, what Simón sees in the eyes of the boy appears to be a kind of essence of metaphor (“like like 
like a fish”), or the relational aspect of metaphor concretized into a discrete quality or essence. What 
the citizens of this limbo need in order to solve the predicament of their bloodless existence, is to 
re-establish the imaginative leap of faith – or, to return to the language of our imaginary handbook 
for fiction writing, we might call the “imaginative leap of faith” a “suspension of disbelief” – that 
connects the disparate elements of their world to the allegorical realm from which they have 
departed. Allegory, in this sense, and all the various ambivalences, or relational difficulties, or 
opportunities for play that it entails between the field of the symbolic and the field of the actual, 
becomes, in Coetzee's latest novel, the kind of Ur-myth, or the genesis to which he is trying to 
return. 
 




transcendent form (Plato, Republic §506d-e). What he is able to do in its place, he tells his 
interlocutors, is “to talk about something which seems to [him] to be the child of goodness and to 
bear a very strong resemblance to it” (§506e). He goes on to present the famous allegory of the 
cave, in which the tangible realm of human affairs is represented as a shadowy place of darkness (or 
a “prison cell,” §517b) where humans are bound in chains, spending their lives looking at 
reflections on a wall. Outside the cave is the true “realm of knowledge”, where one might perceive 
the sun, which is analogous to goodness itself, the very “source and provider of truth and 
knowledge” (§517c). For the chosen one to whom it is given to escape his bonds and venture 
upwards into the domain of the sun, the transcendent realm of truth is a blindingly magnificent 
place: 
 
He wouldn't be able to see things up on the surface of the earth, I suppose, until he'd got 
used to his situation. At first, it would be shadows that he could most easily make out, 
then he'd move on to the reflections of people and so on in water, and later he'd be able 
to see the actual things themselves. Next, he'd feast his eyes on the heavenly bodies and 
the heavens themselves, which would be easier at night: he'd look at the light of the 
stars and the moon, rather than at the sun and sunlight during the daytime... 
And at last, I imagine, he'd be able to discern and feast his eyes on the sun – not the 
displaced image of the sun in water or elsewhere, but the sun on its own, in its proper 
place. (Plato Republic §516a-b) 
 
For Coetzee, it seems, the logic is reversed: the proper locus of reality is the realm of literary 
representation itself, with all the difficult negotiations between the desire for transcendence and the 
unsparing interrogation at the hand of history that it entails. And the world beyond the allegory, if 
Childhood of Jesus is anything to go by, is at best a kind of limbo: a place, as Coetzee writes 




turn out to be uncomplicated, even banal” (“Homage” 7). The thought holds equally true for the 
idea of the self in Coetzee’s autobiographical fiction. If we were to attempt to separate that self from 
the aesthetic paradigm that gives shape and texture to its experience – the murky terrain of self-
questioning and doubt, half-expressed feelings of compromised desire, the unrelenting pressures of 
a demanding socio-historical milieu – and that is, perhaps, the closest thing we have to an authentic 
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